October surprise. Why war in Israel will turn the race in the US in favor of Trump
For the second time a year, Iran released missiles on Israel, and the United States helped Israel to knock down these missiles. Jake Sullivan, US National Security Advisor, promised that Iran would be "serious consequences" and said the US would "work with Israel" to achieve it. It sounds sinister as a threat to common US-Israeli military action against Iran.
In April, Israel managed to persuade to limit the measures to the level at which the Iranians could settle in silence - and the exchange of blows stopped. This time, the likelihood of preventing further escalation between Iran and Israel seems much less. Israel had just opened the second front in the war with his regional enemies, having made a ground invasion of Lebanon in addition to the devastating blows that he had already struck by Hezbolla's battle forces.
The Benjamin Netanyaga government clearly feels that his enemies are in the run. He may want to strike in response to Iran, hoping to cause long -term harm to the Islamic Republic and possibly her nuclear program, which they are afraid. Some in Iran may be afraid of traping, firing Israel again with rockets. But the inability to respond to Israeli blows on Hezbolly, which followed the murder in July in Tehran, leader Hamas Ismail Gania, will also seem a serious risk.
The gloomy logic of war and restraint suggests that a state that is unable to protect its friends or respond to attacks in its capital looks weak. And weakness can potentially lead to new attacks, as well as loss of influence and prestige. Along with his rigid statements, the White House may still call Israel to check his actions in response and not strike in response so much that Iran feels forced to raise the rates again.
After the troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, Baiden administration does not want to be involved in another conflict in the Middle East. As the Israeli troops are already fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, the Netanyahu government may have their reasons not to go to the escalation of direct conflict with Iran right now. But if the Israelis decide that they still want to take more direct action, they have already shown that Baiden administration's calls for restraint may well ignore.
Although the White House may hope that when working with Israel, he will be able to have a greater impact on the strength and nature of the Israeli response. For many months, the United States has urged Israel not to start off the offensive on Hezbolla. After Israel began fighting last month, Biden administration, along with the United Kingdom, France and other countries, called for an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon. This proposal was ignored again.
The readiness of the Netanyag government simply to ignore the wishes of its closest ally and the guarantor of security stems from the paradox underlying US policy. Baiden's administration can call Israel to restraint in Gaza and Lebanon. But it will always cover Israel from the consequences of escalation, citing a comprehensive obligation to protect it from Iran and other regional enemies. As a result, the Israeli government understands that Biden's administration can call almost no risk.
Moreover, it can even bring some benefits if the United States still makes its military power against Iran. The likelihood that America will refuse to support Israel in a crisis - and it is always small - it is even more reduced because it remains a little over a month before the US presidential election. Kamala Harris flirted in order to take a stringent position on Netanyag on Gaza. But she also wants to look fully supported by Israel at the time of danger.
And in no way it can risk it seeming soft about Iran, with which in the United States the ancient history of hostility, which goes back to the crisis with hostages of 1979-81. However, the current dangerous situation can be a bad news for Harris. Donald Trump likes to claim that peace was prevailing during his presidency on the planet, and the "weakness" of Biden administration led to wars in Europe and the Middle East. This latter escalation is best suited for its version.