US Special Operations forces: How to Reform a 70,000th Army of Professionals
These forces are designed to withstand the "hot" and "cold" wars of Russia in Europe, to reinforce the forces of the Allies on the Korean Peninsula, to restrain Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific region, to resist extremist organizations, to wage irreconcilable wars in Syria and Levanta and to patrol vast spaces security forces. One reason is that the forces of special operations are selected, taught and trained to work throughout the spectrum of confrontation-conflict-war.
Whether large -scale fighting in large theaters, whether the indirect use of force through proxy, information operations and civilians, the forces of special operations have proven their scalability, efficiency and power. Focus has translated Bryna Petita's article on US special operations and their operations. After September 11, 2001, the roles of the US special operations have expanded significantly, and the concept of their use should also change.
The forces of special operations are an organization leading a campaign. The US military defines campaign as "a structure for organizing and synchronizing simultaneous actions and operations aimed at achieving or providing political goals. " Simply put, the campaign is a continuous number of hostilities, steps and signals that the authoritative hand, which has resources and will, directs to bring the matter to the end, despite failures, failures and shocks.
Ideally, the campaign brings together all the elements of American power. There is a problem here: the methods and means of campaign used by the US military, often do not correspond to those methods of designing forces that are characteristic of the forces of special operations in the conditions of irregular wars. In order to cope with this problem, the forces of special operations create their own campaign designs in a irregular war.
This is necessary because the US opponents are developing their own campaigns, which bypass the US strengths and use places, populations and problems that undermine the US. In recent years, the forces of special operations have implemented successful models in countries such as Columbia, Philippines and Syria.
Since the forces of special operations are firmly held in the world of terrorism and are used at the same time for strategic rivalry, the combined forces should not simply transfer patterns of special forces from one theater of war to another. A creative approach is needed. Sometimes the forces of special operations are involved in the settlement of crises, the fulfillment of individual tasks, such as the release of hostages, or providing temporary decisions in a chaotic environment.
These are operations, not campaigns. As an alternative, within the framework of the larger joint campaigns that have logic related to clear goals, special operations can offer irregular methods of campaigning that allow you to withstand threats with other forms of American armed forces.
With a skillful approach and development of the concept, irregular campaigns provide opportunities to change the enemy's decisions, increase the effectiveness of partners' actions and demonstrate the impact on distant territories where Russia, China and Iran decide to challenge US domination. Examples of individual campaigns or applicants for their conduct can be given to improve the understanding and use of irregular campaigns.
The use of three methods, which I define as "touches", "middle path" and "involvement", produced excellent results or, in some cases, led to small and justified investments in hedging. By clarifying how special operations are formed, politicians and military planners will be able to use special operations to achieve maximum strategic effect. The first approach is the "smear" method.
This method is intended for underdeveloped political zones or troubled operational situation, where US interests are limited, where there is no obvious political decision and any operations related to risks. Such zones include Levant, Myanmar, Nepal, Serbia, Venezuela, Moldova and some archipelagoes in the Asia-Pacific. These conditions deserve some participation, which demonstrates the interest and intentions of the United States, but is limited.
In these cases, the presence of special operations forces does not become the final marker of political or military will. The forces of special operations operate on the political front, exploring which US political actions will become acceptable in the seat canine. They act as specific policy expressors because of their presence, activity and influence, agreed with foreign partners.
In this case, American politicians are seeking probe, but at the same time they want to be able to choose (or reject) the options offered by their special purpose groups. Suckers can remain low at a low level, and without turning into something more, purposeful and long -lasting. One of these examples is Nepal, where the forces of special operations are constantly operating, but only a small number of servicemen conduct monthly training, training exchanges and high -altitude climbing measures.
For special forces in place, these actions may seem unproductive or half, no matter what caused certain political restrictions. In the case of Nepa, it is the host country that limits the US presence. Moldova also gets into the same category. According to the proclaimed neutral policy, Moldova balances her safety, limiting US military investments with basic border, cybernetic operations and security forces.
In such cases, participation in special operations is a signal of wider opportunities or an indicator of limited interest in US participation. In such cases, it is necessary to maintain activity and episodic participation so that in the event of a change in policy or increasing interests in the US, the point of support from which can be developed remains. The second option is the Middle Road. This approach is characterized by a rotary deployment of troops.
Such operations are ideally performed according to some common strategic "roadmap", which determines priorities and synchronize US resources. The middle path suggests that not all regions can be properly understood, provided with resources and used in a way that is designated as "basic efforts" in the military doctrine. Currently, the US Special Operations are deployed in 80 countries.
The commitment of special operations for the constant presence in regions such as Thailand, Georgia, Eastern Europe, Balkans, Chad and Lebanon is a typical example of this approach. In these circumstances, groups of special operations carry out episodic breakthroughs, alternating with periods of slow results that are barely noticeable.
One of the approaches that led to the creation of a mission with a small number of participants and a long service life is the US participation in the operation in the south of the Philippines (2001-2014). I commanded an operational group of US special operations in the Philippines in 2008.
