Opinions

Taiwan scripts. Will China start war on

Alexei Zhivra Analyst Fund Democratic Initiatives named after Ilko Kucheriv, an expert from East Asia has passed a month since the speaker of the House of US Representatives Nancy Pelosi came to Taiwan a day, but hot discussions on the development of relations in the Beijing-Taibei-Washington triangle.

The visit of the great Western media, having learned about such plans, launched a whole debate about the expediency of "teasing China", especially when the Kremlin's bloody hands are destroyed by the current foundation for world security. Moreover, the official Beijing only poured the oil into the fire, promising "consequences".

And then the training of the People's Liberation Army of China (NVAK) around the island gave individual commentators to the opinion that the third world with the participation of two superpowers was almost inevitable. Video of the day, however, although aviation traffic was redirected, the connection itself did not stop. Similarly, no one abolished major events in the island state or, moreover, evacuated staff.

And, interestingly, compared to foreign media, the Taiwanese themselves responded to the threat of an invasion by China more than ironically, answering the question of the Ukrainian about the level of readiness of the population with the words: “If you were 8 years old for preparation, then we had goals for it. decades. " Does it sometimes not remind you of the behavior of many Ukrainians before a full -scale invasion? What is the reason for such self -confidence in a country where only 23.

5 million lives and which resists almost 1. 4 billion from the mainland? The fact is that this is not the first such "rodeo" for an island state, the survival of which has long been considered even less likely than ours. Both Ukraine and Taiwan are both large aggressive neighbors who, thanks to their influence agents, try to form public opinion within the country. Both went through occupation in other countries, and are young democracy - Taiwan only lost a long -party dictatorship in 1987.

But this is the similarity of our states. Unlike Ukraine, "Chinese Taipei" (this is the name, at the level of Beijing -controlled former Hong Kong and Macao colonies, the island should be used in official rhetoric thanks to the so -called "one China's policy" that controls relations with the mainland) has no access to The usual diplomatic instruments for us. For the most part, Taiwan has "economic missions" than full missions.

Thus, in particular, in Ukraine there is no official representation of this state at all, and its affairs in Ukraine are taken care of by the representation in Poland. Accordingly, the search for allies is complicated by "minor" diplomatic ties, and any attempt to go into the official plane is accompanied by a protest from China, which almost always threatens economic sanctions-yes, in particular, in 2021 it happened with Lithuania. But this state of affairs did not always exist.

The loss of international recognition in the 1970s was directly related to the rapprochement of the US and the PRC, which took place as opposed to the USSR and ignoring the interests of Taipei. Moreover, by 1971, the Republic of China (official name Taiwan) occupied a place in the UN Security Council (!), When it was replaced by the People's Republic of China (China).

And in 1979, Taiwan lost his military guarantee of his independence from the United States - all subsequent treaties do not mention clear mechanisms of joint protection. The scale of the fall and the reaction to the "betrayal" by the allies in the middle of society can only be imagined. And already, how, so, such a small country managed to withstand to our time? There are several reasons for that. Let's start with geography.

The very existence of Taiwan as an independent formation is caused by a favorable geographical location. The fact is that de facto losing the Chinese Civil War to the Communists, Homindan-a nationalist party led by General Chan Kaishi-was forced to leave mainland China. In turn, the Chinese Communists, having the advantage of living forces and weapons on land, did not have the necessary naval forces to knock out "nationalists" from Taiwan.

Any attempts to attack the island would end with a complete failure of the Communists not least thanks to the unpredictable Taiwanese Strait, which separates the island from the mainland. And even reaching the island, the NVAK would have to wage war in an inconspicuous mountainous area, which occupies about a third of the entire area of ​​the country against a well -prepared and experienced enemy.

Accordingly, not being able to complete the Civil War, the parties have moved to a "cold" confrontation that continues to our time. Only in recent decades, backed up by rapid economic growth did the PRC began to invest significant resources in such expensive pleasure as the naval forces, trying to shift the status quo in its favor. The successful geographical location of the island itself has a great influence on another fundamental restraint factor - the economy.

It is the geography that allows Taiwan, along with the allies, to keep the potential "fire" control over the region, through which the main trading routes of the world pass and on which the PRC depends. The latter, in particular, closes its needs for energy resources through marine corridors.

Accordingly, being in the immediate vicinity of the mainland, Taiwan acts as a significant lever in the relations between the PRC-the United States, as well as allies of the latter from the wider region of Southeast Asia and Oceania. While Taiwan remains virtually independent, Beijing will not be able to cherish the hope of aggressive expansion, even despite its economic weight.

