US nuclear doctrine and conventional weapons: Under what conditions Washington will press "Red button"
What are the features of the US doctrine and is it possible to strike first? The US nuclear doctrine justifies itself: from the end of World War II, no one has inflicted nuclear strikes in the United States or other countries. Focus has translated the Security Analytics article, the US Air Force Transfer Harrison Cassa on National Interest.
In the article "What is the US nuclear doctrine?" It is about the concept of restraint, its effectiveness and the conditions under what conditions Washington can press the "red button". The nuclear war remains among the most serious threats to the existence of mankind and perhaps the most uniform threat to its disappearance.
One of the world's largest nuclear arsenals is the United States, which retain deliberate uncertainty in their nuclear policy, which is why it is extremely difficult to understand how and when America can use nuclear weapons. Despite the uncertainty of the US doctrine, precedents and procedures give a certain idea of the real nuclear policy of the most powerful country in the world. Some states have nuclear weapons to compensate for the shortcomings of their conventional armed forces.
For example, Pakistan's armed forces are generally considered weaker than Indian, but Pakistan's nuclear weapons help maintain the balance of power between the two sides. The United States has long have the world's strongest conventional armed forces, which eliminates the need for a nuclear shield. Instead, the basis of the US nuclear doctrine was nuclear restraint, that is, the highest priority is to prevent nuclear aggression by the enemy due to the threat of devastating revenge.
Since the onset of the nuclear era in the 1940s, the United States seeks to convince their opponents that any nuclear attack on the US or their ally under the treaty will be regarded as an occasion for a huge scale in response. Of course, restraint depends largely on the United States's ability to strike a second blow that requires a variety of nuclear arsenal. It is safe to say that this restraint strategy has worked: after all, no one has ever inflicted a nuclear strike in the United States.
In the 1950s, Presidential Dwight D. Eisenhower adopted a "massive retribution" policy on the use of nuclear weapons-essentially the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons in response to any provocation. However, in the late 1950s, a number of incidents occurred in the world that this approach could not cope with-mainly because the United States would have to move to the nuclear war, and Eisenhower repeatedly refused to go. After joining President John F.
Kennedy in 1961, American politicians adopted the doctrine of "flexible response", which allowed a whole range of response options - from normal defense to limited nuclear weapons. The purpose of this approach was to give politicians a number of acceptable options that do not lead to a full -scale nuclear war - a commendable decision, given that such a war can lead to the death of mankind.
To this end, the US still supports a number of systems that allow you to give a proportional response without resorting to a full -scale nuclear war: it is a nuclear triad. The most recognizable feature of the US nuclear doctrine is a nuclear triad consisting of: a triad guarantees that no stroke can deprive the United States with the entire nuclear arsenal.
Opponents understand that any nuclear attack on the United States will strike back that will destroy the country's country, which makes the first blow to a deliberately losing option. As mentioned earlier, the United States retains deliberate uncertainty. For example, the United States has never taken a common obligation to "do not use weapons first", leaving opponents to guess how and when the United States decides to use its formidable nuclear arsenal.
This uncertainty leaves open, for example, the possibility that America will decide to strike in response to nuclear weapons in the event of a sufficiently strong attack by conventional weapons. The doctrine also does not mention whether nuclear weapons will be used in response to the use of other types of weapons of mass destruction, namely biological and chemical. The US official doctrine calls for minimizing civilian losses during a nuclear attack, focusing on military purposes.
However, the scale of nuclear stroke inevitably leads to enormous concomitant destruction, which makes this issue somewhat contradictory. So far, the comprehensive US doctrine of nuclear weapons has justified itself: since in 1945, the United States has dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no one has ever inflicted nuclear blows to the United States (or other countries).
In order to continue this achievement in the 21st century - in the face of confrontation between the US and Russia, the growth and improvement of the nuclear arsenal of China and a potential threat from North Korea and Iran - will need to be solved new tasks. In addition, the development of cyber threats and artificial intelligence adds another level of uncertainty in the world, where an elementary mistake can lead to the destruction of all humanity.
Harrison Cass is a senior author of the defense and national security department at The National Interest. CASS is a lawyer and a former political candidate who joined the US Air Force as a trainee pilot and was then demobilized for health. It specializes in the military strategy, the aerospace industry and global security issues. Harrison has obtained a doctor of law at Oregon University and a master's degree in global journalism and international relations at New York University.