No one is ready for compromise. Reflections on the year of the war in Ukraine
"Well, went!" In such words, my team met at the Royal Institute of Joint Services on February 22, 2022 that Putin signed the recognition of Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics, and additional Russian forces were floating in Eastern Ukraine. From the end of November, when it became clear that Russia would start a full -scale invasion, I worked with a comprehensive sense of horror.
I constantly mentioned the feeling of 2014, when the Islamic state seized Mosul by shooting hundreds of peaceful Iraqi in ditches, or the break of the Salech Alliance with Hussites in Yemen, when the raids and my friends disappeared. I knew that he was followed by something just as horrible, but much larger. Focus translated Jack Wotling's article about the Russian Federation against Ukraine and further events in the battlefields.
Returning from Ukraine the day before, Nick Reynolds and we were not sure of how the events would develop. On the one hand, none of us believed that the Russians have enough strength to seize and control the cities of Ukraine in the face of a motivated folk resistance. We expected protracted, bloody battles.
At the same time, during the last meeting in Kiev, the Ukrainian General assured us that "with probability seventy percent [nothing] will happen, thirty percent - that there will be some escalation in the Donbass. " None of us was convinced that the Ukrainian government has forces capable of blocking the main directions of the offensive to Kiev, at the same time we both awaited blows on ammunition and railway infrastructure of Ukraine to weaken the resistance of its regular army.
As it turned out, the events happened better than we hoped. Russia did not aim at logistics infrastructure and preferred air defense, not Ukrainian reserves. Moreover, she could not instruct and prepare her troops. Three vital days of confusion allowed Ukraine to relocate their strength and prevent the environment of Kiev. By the time we returned to Ukraine in April, the defeat of Russia seemed possible. However, it is much more difficult to ensure Ukraine's victory.
It will depend on the significant expansion of Western support and unchanged incompetence of the Russian military. Today it is still yes. Indeed, in the nine years of Russia's war against Ukraine, we have not approached a clear vision of what it end. Russia's failures have created an opportunity for Western allies of Ukraine to end the war on favorable conditions. Now they need a coordinated military and diplomatic strategy to do so.
The support was received on time because the Russian military failed to realize their potential. It is extremely important that Moscow was unable to start mobilization in May 2022. The strikes of long -range artillery destroyed Russia's logistics, and Ukraine managed to carry out two successful offensive operations, reflecting Kherson and Kharkiv by the beginning of winter.
Today, the Russian armed forces are on the verge of their capabilities: they are poorly trained and poorly coordinated units with a decrease in the decrease. But, as it is always in the war, the weakness of the enemy is only important if you have the opportunity to use it in your interests. Russia's last offensive was in a hurry, and it turned out to be too few troops to make serious breakthroughs. About seven storm brigades remained in Lugansk and about four in the south.
The direct question of tactics that will dictate the course of the conflict by the end of the year is whether Russia will be able to force Ukraine to use reserves to reflect its attacks. If this is done, it can negate Ukraine's ability to start offensive. The mobilization of Russia and recently built defense structures mean that the Ukrainian offensive maneuver should begin with a purposeful breakthrough. Thus, Ukraine needs reserve units to develop success.
If Ukraine fails to go on the offensive, then Russia will most likely continue to strengthen its defensive positions, and this will create conditions for a prolonged conflict. If the Russian defense industry consolidates production or if China begins to replenish Russian equipment, then new large combat units may appear during the year. However, there is also a more favorable scenario.
If Russia spends its reserves on complex attacks, as under a coal, and Ukraine will not be forced to use its reserves, Kiev will be able to start offensive operations and increase the pace of liberation of the occupied territories. In the presence of stable channels of training of personnel and formations in Europe and supplying kits for battalions, Ukraine could continue to create additional reserves for the development of its success.
International partners of Ukraine will largely determine which script will be most likely. Throughout the war, the expectations of politicians fluctuated between catastrophism and euphoria. This created a problem for analysts, who were tasked with giving them a more realistic view of the situation.
If in June it was extremely difficult to convince politicians that the victory of Russia was not inevitable, then by September it was no less difficult to convince them that the victory of Ukraine was not as guaranteed. The same tendency influences public opinion about the war.
The Kherson offensive, for example, was declared a failure for several days, although the entire logic of the operation was to cause irreparable losses to the Russians, pressing them to the Dnieper, not knocking them out of the city by storm. These expectations of take -offs and falls are determined by the structure of national security, which was created to respond to crisis, and which is convenient to determine the long -term strategy, but it is difficult to implement it in the medium term.
Until the situation becomes a crisis, it remains urgent enough so that it can be placed on a day for a decision to make a decision. A good example is ammunition. The fact that Ukraine depletes the ammunition reserves of its partners was clear in June, and analysts were alarmed from the very beginning of the conflict. But the desire to expand the production of ammunition in Europe was truly intensified only at the end of 2022. The tendency to make a delayed decision has led to unpay.
For example, it was clear in August that winter would enhance Ukrainian troops. But key decisions among allies of Ukraine, aimed at maximizing the support of the Ukrainian military, were adopted in Ramstin only in January 2023, which led to the loss of three months, which could be used to create additional Ukrainian reserves. The commitment of Ukraine's partners to create the conditions for reconciliation of the territory is a relief for Kiev.
President Joe Baiden's visit to the Ukrainian capital also shows that Russia's hopes to populate Ukraine's partners are inappropriate. But once again I will emphasize that politics should consider not only urgent but also important. This means that at the same time as the work on ensuring the success of Ukraine on the battlefield, Western partners should develop a clear position in the negotiations. Whatever position they take, it should be the only one.
Given the existing deep political differences, it means that hard work on developing a common position should start right now. States are not just geographical entities. These are communities of people who expect prosperity and security. So, even if Ukraine is able to return its occupied territories, the war will not necessarily end there. Russia will still be able to produce rockets and barrel ammunition, maintaining a constant rhythm of strokes.
Her submarines will be able to continue the blockade of Odessa. Russian Air Force is constantly threatening the sky of Ukraine. And Russian special services are quite capable of continuing their attempts to destabilize Ukrainian society. As a result, Ukraine's airspace will remain largely closed. Exports through the Black Sea will be blocked. Investments in the Ukrainian economy will remain minimal in view of the high cost of entry and the constant threat of air strikes.
Ukraine will be unable to move on and, as before, will depend strongly on its international partners in terms of financial survival. In short, Russia can decide that if it cannot occupy Ukraine, then it will all be deprived of its peace. Hiding in the threat of nuclear escalation, Moscow will be able to avoid threats to its territory while restructuring its economy to cope with the consequences of Western sanctions.
This is just one example of how events can develop, but many of its options deserve attention. Today, the Russians consistently declare their determination to continue the war. They do not offer any conditions except the surrender of Ukraine. International partners of Ukraine, on the contrary, have been consolidated around a military strategy, but still remain divided on policy.