With Putin-as with Hitler: Why 2025 in Europe risks repeating the fatal 1938
The event has already weakened its position in the negotiations, withdrawing the issue of Ukraine's immediate access to NATO. What happens if Putin recovers his attack in one year, three or five years? The conference participants in London Chatham House were constantly returning to the idea that Europe was experiencing 1938. On the one hand, such a comparison is quite appropriate.
When, in September of that year, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew to Munich and sold some Czechoslovakia in exchange for "Peace in our time", the moment when most of Europe believed that it could avoid war with Germany. This delusion lasted only six months. Any agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in 2025 will probably have similar characteristics: land for temporary peace.
But Putin's ambitions will not change, although he may take three or more years to restore the army before he goes to the west. The west seems to be lazy consensus based more on hope than a serious analysis that Putin will agree to stop his further invasion of Ukraine. Despite the mass sacrifices and the loss of a huge amount of equipment (and the opposite situation in Syria), it may prefer to continue the war.
In the last few months, the Russians are gradually moving in the Donbass, and the scale of problems with people in Ukraine has become increasingly obvious. Ukraine needs peace (or even pauses) much more than Russia. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is under more domestic political pressure than Putin. In fact, the main motive for Putin, which agrees to the truce or pause, would be the desire to give Trump a result that he could sound at home as a success.
After a period of relative peace, Putin may well calculate that Trump will interfere evenly when the war begins again (and it will undoubtedly begin). Trump has a bad track list of peacekeeping. His Dohian Taliban Agreement (behind the back of the Afghan government) was the same as a talentless diplomatic act as any other in history, and his talks with North Korea was not led to the conclusion of a denuclearization agreement.
Asymmetry has already emerged in negotiating positions for any predictable negotiation with Putin. Even before the NATO negotiations, NATO negotiations are deducted from the agenda. Yes, it is already widely acknowledged that Putin can preserve Crimea, de facto, if not de jure. It is considered itself clear that Ukraine will have to leave the Kursk speech. And for sure Ukraine will not be given membership in NATO.
Joe Biden has made it clear from the outset, and Trump is likely to hold the same thought. Hungary and Slovakia (and perhaps Austria) will also resist any such idea. In private conversations, British diplomats recognize that Putin is unlikely to agree to court or reparations. Therefore, contrary to the basic principles of diplomacy, the event will negotiate with minimal requirements. Putin is likely to put forward maximalist positions; For example, he will probably require all four areas entirely.
He wants to keep control over the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. It will require NATO countries not to place troops in Ukraine and to respect Russia's interests in the field of security. What will Ukraine remain with? After the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, it would be reasonable for Ukraine not to accept any "assurance" or even "guarantees". It has been suggested that the United States could be proposed to place European troops along the border between Ukraine and Russia to serve as a barrier.
But the length of the border is more than 1200 miles, and this will require a huge number of troops at a time when the UK is difficult to even keep your contingent in Estonia. In addition, Kiev can be forgiven about what these European countries will do if Russia crosses a new ceasefire line. Will German, French or British troops open fire, will they simply nominate like the UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon? One big difference in 1938 is that the United Kingdom is no longer a military state.
Under the former Defense Minister Ben Wallace, the United Kingdom provided a large part of her reserves to Ukraine, but could not reorganize her at home. One high -ranking NATO official recently told me that the United Kingdom is now considered one of NATO's weakest military participants.
Poland and Finland are now two of the most striking military states that oppose Russia, with the support of the Baltic and Sweden countries (the latter has also achieved significant success in ensuring internal stability). France still retains serious potential, but the military development of Germany, promised by Chancellor Olaf Scholts, has evaporated quietly. This can also be compared to 1938, but with one serious difference.
In the 1934 budget, Britain decided to double the number of her Air Force from 42 to 84 squadron. This solution, known as scheme A, then with regular intervals, changed new extension schemes until the scheme of M. was all surprised at the end of 1938 when they learn that the Treasury Chancellor, which approved the scheme A, was none other than Neville Chamberlain.
Thus, the great political tide of 1938 was the same man who contributed to the fact that the royal Air Force was preparing to defeat Luftwaffe in 1940. And here is another similarity in 1938 that the Trump administration does not want to go to war in Europe or Europe. Indeed, Europe should be satisfied if it was able to keep the US in NATO and had to send Trump a signal that it would now take on the main financial burden of war.
However, Europe seems to sincerely want to go to internal economic casualties for the protection of Ukraine. It's desperately short -sighted. If Russian troops either violate the ceasefire or continue to move to Odessa, Moldova, the Dnieper and Kiev, what will Europe then do? Of course, the best result would be a well -agreed peace agreement. Russia suffered enormous losses and would not impose North Korean troops if it was not in despair.