Putin's "combat" system. What is going on at the front now
It looks like this strategy: Putin's system is something in between funny, absurd and grotesque - and probably a great pleasure for such a sarcasm fan as I - to watch at the same time: a video of the day - as in the USA, a country based on illegal immigration, oligarchy I like that illegal immigrants are near its luxurious real estate objects in the Martas-Vinard area.
It doesn't matter: the public is still occupied by quarrels around whoever tries to take away torches in people with torches, and pitchforks in people with pitchforks; - As in Germany, the oligarchy broke so much with Putin that the government had to nationalize the local "daughter" of Rosneft.
And since the media is paid to the trees that there are no forests, they are still honest with panic about the "future gas crisis" and declare the official reason for the nationalization of "Rosneft" "protection of energy supply of the country. " It doesn't matter that it is actually an attempt to understand the mire of corruption and espionage in the highest echelons of politics and the armed forces.
What I am a surprise, surprise - I return to talk about torches and pitchforks; - And as in Russia, where the main problem is the Putin System, which is essentially very similar to the management system of somewhere in the West (which surprise, given how many billion billion of dollars and euro Putin has invested in the creation of "Western liberal democracy") However, it is focused on only one person - the same problem is carefully ignored.
Therefore, the Russians are engaged in solving problems with torches and pitchforks. For my pleasure, these effects are amazing: while the Kremlin's fool (so the author calls Vladimir Putin - NV) remains in the ear involved even in tactical solutions on fronts in Ukraine and no one dares to make decisions without it, a mass of Western experts or does not know or not dare to talk about his failure (at least not "having indisputable evidence").
So, he does not blame Putin (or does not know why to do it), and the Russian mainstream and social networks are accused of "commanders and executives" below Putin, but not Putin himself: few people dare to blame Shoigu and Gerasimov (ie the Ministry of Defense Ministry and General Staff); Some complain about the special services (GRU and FSB), but the mass is occupied by the accusation of commanders and lower levels, none of which is never clearly named.
Therefore, we still hear the story that "Putin releases his commanders" - although he did almost nothing of it, that it is not surprising for the closest consideration. And why should he do it? As in the field of civic administration and economy, in the last 22 years, Putin has placed his favorites for all responsible posts.
One day, they can all abuse social wealth and be as corrupt as they please, enrich themselves, their families and friends, as they please, eliminate rivals, as they please, and in general do everything they want. They are as inviolable as Putin, they are above all laws - as long as they pay Putin his share and/or provide support when he needs it.
Not surprisingly, during (re -invasion of Russia, the situation reached the moment when all field commanders initially verify their decisions with Putin. In doing so, they rejoice in Putin ("he has everything under control"), but most importantly - they cover their ass: they can continue to collect prey and evacuate it to Russia until something goes wrong ("And it was not me" ).
The battle for the Donbas given this "Putin system" and - meanwhile, is already proven - Putin's military incompetence, it is not surprising that today "live" on TV (or social networks) we can observe the frank paralysis of Russia's armed forces (Armed Forces), private military companies (PECs), such as Wagner PEC and/or Redout, as well as separatist forces in the battles in Ukraine.
In the eastern district of Kharkiv region, what is left of the 20th DSAA, which is constantly shaken by new and new Himars strikes on its headquarters and other important nodes, seem to be not sure of its real task: to install a new front line down the Oskil River or retreat On a new defense line, about the middle between Pokrovsky and Svatov? In the southeastern corner of the Kharkiv region, the 1st GTAA was in front of a similar dilemma: it cannot hold the front line along the rivers Oskil and Siversky Donets, but at the same time does not retreat.
Yesterday she lost Yarova to the east of Svyatogorsk, but still continues to the north and southeast. Actually, it is Putin - and he is such Russian chauvinists and illusionists - insist on the maintenance of the Red Liman, no matter what, although it is absolutely meaningless. But they are still there. And the Lugansk and Donetsk separatists are so blinded by what is happening around them that they did not understand that they are carefully used as Putin's cannon.
