The last days of the Kurakhiv bridgehead. As the Russian troops develop an offensive and what to do the Armed Forces
The troops at once of three groups (UVs) of the enemy - "Center", "Yug" and "East" are obviously eliminated in the near future, and God forbid that this liquidation passes without the surroundings of our units, and ended only by their waste, preferably organized and organized and organized step by step.
Enemy troops, in the form of the 90th Tank Division (TD), in the North Fas (flank) of the bridgehead, with the effective participation of units of the brigades of the 51st All-Military Army (ZVA), namely-1st, 5th, 110th, 110 , 114th OMSBR, continue to develop their success in the tactical zone, actively attacking the positions of our advanced units in the directions of Novooleksiyivka-Ukrainka, Novodmitrovka-Suntska, and also move along the northern shore .
The right flank of the 90th TD from the north, in the direction of Selidovo-Grigorivka, apparently provides units of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (MSD) of the 2nd name of the enemy. Which, in particular, enables the command of the 90th TD to maneuver your own and downtished forces and means in the Grigorivka-Selidovo-Tsukurine-Novodmitrovka lane with the purpose of permanent efforts in the general directorate of Selidovo-Andriyivka.
The Armed Forces, however, still hold birch trees and conduct stubborn reargarten battles in the villages of Voznesenko and Novoselidovka, but, apparently, the advanced units of the enemy have already broken through the west of this border in the direction From the entire northern coast of the Kurakhiv reservoir.
As it does not sound paradoxically, but the situation in the strip of the 90th TD of the enemy for the Armed Forces looks more favorable than what is created to the south (in the south Fas \ flank of the Kurakhiv bridgehead). At least, the overall meaning of the action and the closest task of the enemy to the north of the Kurakhiv Reservoir is quite clear, as well as the directions of making basic efforts.
Therefore, obviously, the organization and fighting from the Armed Forces of Ukraine are more or less systematic and orderly.
However, in the strips of the 8th name of the enemy (Yug ")-the 20th and 150th Motorized Rifle Divisions (MSD) and the right flank of UV" Vostok "(36th Separate Rifle Brigade (OMSBR) ZVA, 37th OMSBD 36th, 39th OMSBR and a tactical group of the 18th machine-gun-artillery division (rush) from the 68th AK, as well as the 40th Separate Marines (MP) of the enemy ), that is, in the southern part of the Kurakhiv bridgehead - the situation for the Armed Forces gradually becomes extremely negative.
In particular, the enemy (the advanced units of his 20th SMEs from the 8th ID, strengthened by the units of the 150th MSD), breaking through to the village. Far, he has already managed to tie battles in the village and, obviously, intends to move further towards Konstantinopilsky and Uspenivka from the northeast direction (about 4-4. 5 km remains in the enemy). The Armed Forces of Ukraine cannot stop this movement of the enemy.
However, from the south, the advanced units of the 36th OMSBR of the 29th TEA of the enemy (apparently reinforced by individual units of the 37th OMSBR) are actively progressing to the west with. Labor, along the Shakhtarske-Uspenivka road and are already about 2. 5 km from its southwestern outskirts.
Thus, those units that are still defending before the front of the 39th OMSBR of the enemy in the area of Antonovka, Katerynivka and Elizabetivka settlements, risk being surrounded if the enemy continues to advance to the Uspenivka-both from the northeast direction and from the south, and from the south. .
Moreover, it is obvious that the 40th MP and the main forces of the 37th OMSBR enemy continue to "ram" our defense in the direction of spill (and accordingly, towards Constantinople) and in the direction of Maksimivka-dry fives, obviously, trying this threat to The environment for our units to "scale" even more, practically for the whole Kurakhiv speech.
The frontier of the Armed Forces on the Suki River, which was to help the Armed Forces command to stabilize the southern part of the Kurakhiv bridgehead, at this point is very close to being broken, about somewhere on the segment of Konstantinopilsk - Uspenivka. Ukrainian units are still fighting for work, but in the neighboring areas they are moving to the river.
Moreover, the position of our troops in the area of Ganivka - Antonovka - Katerynivka - a merry grove due to the breakthrough of the enemy to the village. Farre quickly deteriorates, with almost every hour. Directly in the area of the village. The Kurakhov enemy continues his attempts to break from the east to the village. Obviously, the units of the 150th ISD from the 8th ID (UV "South) and some part of the forces of the 51st ID (from the Center Center) are applied here.
It is interesting that the enemy here uses the same "methodology" of infiltration to the settlement, which he used in Selidovo. Acting in small infantry groups, he literally "climbs into any hole" in our defense, occupies more or less convenient positions in our defense system, gradually accumulates there, and then moves to massive and intensive attacking \ assault actions by accumulated forces and means already directly in the settlement.
