The Russians blinded. What are the effects of A-50 aircraft over the Azov Sea
For both categories of consequences, I would even say radically important, the so-called tactical and technical characteristics of this aircraft, what lies behind the abbreviation TTH.
However, it is important to understand that the same TTHs, which make it so unique, apply not to himself (the basic plane is quite ordinary and well known since Soviet times a serial military transport aircraft IL-76), and the radio technical installed on its board The complex (RTK), which allows to transform the aircraft itself, of course, with this RTK, in such a radar complex (RLC) of air base.
It is the opportunity to lift this RLC into the air and makes it "longtime" (because it dramatically increases the range of detection of air, terrestrial and surface goals due to the location of the radar station (radar in the air) and accordingly - "unique".
Of course, during the development and creation of this complex, "customers" (which was the USSR) came to the conclusion that this aircraft should be given the ability not only Identifying a goal with other "subscribers", mainly by other CP (PU) and means of damage, that is, to distribute, guidance and generally manage the actions of other means (including damage) for the objectives identified. And it is advisable to do it in automatic (semi -automatic) mode.
According to these wishes, in addition to the radar, the plane was installed on the plane, adapted to work on the aircraft and "in the complex" with this radar. Together, all this was called "Shmel" . . . Here, it is its TTH that is "key" to determine the value and value of the destruction of this aircraft.
If in simple words, as a result of all these manipulations, the Soviet Union at the end of its existence (A-50 aircraft, having made the first flight in 1978, and was "adopted" only in 1989) managed to create a DRLV complex More or less comparable (but, except for its intended) with an American analogue, aircraft DRLV US Air Force Boeing E-3 Sentry with RLS An/Apy-1 \ 2, which made its first flight in 1975… because after its own TTH This A-50 was significantly inferior to the American, and the process of "bringing it to the mind", the manufacture and cost were so capacious that they were quite comparable to production, for example, a strategic bomber type Tu-160 .
. . Sery, at the Tashkent Airline of the USSR. To produce on one data-33 aircraft of this type, and in the other-31. In 1991, of course, these power with "far radar" of the air base ended. From 2003 to 2009, the Russian Federation implemented the program of modernization of this aircraft, given the fact that by its intended purpose and opportunities, this aircraft was very important in the combat management system at operational and strategic levels.
The main sense of modernization was to attempt to expand the entire complex of TTX RTC "Schmel", its automated control system (ACS) RLC, as well as the equipment of communication and installation on board the aircraft, figuratively speaking, toilet and buffet . . . or as it was called in Russia itself - "Bloc of the bey -shaped equipment". The upgraded sample was called A-50U. Now, directly to the consequences . . .
Now, specifically, as it will affect (or rather, it is already reflected) in the situation . . . First about TTH, which "matter". 1) the possibility of identifying air goals (we exist from the recently the area of duty of these aircraft in the North and Northwestern parts of the Azov Sea). From the northwestern direction.
From the northern direction - respectively: according to the Russians themselves, this "fool", allegedly, can cite through all sorts of command algorithms (ie, "saglasovaya" and "affirmed") somewhere up to 12 own fighters, and in the autonomous control mode (ie, ie , independently, from the A-50U) to operate virtually a whole airfield-up to 30 aircraft. As for me, the numbers, to put it mildly, a little overestimation . . .
Because well, very rarely, this duty has given more than 4-6 own "boards" in practice. Obviously, the most important goals for A-50U aircraft were the Air Force Air Force. First of all, they can carry KDBs (winged missiles of "storms" and "scalps" + refined "Neptune" and a number of other Ukrainian means of aerial damage, which I will not officially mention).
Moreover, the alternation of the A-50 \ A-50U was organized by the enemy so that the zone of guaranteed detection of air goals (and this is possible to consider air space, starting with the boundaries of detection of targets of the type of KR) completely "covered" the territory where Russian troops operate. In fact, the enemy sought to create a solid and guaranteed radar field over his troops throughout the southern zone. Now take and pushed all these borders and zones . . .
at least 200 km to the east, into the airspace over the Krasnodar region of the Russian Federation, as it happened immediately after the A-50U defeat above the Azov Sea. What will happen? At least a few things are at least: you do not explain to you how it will affect the real capabilities of not only our air forces, but all the Armed Forces. I think you yourself, my dear readers are able to draw the following conclusions in this sense. And the last of the consequences, worthy of attention.
It is obvious that the Russians, of course, can make "any game about" Findli-fayera "on the part of their air defense, etc. In doing so, they can deceive themselves, their "public" and anyone else. But in the case of the destruction of A-50U, they objectively have to put up with the "Joint Reality" that Ukraine has "some kind of cunning weapons" (say so), which is capable of affected .