The Battle of Drones and Helicopters: How Unmanned Systems Changed the Doctrine of Modern Warfare
How will the confrontation between drones and helicopters develop? Is there a side that already has an advantage? At one time, helicopter landings symbolized a decisive blow to the enemy's rear. Today, their role is taking a backseat as small, inexpensive drones cripple enemy logistics with far less cost and risk. Focus translated an article by authors from Ukraine, military officer Yevhen Malik and security expert Olena Davlikanova, for the National Interest portal.
In the article "Can drones finally replace helicopters?" the possibilities of UAVs and helicopters in the conditions of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war are reviewed. Helicopter landings became a legend on the battlefield in the late 20th century. Their goal was simple but ambitious: land troops deep behind enemy lines, disrupt the chain of command, cut supply routes, and sow panic.
Such a method requires dozens of aircraft, hundreds of soldiers, neutralization of multi-level air defense and a carefully synchronized ground offensive. It is also associated with a high risk of human casualties and sky-high costs. Deploying even a battalion-sized tactical group—approximately 600 paratroopers—requires 20 to 40 transport helicopters, such as the Mi-8 or UH-60, supported by heavily armed escort helicopters such as the Ka-52, Mi-24, or AH-64 Apache.
The success of the mission requires the preliminary suppression of enemy air defense with the help of artillery, fighters and means of radio-electronic warfare. The price of such an operation is staggering. One such operation can cost 20-40 million dollars, including fuel, ammunition, equipment wear and personnel training. The risks are no less serious: modern MANPADS and radar-guided guns can shoot down up to 30% of the helicopter fleet, if the enemy's defenses are not neutralized.
The loss of several helicopters with military personnel on board can turn a lightning raid into a strategic disaster. However, this method has an obvious advantage: the sudden capture of large objects that cannot be neutralized remotely. Attacks on bridges, railway junctions and command headquarters require a physical presence. If successful, a helicopter landing can not only stop supply lines, but also create conditions for encircling entire enemy formations.
Meanwhile, drone mining is becoming an inexpensive alternative for disorganizing enemy rear areas. And although drones cannot yet capture targets in the traditional sense, there have already been recorded cases when UAVs captured enemy soldiers and escorted them to Ukrainian positions. A drone operation can be handled by a few quadcopter operators with improvised munitions capable of stopping supply convoys.
However, the effect on the battlefield is strikingly similar to that of a helicopter landing: rear supply stops, leaving forward units without fuel, ammunition or medical support. Even simple quadcopters with a payload of 1-3 kg can deliver anti-tank mines, such as PTM-1 or PTM-3, to roads, bridges or bottlenecks up to 15-20 km behind the front line. Larger drones, such as Ukraine's Supercam or Russia's Shahed, increase this radius by dropping mines or small bombs deep into enemy rear areas.
This tactic has a cumulative effect: each explosion halts cargo convoys, and the constant threat forces the enemy to change routes or use limited engineering forces to clear roads. The economic benefits are obvious. A week-long drone mining campaign would require only 10-15 heavy quadcopters, 50-100 mines and about 25 personnel, at a total cost of $1-1. 5 million. This is about 30 times cheaper than a helicopter landing, with roughly the same logistical costs.
Casualties are acceptable - EW assets may shoot down some drones, but many reach the target and the operators remain safe at a distance from combat. Helicopter attacks have not gone away; they still remain the only way to physically seize key positions deep in the territory. However, in the era of dense air defense and limited budgets, it is drones that are becoming the main tool for operations in the rear. This transition is not only technological, but also doctrinal.
A helicopter landing is a lightning attack, a bet on sudden shock and chaos. UAV mining, on the other hand, is a slow suffocation that gradually blocks the enemy's vital arteries. Modern warfare shows that with limited resources, suppression can produce an effect comparable to shock, with much less loss of men and equipment. But it requires time and perseverance.