There is information that the enemy thus managed to "infiltrate" in the village. Kurakhovo - advanced along the Zaporizhzhya avenue into the area of the High School building №3.
Obviously, the enemy's command is quite aware of the lack of personnel in the advanced units of the Armed Forces (and accordingly, the impossibility of dense and continuous control of them in a particular area of literally all sites and corresponding zones suitable for the promotion of small infantry groups), which, in fact, means existence " The gap "and the intervals between positions and strongholds of the Ukrainian units in the tactical zone.
They carefully look for them and climb them through them. Obviously, the level of tactical intelligence and the quality of monitoring of the entire tactical zone increased sharply. Typically, the enemy command applies this "method" not only to "infiltrate" their assault groups during hostilities for some more or less significant settlement, but also in general in those areas where its coming tactical groups face organized defense.
In order to increase the pace of the offensive and complete the elimination of the entire Kurakhiv bridgehead? Not so much. In general, in the reserve of UV "Center", which I will remind you, in addition to Kurakhiv direction, in fact on Pokrovsky (NSU) and Toretsky directions in the 5th Motorized Rifle Regiments and one tank regiment (80th TP, from 90.
-TD), as well as 6 "backup" rifle and motorized rifle battalions, at the end of October, about 14-15 thousand "carcasses", with 110 tanks and 250-255 units of BBM. They had somewhere up to 80-90 units of "become" art and approximately 12-14 units of RSZV. But, this is the entire area of responsibility of the Center in the Center, and somewhere up to a third of these forces and means were either in the territory of the Rostov region or in the operational rear.
As far as I understand, in early November, the command "Center" tightened some of these reserves in Kurakhiv direction (first of all, it concerned the 90th td This was in the reserve, but also formed an "additional" assault Motorized Rifle Regiment \ SME-428th SME). Similarly, the brigades of the 51st General, which are deployed and operated in the Kurakhiv direction, also received an additional up to 4-5-5 battalions of "March replenishment" from their "reserve" units and units.
It is by these forces now that the Center is coming in the Kurakhiv direction, and, apparently, planned earlier and the long -standing enemy's expected offensive on Pokrovsk at this point "moved a little in time.
" For its part, the 8th name (if you count, even with the 39th OMSBR from the 69th AK and the tactical group of the 18th Bank), was also sufficiently limited forces and means-1 in the end of October to "build efforts"-1 Rifle Regiment (SP) and 4 battalions, one of which is tank (probably from the 20th MSD). However, they were all deployed in the nearest tactical rear of the army. These are 2-2.
3 thousand Russian in \ slings, up to 32 tanks, BBM-ok, in general-less than 20 pieces, well, up to 40 units of AU "become" art, with reactive-somehow did not happen.
As far as I understand, in the context of the "frontal" on the offensive (from the east) to the Kurakhiv bridgehead of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces and the means of the 20th and 150th SME Without their individual units, they have long and "tightly" drawn into grueling battles and to separate something from their composition for the reserve for the reserve, the Russian command could not do it before) to grow efforts - it was enough.
The problem was different that in reality to strengthen their troops, which directly came to the curakhov in the lane of the 8th national, the Russian command could (and did it later) with only two battalions-one tank and one motor-shot.
That is why we see such a distortion in the reserves in the strip of the neighboring 51st name of the enemy, which receives reserves almost in permanent mode, compared to his 8th name, where they are glad to 1-2- m battalions, because they are both both They operate in the same direction.
Moreover, in the lane of "East", where, in fact, in the "first line" there are 4 full -blooded brigades, of which 3 are motorized rifles (OMSBR), and one - Marines (MP), the enemy command may be introduced into the enemy The battle at one time (within 24 hours) to only one motorized rifle. Moreover, in the reserve there are "East" (which still operates in the Vremiyiv and Guliapolsky directions) up to 6. 5 thousand in \ sl, 12-14 tanks, up to 88-90th BBM-OK, 45-46 AC.
Thus, at this point, the enemy concentrated and unfolded in the Kurakhiv direction of formation from the warehouse of three (Center "," Yug "and" East ") with a total number of about 70-71 thousand in \ p. The enemy has the most wide opportunities and ability to further increase their efforts in the offensive lane of the 90th TD and the 51st ID (this is the North Fas and the Osa's Directorate).
Obviously, this does not quite correspond to the current practical results, where, on the contrary, the value of the southern flank (the strip of "East" and the 8th Magician "Yug") regarding the prospects of successful for the enemy of completion of the Kurakhiv offensive is gradually increasing.
Moreover, probably the enemy cannot fully use the operational reserve of the Center in Kurakhiv direction, because it is 2-A and 41-A, which acts, in fact, in the Pokrovsky direction, will also need reserves in the near future . . . And not far away in small volume.