No benefit, only politics: why Russia used "oreshnik" and what to do next
Launch on the morning of November 21, according to the Ukrainian President of Zelensky, Russian weapons, which has "all the characteristics of" intercontinental ballistic missile, caused fears about nuclear escalation, especially after dramatic personnel appeared on which several shells hit the Dnieper.
Later, Russian President Putin stated that this blow was a successful "test" of a new ballistic missile of the Middle Dent "Orezhnik", which has a "non -nuclear hypersonic potential", and directly linked launch using Ukraine in the Russian territory of Western weapons, such as winged Storm Shadow and ATACMS missiles. However, after almost three weeks, it seems probable that the purpose of starting was to send a signal to NATO members rather than to achieve a tactical effect on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, new details have emerged. The available information clearly indicates that it had a greater range than the "Iskanders", which they used in the conflict and which have a range of up to 500 km, since it was almost probably launched from the Kabbin Yar (approximately 800 km). PS-26 (SS-X-31 in NATO designations) is a much larger rocket, which is commonly called either intercontinental or medium-range ballistic (IBRD or IBRD).
The PC-26 program was expected to be stopped or suspended in 2017 in favor of the development of hypersonic glider apparatus. However, the recent open report of the US Intelligence Directorate said that it was only postponed, and the fact that American officials at a briefing immediately assumed that they had struck a new missile, add confidence that or PC-26 program They were revived, or its elements were used as a basis for the development of a new rocket.
The video of the impact on the Dnieper shows that several shells were included in the city, as well as perhaps false targets and debris. The number of shells (several dozen) may also indicate that more than one rocket has been launched, although Ukrainian intelligence states that "six warheads" were used, each of which contained six subbovitators. According to a conventional definition, the MBR is a ballistic rocket whose flight range exceeds 5500 km.
The MBBs usually have a range of 3,000 km to 5 500 km and are located above medium -range ballistic missiles and low -range ballistic missiles (such as ATACMS or "Iskander"). Some of the early anonymous American sources quickly challenged the Ukrainian characteristic of the impact on November 21 as the IBR.
This can be the result of the classification issue if PC-26 was really involved: initially it was declared as an IBR, but later tests showed that it was designed to carry a heavy pay load over a distance of less than 5500 km, and Western officials suspected that It was indeed a MBR, modified to violate the terms of the RSMD agreement, which forbade land base missiles with a range from 500 km to 5500 km.
The United States left the 2019 treaty on the basis of Russia's failure to comply with Russia (it concerned the 9m729 winged rocket than PC-26). Emphasizing the development and use of the IBR in this case is another way to remind observers of the history of Russia's abuse system of arms control and justify the current actions of the states in this field, even if the Russians seem to have reported the United States before launch.
The use of IBBs will not necessarily have great military importance, because, although they are much faster (and therefore they are harder to intercept) than short -range missiles, they are usually lacking accuracy for use with ordinary useful loads against many important goals. For comparison, the probability of a circular error of Chinese MBR DF-26 is about 150 m, while in Iskander-M 9m723-less than 10 m. Such as Shahed drone or winged KH-101 missiles would be more accurate and cost-effective.
However, a heavy amount of a good useful load that such a ballistic rocket can allow it to be used against some unprotected and immovable purposes (such as government buildings) with ordinary warheads, despite their inaccuracy. It also demonstrates the possibility of struck by a weapon, which-to the maximum degree-can be launched far beyond the reach of any Ukrainian ballistic or winged missiles, both foreign and domestic production.
This will create a serious problem for air defense that Ukraine has managed to create around cities and critical infrastructure. Systems such as Patriot can only affect the IBR in the terminal phase, when the interception is difficult and requires additional costs for interceptors, which have to start the volleys, since the defenders do not have time to watch whether the interception has occurred before another missile (approach " , look, shoot ").
Kapinin Yar can still be amazed by some of the most long -range Ukrainian drones, so the object is vulnerable, but many of Russia's starting installations are mobile.
However, the fact that in the nuclear sphere of the country is only used by IBBs is symbolically more important because it appeared against the backdrop of revision of the Russian nuclear doctrine, which many perceived as a decrease in the nuclear threshold of Russia (even if it has largely codified existing but unwritten policies) .
The existing Russian weapons used against Ukraine (Small -range Ballistic missiles, Winged Missiles "Dagger" and "Caliber") already have nuclear potential, but a similar large missile sends a more powerful signal about the potential use of nuclear weapons and "punishes "Ukraine for the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow.
