Japan could win in World War II: five options for which it was possible
Focus translated the article of the head of the Department of Maritime Strategy at the Naval College of James Holmes about what chances were in Japan not to lose in the Second World War. Let's look at the truth in the eye. In Imperial Japan, there was virtually no chance of defeating the United States in confrontation to the victorious end. The answer lies in determination and resources.
Until the Americans lost their self -control and demanded that the leaders seek full victory, Washington had a mandate to transform the huge industrial potential of the republic into a virtually invincible armade of ships, aircraft and weapons. Such a material advantage was simply insurmountable for Japan - an island state with an economy, which is a tenth of the US. The quantity has its own quality. No willpower or combat virtuosity will be able to compensate for too much inequality.
Tokyo faced this problem after Pearl Harbor. Therefore, Japan could never defeat the US marine forces in the Pacific and impose Washington its conditions. But that does not mean that she could not win the Second World War. Sounds counterinitively, isn't it? But the weak sometimes win. According to the strategic sage Karl von Clausewitz, the story knows many examples where the weak ones have sought their own. In fact, Clausewitz notes that sometimes a smaller coal makes sense to fight the first.
If his leadership views strength as a single tool, and the trends of events look unfavorable - in other words, if just now everything is working out now - why not act? According to Great Charles, there are three main ways to win the war. First, you can defeat the enemy's armed forces and dictate any conditions. The second is to recover from the enemy a higher price than he is ready to pay for achievement of his goals.
The value that the belligerent side gives to its political goals determines how many resources and for what time it is ready to spend on their achievement. Take measures that make the enemy spend more lives, weapons or valuable resources - one way to raise the price, as well as delaying confrontation so that it pays more expenses. And thirdly, you can embarrass him by convincing him that he is unlikely to achieve his military goals.
A disappointed opponent or one who avoids military expenses is a compliant opponent. He concludes the most favorable agreement to withdraw from a difficult situation. If the military triumph was unattainable for Tokyo, the last two ways remained in the Pacific. The Japanese Command could reset resources, reducing the mismatch between the forces between the warring parties. They could make the conflict more expensive, painful and protracted for America, undermining her determination.
Or, on the contrary, they could not ignite the rage of Americans at all so as not to solve a total war. By refusing to strike on Hawaii, they could weaken the enemy's determination or may have removed him from the game. As a result, no action by itself - no stratagem or a powerful blow - would not have led to victory over the United States. Rather, Japanese commanders should think and act less tactically and more strategically. Thus, they would increase the chances of Japan.
This leads us to "five ways that Japan could overcome. " The items listed below do not exclude each other. The Japanese leadership would have increased their chances if everyone had used them. And, of course, some of these measures would require the leadership of supernatural insight. Predictive is a virtue that the emperor he hesitated and the warring military commanders of Japan was so lacking. Was it possible to count on prudence in their actions is a topic for discussions.
So, let's start! Restraining enemies is a prerequisite for even the strongest fighters. Little states with great ambitions need to avoid war with all in a row. The imposition of discipline in the wars was particularly difficult for Japan, whose political system-unfortunately, such as imperial Germany-was divided into the Imperial Japanese Army and the Navy (IJA and IJN), without any significant civilian political supervision.
In the absence of a strong emperor, the army and the Navy could freely indulge in their internecine confrontation, fighting for influence and prestige. The army turned its view to Continental Asia, where a land campaign was planned in Manchuria and then in China itself. The fleet insisted on a maritime campaign aimed at the extraction of resources in Southeast Asia.
Surrounding this opposite desire in the period from 1931 to 1941, Japan actually surrounded herself with enemies of her own free will-invading Manchuria and China, then struck the imperial states in Southeast Asia and, in the end, struck Pearl Harbor. Any tactic, which is a little on your feet, will tell you that the axis of threats is 360 degrees when enemies on all sides leads to dangerous situations. Tokyo had to prioritize. He may have achieved some of his goals if he had acted consistently.
Admiral isora Yamamoto allegedly warned his commanders that Japan should win a quick, decisive victory in order not to wake up the American "sleeping giant" with fatal for Japan. Japan, as Yamamoto prophesied, can create what she pleases, for six months - at best of the year - before the United States collect all their forces for hostilities.
During this time, Japan had to stun American society with a compromise peace-in fact, the distribution of the Pacific Ocean-and at the same time strengthen the island defense perimeter that surrounds the territory of the Asian-Pacific-Pacific conquered by Japanese weapons. And if efforts were not successful? The American industry would start to produce arms massively, and new ships, laid down under the law on two oceans in 1940, would be arrived at the theater of war.
The balance will change irrevocably. In short, Yamamoto warned the warlords against the "writing of scripts" with confidence that the opponent would do exactly what they foresee. Admiral knew somewhat about the United States and understood the tendency of Americans to act against expectations. If at the strategic level, Admiral Yamamoto gave wise advice, then at the operational level they were doubtful.
His solution to the problem of hidden material advantage of the United States was to strike the fact that naval experts considered the center of hostile power-the fleet of the enemy. For decades, Japanese Navy planners have planned to conduct "intercepting operations" to slow and weaken the US Pacific Fleet, which was moving west, probably to help the Philippine islands.
When aviation and submarines located on the remote islands will reduce the Pacific Fleet, Japan's combat fleet will have to start a decisive battle. However, Yamamoto persuaded the Navy command to give up intercepting operations in favor of a sudden blow to the Pearl Harbor. But in fact, the battle line, located in Hawaii, was not the nucleus of American naval power. He was a fleet that was born within the framework of the "two oceans law.
" Therefore, the best thing that the Yamamoto scheme could achieve is to delay the American counter -offensive in 1943. Tokyo may be better to adhere to the interwar plan, which would lead to an increase in US expenses, delayed conflict and potentially deprive the US with determination. Just as Japanese officials were simply unable to limit themselves to one war at a time, they were simply unable to limit the number of active operations and theaters of combat. Look at Japan's actions in 1942.
Operational fleet groups struck in the Indian Ocean, arranging Pearl Garbor British Eastern Fleet near Ceylon. They considered it necessary to strengthen the northern flank in the Battle of Midway, attacking the remote Aleutian islands.
And they expanded the external perimeter of the empire's defense - and took on the protection of a huge new water space - opening the Second Theater of Miting in the Solomon Islands in a vain attempt to cut off the sea paths that connect North America with Australia. The weak fighter is obliged to ask himself if there are so much benefits from minor enterprises and what he risks in the most important theaters before starting new adventures.
Japan, which had smaller resources, has increased its costs for itself as the United States. It is unclear, but Japan's imperial fleet was neglected by the fact that the Pacific Fleet of the United States began to do as long as his Lincora in Pearl Harbor was burning: at full capacity to use their underwater forces to sink any vessel, military or trade, which walks under a hostile flag . By 1945, the US submarines split the island empire, cutting the navigable pathways that connect its parts.
The Japanese submarines were not inferior to the US Navy underwater fleet. The Japanese Navy commanders had to look at the sea card, to understand that the US naval forces had to overcome thousands of miles of the ocean to get to the western Pacific, and to instruct the submarine skills to make trans-Pacific naval paths forbidden. It is difficult to imagine a simpler and more cost -effective scheme by which the Japanese fleet could have a difficult defeat of his opponent.
Neglect of the underwater war was a difficult operational misconduct. James Holmes heads the Department of Maritime Strategy named after JK Weille at the Navy and works as a teacher of the School of Public and International Relations of Georgia. The former US Navy officer, who was engaged in surface fighting, was the last in the history of an artillery officer who, in anger, was anger from the main tools of Lincor during the first war in the Persian Gulf of 1991.