In addition, Taiwan remains the largest manufacturer of computer semiconductors, covering about 60% of the world market. This fact, in particular, causes the US strategic interest in maintaining the island's security, at least as long as the country has developed its own capacity for chips. Moreover, despite the efforts and successes of the PRC catch up with Taiwan in the process of the process, the main issues remain the volume and speed of production, which are still on the side of Taipei.

The probable loss of such supplier of semiconductors as Taiwan, today - whether as a result of sanctions, or as a result of hostilities - critical for Beijing, which is still predicted by economic hegemony at the conditions And Taiwan. Yet, the most important factor in the confrontation between the PRC and Taiwan is society.

On the one hand, Taibi has a much smaller human resource, but can reveal its potential much more efficient, has the ability to adapt and boasts the existence of a true social discourse. While the PRC censures for the postulates of history, which is actually seeking to restore the country in the borders of the price dynasty of the late XIX century, Taiwan is not in place.

Since 1987, instead of repeating the brutal policy of assimilation of national minorities, which is now in the PRC, Taiwanese have been trying to rethink the heavy pages of history. One of these points is the time when in 1949, General Chan Kayshi's army moved to the island. Then, in martial law, Hanka - numerous aliens from the mainland - carried out repression against the local population, which was significantly different from them both culturally and linguistic.

Today, such a policy is mostly recognized as it is false because it has actually destroyed the Taiwan's identity, and the efforts to reconcile and find a lost connection receive comprehensive support from the state.

Thus, with considerable time to development and relative isolation from the rest of China, Taiwan gradually turns into a truly independent state with its own Taiwan identity and culture, which combines both the traditions of the Hanni, the indigenous population of Taiwan, and Japan, which has occupied the island for a long time. It is the search for one's identity that is one of the catalysts for the conflict today.

The struggle for legitimacy, which in one form or another lasted since the late 1940s between Taipei and Beijing, it is completed, but this is not the case as the latter would like. On the one hand, a new nation is being formed on the island, and on the other, the time is floating in the PRC when it could at least formally speak of Taiwan as a part of Great China.

Is the story of rejecting the very possibility of existence of an individual people remind you of anything? Interestingly, in the irony of fate, it is the Homindan Party, once the main enemy of the Communists, opposes the formal proclamation of independence by the island and generally supports a significant number of narratives of mainland China.

The reason for this is all the same attraction to the unified Chinese identity around the largest ethnic group and maintaining a claim for control of all China's times of the empire. But with every generation, this idea loses its adherents and it is the youth that becomes the bearer of the new Taiwan identity, and the support of Kuomindan is increasingly based on older people.

Considering all the above factors, we can say that the course of cases on both sides of the Taiwanese Strait is in a state of violated equilibrium. In one of the scenarios and under the conditions of the current vector of development, Taiwan will gradually lose his military advantage in the region, where not too long ago, allied forces, led by the United States, dominated.

It is discounted that the island will lose the monopoly on the production of semiconductors in the next decade - one of its structural advantages over the opponent. And the further development of Taiwanese identity will only encourage China to take the fastest action to seize its imperial inheritance.

In such a scenario, when Beijing gradually displaces the Allied forces and strengthen the logistics of its own armed forces in the region, Taiwan will only remain on their own professional but small armed forces in the face of probable economic blockade. The main obstacle to such an event is the economic dependence of China itself on the Western countries, which are the main markets for Chinese products.

An important role is played by energy dependence - one of the reasons for the convergence of China with Russia and the probable proof of the path chosen by Beijing. However, in order to solve these two problems, the PRC needs to spend considerable resources and in the process of losing current economic growth. Even under the conditions of passive counteraction to the event, such a scenario will take about 10-15 years to make the PRC feel comfortable in using any tools to "return" Taiwan.

What will be waiting for Taiwans, you can imagine by paying attention to the example of the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party to Uigur - mostly the Muslim minority living in the southeast of the country. It is the facts of persecution, the creation of "re -education" centers and systemic discrimination of the Uighurs, and even earlier the rigid and unpunished occupation of Tibet, they speak of the inability of the PRC to coexistence and aggressive intentions.

The scenario of the military invasion here and is now unlikely, as it will lead to a mutual and rapid economic fall of both many countries in the West and more largely China itself. Moreover, while the Chinese Navy is unable to conduct operations far from the shore and is unlikely to establish control over the main trade routes to continue to provide their own energy needs and access to a few markets that remain open under such conditions.

So far, the most likely option of developing events is still a return to that equilibrium that has existed so far. By the way, it is unknown whether it would have happened without a Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is because of this arrogant attack by the West at an accelerated pace that they rethink their own military strategies and move towards increasing the cost of defense.