What will be at the front in 2025: whether the Russian army can grow to a million people
Therefore, for me, during this, parts next week will be advisable to consider immediately from a few "points of view" this question and this question and Then - to try to draw some generalized conclusions. Today we will start with the "resource" component. Personnel, OVT, reserves formation, etc.
Therefore, in the definition of the basic outlines (in the sense of the nature) of the enemy campaign for the above period, it is certainly important that it is not important for him to have a certain "instrument" for this (yes, I mean a strategic grouping On the territory of Ukraine and around it). Moreover, one of the decisive values, at the same time, will have its size and quality, that is, the size and level of its capacity (well or its main components). So, let's try to understand… 1.
As of the morning 16. 11 2024, the total number of "uninked groups - 567. 2 thousand servicemen. This is given the number of the latest strategic and operational regroups of the enemy troops (forces) both in separate operating areas and within the entire strategic grouping of his troops, or his entire army.
Thus, it becomes clear that a couple of months ago, a couple of months ago, the planned (desirable) number of this group of Russian troops is planned (690 thousand in / in at least the end of this year, will not be reached. Moreover, this will happen even if Pouilo orders mobilization right tomorrow . . .
What does this mean about the nature of the 2024 Winter Campaign? And this means that to continue the fighting on the territory of Ukraine to the Russian command and the military-political leadership in the Kremlin during the specified period will have, in the same way, almost the same composition of forces and means that it has already been expanded in the structure of its strategic group in Ukraine, Moreover, including almost all operating areas, both basic and auxiliary (minor).
Ba, even more, operational - also under a big question . . . I met in the spaces of "Tirnet" an interesting opinion of a number of experts that the main element of the Kremlin strategy in this war is the attempt to bring the number of groups of their troops in Ukraine to a million mark and by mobilization "Overload" simply set us this mass.
In this slender version, everything looks allegedly logical and consistently, with one slight exception - between desire and real capabilities, a considerable distance lies, sometimes it is a natural abyss. The so-called "partial mobilization", which started in the fall of 2022 and has been continuing (mostly in hidden mode), gave the Russian command in its first "wave" about 150-180 thousand "goals", more 100 more -120 they were awarded to the second . . .
and even given the losses during 2023, as well as the tributaries of all kinds of volunteers, mercenaries and contractors, managed to reach the 2024 year in the figure of half a million in \ sl (even a little more) to The moment when the beginning of their strategic offensive (late June - early July this year) was planned . . . But since then the number of Russian strategic grouping, which, in fact, was leading this war, fluctuated sufficiently indicative.
She reached her peak in the summer (before the Vovchansk campaign)-up to 578-580 thousand (I even in one summary met the figure of 589 thousand). Then-only decreased, there was a moment when it fell to 542-545 thousand. And here, by the end of autumn - the beginning of winter, due to the end of the "delayed" formation and deployment of a number of backup divisions, which have already begun "rolling" to come to the front, they managed to bring this figure to the mark - 567 thousand.
Agree, this is not an oscillation within the "plus-minus 200-300 thousand", as if the Kremlin would really be able to increase the number of strategic grouping in Ukraine in Ukraine in Ukraine. However, it also does not mean that he does not want it, it only means that he can't do it at this point. Or it is better to say - cannot afford mobilization. And for many reasons-starting with socio-economic, ending with internal and foreign policy . . . 2.
During 2024, the Russian military command of strategic level in addition to the 2022-2023 years deployed in 2022-2023 deployed 6 (six) formations in rank "Division" (the main tactical connection of land troops), namely: in October the month they were in the following state: as we can see, the composition and structure of enemy reserves that fall (of course, with "stretch") under the definition of "strategic reserves" - Elosed enough.
In fact, these are the operating areas of UV "Sever" and "Center", that is, those where, at the moment, the enemy is already coming, seeking to achieve the operational result. 3. What kind of conclusions can we, on the basis of paragraph 1 and paragraph 2, if we try to combine them, in the context of the possible nature of the enemy's actions on the future winter campaign? True . . .