To defeat Russia. How to reorganize the Ukrainian army
Video Day Ukraine launched a war with 38 maneuverable (infantry and tank) brigades and nine artillery brigades organized on the Russian model. Each team has about 4,000 soldiers under the command of the colonel. Unlike the Western armies, Ukraine does not use higher -level divisions and buildings characteristic of NATO, instead relying on "regional" commands.
They lack the real battle staffs that can integrate aircraft coordination, deep -water fire, logistics, exploration and command and higher -level command. The current organization suffers from problems with the definition of "responsibility zone" and does not allow Ukraine to carry out large -scale offensive operations.
The best approach is the transformation of regional commands into real corps headquarters, which is commanded by a three-star Lieutenant General with a trained combat headquarters, and the introduction of divisions commanded by a two-star Major General, as an intermediate echelon of command. Both should contain supporting formations (artillery, anti -air, aviation, engineering, liaison, logistics, medical and intelligence units), which are crucial for success in the modern war.
Creating these structures in wartime will be a difficult task, but with proper support they can be deployed by 2023. The result of this step will be the creation of four regional orientation buildings with a number of two to three divisions (including territorial defense forces) depending on the terrain and threat. To move on the offensive and counter -offensive of Ukraine also requires the fifth housing of the total reserve of at least three tank and mechanized divisions.
This would serve as an armored fist under the guidance of the most experienced and successful commanders for decisive operations to displace the Russian army from the territory of Ukraine. In order to coordinate these buildings, Ukraine must create a four -star Field Army headquarters, which will be headed by the commander of the Ukrainian Land Forces.
Many building blocks of these formations already exist in the current structure of forces and in constant headquarters, which only need to be transformed or expanded for use on the battlefield. This state does not have to be particularly large, as in the US and NATO, and key staff positions can be filled with at least partially officers who are unable to serve on the front line through wounds or age. Women are already in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in large numbers and can play a key role here.
Using the staff of staff officers who have already undergone Western training in staff and military schools, as well as with the support of NATO and the EU, these staffs can be formed by the end of 2022 and can be theoretically ready for the mission by the end of spring 2023. Since the war is not visible, Ukraine is faced with an urgent need to fill the loss on the battlefield with new recruits. Unlike Russia, Ukraine can use almost its entire personnel reserve in this national emergency.
Commanders will be tempted to throw partially trained soldiers into battle as point replacement, but this desire should be resisted if Ukraine wants to exhibit capable forces. The best approach is the temporary removal of damaged units for recreation and replacement fully trained. After that, veterans in the cohesive units can enter newcomers. The units do not necessarily have to be staffed with a full composition of peacetime if they are equipped with basic weapons and combat vehicles.
The selection and training of junior commanders, namely non-commissioners, lieutenants and captains, are of paramount importance. The best should be assigned to combat units where the highest requirements and the most difficult field conditions. In a more general terms, the careful use of human resources can maximize the effectiveness of Ukrainian forces in the field. Initial reports provide problems here.
Some retired officers are on duty at checkpoints, and at least one Sandharst graduate was sent to territorial forces. Carefully combing civil labor, Ukraine can identify recruits with skills that face military specialties, taking care of preserving the main sectors of the economy and public service. Here, the productivity in the field should be a key criterion for rapid promotion.
Commanders who have found themselves on the battlefield should be discovered and increased regardless of the seniority and placed where they can provide decisive results. All this requires institutional support and infrastructure for recruitment, training, equipment and maintenance in the field.
Ukraine should also develop the potential of the country's defense industry for the production, repair and replacement of combat systems, as well as for the production of ammunition, spare parts and other items of supply required for hostilities. The increase of these opportunities during the war will be difficult, especially when Russian ballistic and winged missiles regularly strikes industrial enterprises in the rear areas.
The reform of chaotic bureaucratic practice and improving the efficiency of production and distribution is also needed. Foreign aid may be useful here, but internal defense reform should be under the leadership of Ukraine. The efforts to reorganize in the midst of war will be painful. However, this is necessary if Ukraine wants to win its national territory. And one of the advantages here is the crisis itself.
In the end, nothing so eliminates the obstacle and focuses actions as an existential threat. Again and again, Ukraine proved that it could adapt and transform, being under high pressure and stress. The reorganization of the Ukrainian army is no different about this. By following this road card, Ukraine can succeed next year and put an end to the war. This will ensure the survival of Ukraine itself and restore peace in Europe.