Our approach was restrained and patience, which was a striking contrast against the backdrop of intense, deterministic strategies that were applied at that time in the desert wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (campaigns where I also participated). The Philippine Campaign was aimed at driveing regional terrorist networks related to Al-Qaeda, but not at the cost of breach of strategic (naval and air) access to the United States to the Pacific.
Despite the more than ten -year stay in the south of the Philippines, the main headquarters did not go beyond the area on which it was located. The mission remained narrow -scale and geographically limited, with a small presence and limited powers. This quiet campaign was appreciated by the United States and the Philippines as successful. Such campaigns do not end with a parade with fanfers. They quietly and everyday way to another plane.
On the middle way, even one special forces or a small group can detect and use unpredictable areas where US advisory assistance can be of great benefit at relatively low cost. Examples are the advanced liaison in the existence countries, which skillfully organize measures for conducting special (or other) operations and place talented specialists in cognitive spaces or physical regions, where the partner and the situation contribute to the achievement of significant success.
The forces of special operations place such linaches in Africa, Europe, Asia, South America and the Middle East. With sufficient capabilities, an elementary base element can combine non -permanent, floating variables into a synchronized whole and causing a seismic jump in progress.
Before the invasion of Russia in Ukraine in February 2022, the command of special operations in Europe used such a coordinator in Ukraine, which succeeded, although incomplete, in the unification of disparate efforts to assist in the creation of Ukrainian forces of special operations. From this position it follows one of the types of operational art: a harmonious sequence of actions and operations that together create the effect that goes beyond the possible.
These can be bombs, relationships, access, material or ideas. Such a big jump forward can be either script or template. It is associated with the intersection of straight lines that can only be determined by the experienced and attentive look of the person, endowed with the powers of the observer. Otherwise, the middle path is masking for mediocrity or improperly directed energy.
It is because this environment is characterized by instability of discoveries and closures and many moments of invisible activity (or inaction), it is difficult to identify and eradicate units that work inefficiently. In such a difficult environment, some teams simply do not notice opportunities that could be identified with a more effective team.
If such groups operate remotely, they are also far from the prompt adjustment of the course, which is required during the campaign from the headquarters. Operational art in such cases remains only a vague idea for a careless artist. Where and when and when special operations are aimed at competition, competition or fight, the results are often excellent. This third model describes the "involvement" approach.
Modern examples are the joint actions of the special forces and the CIA in Afghanistan in October 2001, which resulted in the Taliba destroyed in a few weeks. Another example is the Northern Front of the Iraqi Freedom operation in March 2003, where the operational group of special operations paired with Kurdish formations broke through and destroyed the Saddam Hussein defense line.
These are examples of the US doctrinal unconventional war - a way of conducting irregular fighting, which is headed by special operations, but is supported by the Joint Forces and Government Institutions. The Cold War offers utility models that avoid large -scale maneuverable fighting. One example of deep involvement in the essence of the case is Edward Lansdale, an operational employee of the strategic services management and the SUI Generis intelligence officer of the Second World War.
In the era of stubborn anti-communism, Lensdale became a strategic adviser to the Philippines leadership in the 1950s, and then, in the 1960s, expressed a special opinion about the American approach in Vietnam. Lensdale, who, depending on the point of view, was called "family in the family" or "quiet American", was known for its attitude towards locals, local problems and local solutions.
The forces of special operations, like Lansdale, are best manifested when looking at the American authorities through the eyes of the local population, which is covered by American policy. Another example of the Cold War, which testifies to the organizational choice, is a detachment of a special purpose of the US Army "Detachment-A" or "Det-A" based in Berlin.
Instead of rotation of the forces of special operations in Berlin used the method of special selection and transfer of a semi -permanent detachment (from 40 to 90 servicemen). Thus, Det-A could-and should have understood local policies, risks and threats and develop approaches and individual tactical techniques that would be injected but not provoked the opponent. In this case, the executives recognized the serious consequences of failures on the tense border of the separated Germany.
Then the management of special operations reduced the risk through proven organizations focused only on this lyminal space. In a more turbid environment, the "deep involvement" approach has a less muscular shape and a less noticeable face. This approach directs selected personnel and specially designed power complexes to key intersections, where they can best use the power of special operations.
American counter -terrorism organizations that are often out of the public in places like the Middle East are a typical example of this approach. It is about micro motion and heteraarchic networks, not mass and dull fire power. When the United States is fighting in a calmer environment, special operations can rely on this experience. The forces of special operations - the growing branch of growing - can be the most suitable option for its use now.
Their use will require irregular campaigns that should be conceptually thought out, developed and related to all ways of promoting US force. Being part of a consistent strategic approach, irregular campaigns, designed to take into account specific conditions, give the United States the opportunity to choose and put their opponents in front of dilemma.
These three approaches to special operations - "Droke", "Middle Way" and "Involve" - show how irregular campaigns can influence the future, best responding to the current moment. Brian Petit is a resignation colonel of the US Army. He teaches and advises on strategy, planning, special operations and resistance.