"We chose peace — we got war": how Ukraine lost its nuclear shield 34 years ago and can it be returned
Today, after years of Russian aggression, the question is being asked more and more often: Was this refusal too expensive? The focus was on whether Ukraine is really capable of restoring its nuclear potential, what is needed for this, and how it could turn out for the state. Today, October 24, 34 years have passed since the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the Resolution "On the Nuclear-Free Status of Ukraine".
This act was not only a declaration of intentions, but also a strategic step in the difficult geopolitical conditions of the collapse of the USSR. In this resolution, in particular: Candidate of political sciences Ruslan Klyuchnyk believes that in the context of Russia's continuous aggression against Ukraine, discussions about the restoration of our country's nuclear potential are increasingly being heard.
As you know, Ukraine voluntarily gave up the world's third largest nuclear arsenal in 1994 by signing the Budapest Memorandum. Today, in view of the violation of security guarantees, some experts and politicians are considering the possibility of returning to nuclear status. However, this path is full of technical, financial and, mainly, geopolitical challenges.
After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine inherited not only an arsenal, but also a scientific and technical base: institutes in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Dnipro, where they worked on nuclear technologies. Many specialists in nuclear physics, rocketry, and materials science are still active. For example, the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology has experience in working with nuclear reactors, and companies like Pivdenmash could adapt rocket technologies for carriers.
This does not require a complete restoration of the Soviet infrastructure - modern developments allow the use of more compact methods, such as uranium enrichment using centrifuges. "Technically, Ukraine has the potential to restore the nuclear program. The key factor here is the presence of highly qualified specialists," the political scientist told Focus. According to Klyuchnyk, when it comes to funding, skeptics often point to limited resources.
However, over the past four years of full-scale war, Ukraine has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on defense, mobilizing domestic reserves and international aid. According to the Ministry of Finance, only in 2024 did spending on security exceed 50% of the budget. If the state was able to finance the mass production of drones, artillery and fortifications, then funds would also be found for the nuclear program.
This could include reallocating the military budget or attracting private investment in related technologies. "By comparison, less developed countries like North Korea and Pakistan achieved nuclear status despite economic difficulties. North Korea, with a Human Development Index of about 0. 5 (according to the UN), has invested in the program since the 1980s. Pakistan, with a Human Development Index of 0. 54, developed a bomb in 1998, relying on Chinese aid and domestic resources.
Ukraine, with With a human development index of 0. 77 as of 2023, it has much better starting positions: developed industry, access to uranium deposits, and integration into global scientific networks. Theoretically, we could do without external assistance, using our own developments," the political scientist emphasizes. Ruslan Klyuchnyk adds that Ukraine is theoretically not obliged to ask for the consent of other states, since the Budapest Memorandum is not a legally binding treaty.
But in reality, the start of nuclear work will provoke an immediate reaction from the international community. Sanctions will be imposed not only by countries unfriendly to us, but also by Western partners — the USA, the EU, and Great Britain. The nuclear-free status of Ukraine in the 1990s was a relief for everyone: for Russia, it reduced the threat on the border, for the West, it reduced the number of nuclear states, which contributes to global stability.
Western countries, possessing arsenals themselves, are interested in a monopoly. "The likelihood of direct military intervention is low if nuclear weapons are developed - unlike Israel, which bombed Iraq's nuclear facilities in 1981 and Syria in 2007, or potential strikes against Iran. However, the sanctions would be tougher than the current ones against Russia. It would hit an economy already suffering from war.
Also, Russia, with its intelligence and missile systems, capable of destroying any nuclear facility at the construction stage. Even after a possible ceasefire, Moscow will retain the technical capabilities for pre-emptive strikes, as was the case with the energy infrastructure," the expert continues. In conclusion, according to Klyuchnyk, talks about the nuclear status of Ukraine seem hopeless. They can only worsen isolation and alienate allies.
Instead, Ukrainian diplomacy should focus on peaceful security mechanisms: the strengthening of NATO, bilateral guarantees from the US and the EU, and the development of conventional defense. It is important to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from 1968, to which Ukraine joined in 1994. This is not only a commitment, but also a tool for putting pressure on Russia as a violator.
Only through diplomacy and international law will we ensure a sustainable future, avoiding an escalation that threatens the entire region. It will be recalled that the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine reported on September 23 that the tenth blackout occurred at the occupied ZNPP and the plant was forced to switch to power from diesel generators.