The main audience of this message is probably NATO and a coalition of international supporters of Ukraine, not Ukraine itself is not a very subtle reminder that Russia has a wider arsenal of different and larger types of missiles. If there are no doubts, the Russian media have readily published graphs that evaluate the time of the Orezhnik missile flight to several large European capitals.
This is happening in the context of wider debates about the possibilities of long -range missiles in Europe, or rather, the lack of such opportunities and further interest in what has become a European approach to striking long range. Thus, in July, the United States and Germany announced the placement of 2026 land base rockets, including SM-6 and Tomahawk, or "developing hypersonic weapons".
It is unclear whether such plans will remain under the new US administration, but it is easy to make a connection between these debate and the use of Russia "Osshchnik", not least because it was not only about the use of ATCMS and Storm Shadow after Putin's statement after the impact but also about US plans.
The boasting mention of the opportunities and future development of the Russian IBRS was likely to warn of Russia's readiness to join the "race" of rocket weapons; Does she have another question. There is more than a trivial resemblance to the Eurorachket crisis. The Russians have serious incentives to demonstrate their nuclear advantages at the theatrical level.
The ghost of nuclear conflict in Europe, not related to strategic exchange with the United States, can pose a significant risk to transatlantic cohesion. On the other hand, systems such as Pershing II emphasize the risks that represent the medium -range systems for Russia, which are ahead of its possibilities of early warning. Many of the systems that are planned to be deployed in Europe, including SM-6 and long-range hypersonic weapons, repeat this dilemma (albeit with ordinary missiles).
Both sides, in fact, choose a default strategy, respectively, presenting each other with a limited exchange at the level of war (Russian threat aimed at the European audience) and the risk of counter in force (a similar ghost that Pershing II has caused in the minds of Soviet leaders).
It is noteworthy that the balance of the forces established in the 1980s was, despite the political noise of that era, strategically stable in the sense that it did not give the advantage of either side and put an end to the fears of breaking. Even often mentioned fears about crisis instability were somewhat exaggerated.
Similar stability is on the Korean Peninsula, where South Korea opposes the North Korean nuclear weapons with its "three axes" system, which combines integrated anti -air and missile defense (to reduce the likelihood and management. Putin's statement last week that Orezhnik could be unfolded in Belarus somewhere later 2025, should be considered in the same light and as a well -expected continuation of his statement about the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons in 2023.
As it will affect Ukraine and strategic stability in general, can only be assumed. It seems unlikely that Ukraine will suddenly limit itself in the use of ATACMS or Storm Shadow, at least under the current US administration, spending months spending permission to use their use in Russian territory. There have already been an image of what is likely to be used in the future to strike the Russian air tights.
And for Russia, massive attacks of drones and a mixture of beats of ballistic and winged missiles are the most tactically useful answer or a form of pressure, especially on the eve of winter. Therefore, the use of "Oshshnik" is unlikely to significantly change the calculations on how best to apply or restrain the strikes of the far radius of the action of any side. This exacerbates the dilemma of restraint for Russia in a more significant sphere - a wider strategic stability.
On the one hand, critical "red lines" were not crossed by either parties: NATO forces were not directly introduced into Ukraine to combat Russian troops, and the Russian Federation did not carry out a common military attack on the Alliance. And at least some standards were followed: the United States reported Russia of the previous launch. On the other hand, international sponsors continue to support Ukraine, albeit sluggish.
At first glance, this state of affairs looks quite controlled, but Russia is concerned about long -term international support of Ukraine, and the playing of a nuclear map is rather undermining than it strengthens its position in the field of nuclear restraint. In part, this reflects the stability of Russia and its willingness to put on the leading place of promotion in eastern Ukraine.
But if Russia was absolutely calm about the international reaction in Ukraine and the question of European missile potential, it would not have to "explain" its nuclear policy. Not creating ambiguity or reducing NATO/Europe ambitions, more and more bloodthirsty, Russian threats were mostly ignored.
If, as a result of this rattling sabers, opponents of Russia will suggest that the sword will actually remain in the vagina, then Russia itself will be guilty of Russia, and at the same time it remains open to the fact that it will feel the pressure in order to somehow exacerbate the situation with the help of more threatening sabotage or subversive, or More alarming escalation of ordinary weapons against Ukraine.
Finally, a significant expansion of the Russian mid -range arsenal is possible if it is possible to release resources, but given that the rate of production of Russian missiles is currently 130 units a month, the increase in the scale of MBR production seems unlikely. Although the nuclear threat at the level of war is the same challenge as SS-20, the value of deployment can be nullified by accelerating Europe and the US plans to create shock and missing potential.