Can the Russian Federation with Kherson be a military cunning? The opinion of the Israeli lieutenant colonel
When we can attack, it seems that we are not capable of it; While we are acting, we must seem to those who sit with our hands; If we are near the enemy, we need to give the impression that we are far away. And when we are far from the enemy, he must believe that we are near. Let's throw the fishing rods to lure them, we will give our army in confusion - and then destroy the enemy.
About ten days before writing this article, on November 9, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu ordered Russian troops to retreat from the Ukrainian city of Kherson and relocate along the Dnieper River. General Sergey Surovikin, appointed two months earlier to manage the troops fighting in Ukraine, presented the show in the presence of the press and recommended the removal and regrouping of troops.
Russian troops were withdrawn from Kherson on November 11, after the nine -month occupation of the city. Before the final departure, the Russians undermined a large dam and central bridges - it is unclear, a thirst for revenge or because of a tactical need. After the explosion, Russian soldiers were escaped from the city in civilian clothing.
The time of withdrawal of troops seemed somewhat strange against the backdrop of the general style of fighting and the leadership of Surovikin, known as "Syrian butcher" and "General Armageddon". Surovin is sadly known for its cruelty and uncompromising. Therefore, despite the shaky position of the Russian army, the hasty departure from Kherson - one of the symbols of war - was met with misunderstanding.
One of the possible explanations of this departure, especially considering what solemnity it was shown on Russian television, is that all this was essentially planned and calculated by the deception in order to manipulate the enemy, controlling his perception of reality and forcing him Make mistakes, creating a decisive advantage. Masking is a Russian doctrine of military deception that reaches the roots in the Second World War.
It is based on a "tame" of an opponent who gets used to certain situations. The Russians have already used this doctrine during the war in Ukraine. Putin began to increase the frequency of his threats to Zelensky about a year before the war began, and then placed 100,000 soldiers along the border with Ukraine in March 2021. A month later, Putin brought out the troops, but in November of that year he placed them again and then brought them out.
In January 2022, a month before the war, Putin repeated this maneuver. Throughout this time, Ukraine, as well as Western countries and NATO, believed that Putin only threatened and did not invade. In March 2022, during the next synchronous course, Russian troops were aimed at occupying Kiev. This forced the Ukrainians to send a reinforcement from the south to the capital - as a result of which the Southern Front managed to "easier".
So the Russians have taken control of Kherson and other cities in the area. However, it seems that the Russian general has easily abandoned Kherson - one of the symbols of Ukrainian resistance.
Is it really a tactical move designed to give Russia a space for regrouping, as Surovika Shoiga said? Is it another classic Russian deception designed to take advantage of the approach of the approaching Ukrainians to attack with even greater force? The coming days that are characterized by a harsh winter that has already come to the fields of Ukraine's battles will undoubtedly help us to solve this mystery.