Accordingly, those who survive are kept in Kreminna, Lisichansk and Zolotarivka: even arrange counter -attacks on Belogovka. First of all, they - in cooperation with the defeated PEC - continue to storm Bakhmut from the east and south, despite hundreds of failures in the last two months.
Something similar to the famous III Army Corps: after his command was surprised to hear that his troops would be thrown as a replenishment, not as a reinforce The contracts of the contractors, signed on February 20-24, passed on August 20-24?), The decision of Putin became even more strange.
Thus, the photos and videos of their units are traced from Kupyansk in the north to (at least) the district of coal in the south, and Western experts are engaged in the question of who in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with which Russian army commands and in what part of Ukraine. Now in Russia, the Bardaka time.
Of course, someone can try to spoil the party, indicating that insisting on illusions is always a bad idea - for example, according to information in Ukrainian reports, Keystone Cops in Moscow (so the author calls the Ministry of Defense From Volgograd and Rostov-on-Don, all additional units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and PEC, as well as supplies to Lugansk, and from there to Svatov (where the main bus station was in the meantime was transformed with the help of Himars into a pile of rubble), Krasnorchenske, Rubizhne and Starobilsk.
One of the S-300 installations was relocated from St. Petersburg. Apparently, upon arrival in these and similar purpose of most troops, the task is to first build fortifications. But nothing is wrong: nothing of it matters. In general, if there is something certain, it is that Putin has made a decision to create a new front line somewhere northwest of the old demarcation line. The question is only where? At the end of the discussion of the Russians I will be indistinguishable.
It is not easy for me (and I rarely do it), but it seemed interesting that some Russian contacts - carefully - asked me if it was possible that the Armed Forces had already lost more than 50,000 soldiers from February to August. You will find information about this in this document: Calculation "Simple": If Keystone Cops in Moscow was paid to families of dead 361. 9 billion rubles, and each family receives 7.
4 million, then as of August 25, 2022 The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation lost 50,000 people killed in battle. A lover of sarcasm in me can not avoid these two remarks: no, for such "papers", no matter how reliable they are, Russian losses do not calculate. The basic principle # 1 of the Putin system is to enrich the state. So, no one can say how many of these "compensation" were assigned to someone below the instance chain.
Indeed, local "power" in Russia has an incentive to "declare losses" - because it indicates that they are "trying enough" (to find and recruit volunteers), even if it means nothing but what they do exactly What they do all the time: assign for every occasion. Like all others, the mentioned contacts only ask about the losses of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Regardless of whether in Russia or in the West, it seems that no one has a "better part" - about the loss of separatists and PVCs. Similarly, no one seems to be concerned about the fact that it is "(three -day)" special military operation ", and no war, and therefore, at least legally - none of the involved Russian soldiers will never be endowed with the rights and privileges of" war veteran " .
Thus, these from the power of "50,000 official Russian servicemen" are not "all losses of Russia in Ukraine from February 24 to August 28, 2022. " But what are the description of how their troops are fighting with America and NATO's "whole armored armored divisions" in Ukraine, the Russians do not even realize how they were really lucky: the event has not yet provided enough artillery for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, To compare it with the Artillery of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Likewise, the Russians are unaware of the growth of the multitasking problem that has arisen in the Armed Forces: regular rotation of parts in battle and out of battle (to give them time to rest and reorganize); promotion of logistics even deeper to the northeast of Ukraine; Preparation of new troops and recharge, as well as adaptation to new challenges . . . At present, this is the main reason why the Armed Forces have not yet passed Svatovo, perhaps, also Starobilsk.
This is as important because no one should doubt that Generals such as Zaluzhny or Nayev are well aware that the easiest way to penetrate through the opponent's front line is to destroy it before it is properly established.