Thus, the question facing commanders today is the choice not between conducting a raid and mining, but between an immediate result and a slow "suffocation" of the enemy. Drones are indispensable for delivering vital supplies such as food, water, medical supplies and even weapons to soldiers in remote or contested areas. Recently, an electric bicycle delivered by drone helped an injured soldier leave the battlefield.
According to General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Ukraine is testing aerial platforms for the evacuation of wounded soldiers. This will save the lives of not only soldiers, but also evacuation teams. Military Seraphim Gordienko believes that aerial reconnaissance as we know it may soon disappear from the battlefield.
He emphasizes that in the "reconnaissance-strike" cycle, reconnaissance plays a decisive role: without visual confirmation, strike missions are practically not carried out, and strike platforms almost never search for targets on their own. He warns that Russia has created multi-layered networks of FPV interceptors that carve out "kill zones" 15 to 20 kilometers deep in the rear.
Daytime reconnaissance UAVs are now almost inevitably destroyed, and nighttime flights are a temporary measure as Moscow expands its coverage area. Even drones flying at an altitude of 4,000-5,000 meters are not protected from detection and targeting. The result is obvious: large sections of the front line are no longer available for intelligence, creating dangerous gaps in intelligence.
Ukraine is rapidly developing its domestic robotics industry capable of producing unmanned systems for combat operations, logistics and mine clearance. The General Staff reported that in July the delivery of goods to the front line with the help of ground robotic systems increased by more than 80% compared to June. The new Ukrainian ground robot "Spider" can carry 100 kilograms, withstand electronic interference and work on rough terrain for several hours.
Volya-E, RATEL H, TerMIT, Rys PRO, KNLR-E and Sirko-S1 platforms transport cargo, deliver ammunition or evacuate the wounded under fire. These systems are designed for different types of terrain, from snow and mud to urban ruins, and have a load capacity of 150 to 600 kilograms.
Combat robots such as the Fury, Saber M2, MOROZ, and D-21-11 (D-11) provide the military with remote fire, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, often operating from a safe distance while attacking enemy positions using machine guns, thermal sights, and modular turrets. There are also drones for mining and kamikaze, designed to destroy enemy armored vehicles and fortifications.
Systems such as RATEL S and ARK-1 are remotely controlled and used to lay mines, deliver explosives, or conduct reconnaissance, combining mobility, speed, and combat power to maximize effectiveness without exposing soldiers to fire. Ground works are also used for demining. Mine-clearing robots such as "Snake", along with multifunctional platforms such as Sirko-S1 and KNLR-E, help soldiers safely clear minefields using remote control and modern sensors.
Equipped with thermal imaging and real-time communication systems, various evacuation robots can find and transport victims to medics even under fire. So, as you read these words, technology is subtly changing the art of war. Yevhen Malik is a Ukrainian veteran of the Russian-Ukrainian war and a former sergeant in the marines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Participant in combat operations in Mariupol and in the entire zone of the Joint Forces Operation, where he managed combat missions, amphibious operations and coordinated tactical planning in extreme conditions. From April 2022 to September 2024, he was held captive in Russia, which further strengthened his resilience and leadership qualities.
Malik holds academic degrees in law (Ukrainian University) and public administration (Kharkiv Regional Institute of Public Administration, National Academy of Public Administration under the President of Ukraine), as well as a reserve officer qualification at the Ivan Kozhedub Air Force University. Certified instructor in small arms and tactical training. An experienced specialist in the field of military leadership, crisis management, as well as strategic and tactical planning.
Actively participates in communication and protection of the interests of the armed forces and veterans of Ukraine. Olena Davlikanova is a senior researcher at the Center for the Analysis of European Politics (Washington) and the Sagaydachny Security Center (Kyiv).
An expert in the field of strategic forecasting and internal processes of Ukraine and Russia, as well as defense and security, who specializes in new forms of warfare, especially taking into account the constant threat of Russia to Ukraine. Co-author of the CEPA report "Containing Russia, Securing Europe", as well as other studies in the field of strategic forecasting, in particular "Scenarios: Ukraine 2032" and "Scenarios: Russia 2032".