It is not possible to storm everywhere: why the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation fail a large -scale offensive in Ukraine
In October 2023, the command of the roof for the offensive on Avdiivka intensified in the "Yug" units in the "Center", the area of responsibility of which is the Lyman direction. At that time, the most capable subdivisions of the 15th, 21st and 30th OMSBR from the 2nd MEP, 55th and 74th OMSBR from the 41st ID and 239th TP and the 228th were transferred under Avdiivka. SMEs from the 90th td. As a result, the Liman direction was weakened without a battle, but the team did not change.
As a result, significant breakthroughs in this direction were not stated in this direction, but recently . . . Loss of significant location in the Serebryansky forestry, departure from the thorns . . .
In mid -May, when the command of UV "Sever" is clear that their performance in the Kharkiv region is "covered with copper" , in the Belgorod region, units of the 83rd ODSBR were transferred, the area of responsibility of which was the area of the temporal ravine, namely-Ivanivske, Klyshchiyivka and Andreevka.
As a result, the SUU not only held the positions, but also expanded the control in the area of the aforementioned villages, and were able to displace the Russians from the channel sector in the time ravine to the positions of the eastern suburbs. Apparently, the relocation of a particular unit to strengthen the other direction significantly affects the LBZ situation.
Rov command is not able to plug the gaps and distribute the resource evenly on the external scale, so that it can hold defense in one area, stable stable on the other, the third - steadily to step on, the fourth is stable - 3,14 ** * and pretend that it's all planned. The conclusions of all of the above, I think, do not make sense to paint. The sixth month of defense for exhaustion ended. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.