Therefore, in recent days (say, since September 14), the units of Eastern OK have managed to release the two -year and East Kupyansk in the Northern Oskol; Studenok and Sosnov in Svyatogorsk district; They surrounded the estuary on three sides; They consolidated the Dibrova and Lake, protected the area between Kreminna in the north and Serebryanka in the south; They could release the Belogovka and controversial and - probably - to clamp the opposition back to Lisichansk.
Down the rest of the old control line in the area of the Toretsk Russians claim that they captured Mykolaivka by a friend and Mayorsk; The Ukrainians have confirmed these attacks, but deny the loss of any place, and also report "regular" attacks on Avdiivka. However, the sands are still "contested", and - after a few unsuccessful counterattacks - Ukrainians repelled the ants north from this place. Of course, the Russians still "fire as crazy" all these areas.
To the south, the Russians do not cease to declare the "great" offensive of Ukrainians in the area of the bug. Inheriting, apparently, the motto: "We will better show them that we know their intentions - and, who knows, perhaps our guess is correct - than they will actually attack and harm us. " The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation almost constantly fired Ukrainian positions between Guliaypol and the Great Novosilka.
"Strange" (not least), about the "big counterattack" of the III AK in the area of Kamianka (south of Zaporizhzhya) earlier this month was reported by most Russian social networks. But this never happened, and the corresponding messages were quickly put under the carpet. TS . . . TS . . . Kherson, though many people insist that Russian troops in the Kherson region are "surrounded", "cut off" from supply and so on, sorry, but I do not think.
More importantly, the Ukrainian pressure seems not enough Putin or commanders of the 49th General Army and the XXII Army Corps. Not only is the ferries in the area of the Antonov Automobile Bridge, even last week, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation brought areas of a new-collapsible (so-called "Sarm")-a bridge in a new Kakhovka. They covered the gateway with land and rubble, and then built a new bridge on it.
In other words, the ingenuity of military engineers remains an exciting topic - and Putin is determined so that his troops are "left" in one way or another. Also, although some still insist that the Ukrainian offensive in the area has been something like a "deprivation of attention" for "basic efforts in the East" - and, without a doubt, Ukrainians really slowed down last week - the fighting continues.
It is safe to say that in the northern section of the front line in this area for more than a week "Crushes", and it passes approximately from Ingulets in the west to the Dnieper in the east on this line: Arkhangelsk: Charting Kostyrka: Russian Novovoskresensko : Russian Gold Beam: Against I do not have a clear idea of how the Russians managed to push the 128th mountain from the Golden Beam, as well as from Mikhailivka and from "Several Mountains to the South", but that's it.
The center should be that not only "America and NATO", but now Ukrainian "Volkssturmi and women of the 5th and 6th wave" are extremely dangerous for the Airborne, because the 17th tank and the 35th Marine infantry We were able to expand the Ingulets bridgehead in the last days. After winning the race on Chkalovo, they released the nameless, small Seideminukh and Novogredneve. Krasnosel and charming - "disputed".
This is no doubt in general "minimal success" (and none of the civilians can return), but they are a clear testimony that there are limits of defense capabilities I know that the 11th Brigade, 76th, 98th and 106th Airborne Division, 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 127th Motorized Rifle Division) are recreated here. In this most active section of this front is the southern district.
For several days, it has been rumored that the 28 mechanized brigade released Kiselivka, while strongly posting the 33rd SMEs of the Don Cossacks, that the remains of the latter were taken to the east of the Dnieper. There is no confirmation of this: the Russians may have departed from a stronghold along the M14 highway, and it is likely that some of these places or even the whole village went from hands several times. But as far as I know, Kiselivka remains (hot) "contested", not "released".
To the north of it, since the seizure of Schmidtovy two weeks ago, operational groups of the Ukrainian Marines and the 14th Mechanized Regiment have raided numerous Russian support points: for example, in Greaterpilly, Husters, Sunny and Dnieper (along Ingul). This does not mean that something of them has been released, but it harms Russian logistics and forces them to take more and more of their artillery to the east coast of the Dnieper.