Where and why beat ATACMS missiles: Three main problems using a long -range weapon
After more than an annual counteraction to the use of Western comprehensive weapons for the task of strikes in the Russian territory, Baiden administration came to the conclusion that the missiles of the long -standing radius of American production against the goals in the Russian territory.
In this regard, the question arises: what has changed to make it acceptable now and what will change for Ukraine? The answers to these questions are less concerned with the harm that the army tactical missile system (ATACMS) can do, and more - what it can give, and whether it will be given a catalyst to support from other countries, such as Germany. The US Armed Forces have a limited amount of ATACMS and no longer produce them.
As for other Western long -range weapons, the pace of their production cannot now give the amount that is needed to achieve significant effect on the battlefield. A good example is how Ukraine has released the majority of the British Arsenal Storm Shadow for Russian deep purposes in 2023, but could not weaken the enemy's military administration to a level that the Ukrainian military could use.
In other words, giving this weapon to Ukraine, the donor is at risk of its own plans for how it can campaign. Despite these restrictions, the concentrated use of long -range weapons can cause disproportionate harm to individual goals, thus opening up new opportunities. The question is whether the Ukrainian soldiers are able to use the gap. An example of how such "gaps" is used is a set of electronic wrestling and shock capabilities used to capture part of the Kursk region of Russia in August 2024.
Since the end of 2023, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have a tendency to be more losses than new fighters are gaining more. Much of these casualties were insignificant and the soldiers returned to the system, but over time it led to the weakening of the units along the collision line and, thus, to an increasing lack of forces in defense, which in the summer of 2024 reached the points when Russia could start breaking the defense of Ukraine in the Donbass.
This did not allow us to use the opportunities created by Russian vulnerabilities. For the international partners of Ukraine, long -time anxiety about unblocking the use of ATACMS against Russia is that limited inventories of these weapons should be used to delay the start of pressure on the Ukrainian Front, but as a result will help to delay the solution of the Ukrainian government with problems with the formation of their own forces.
President Vladimir Zelensky, represented by partners in September 2024, was not considered in September 2024. What has changed? Ukraine is rapidly approaching the moment when it does not solve the problem with personnel, it will be difficult for it to protect the length of the front, and therefore, the process of destruction of combat positions will accelerate. In this context, time for reforming is extremely important.
Partners of Ukraine can do little to change the nature of hostilities on the line of collision, but aimed at the opportunities that give Russia an advantage on the battlefield, you can win time. The next question is why you strike. For any set set of goals, there is a critical threshold of strokes, which must be achieved before a tangible effect on fighting is obtained.
For example, when Ukraine has struck three rocky strokes in Russian artillery warehouses, although the volume of destroyed ammunition was impressive, they were eventually replaced in a timely manner. Ukrainians destroyed three out of ten ammunition depots in this area. The result was a reduction in the number of shells for Russian units for a limited period, not a widespread shortage of shells. If seven warehouses were affected, the effect would be much more pronounced.
Ukrainian military is not a very cohesive organization. In their benches, there are many units, each of which is inclined to pursue creative and often effective goals in themselves, but rarely on a decisive scale. This creativity is one of the strengths of the Ukrainian military.
But when it comes to a deep blow, the lack of discipline in the choice of goals often leads to scattering of the effect, resulting in the resulting operational losses are incomparable with the amount of damaged or destroyed objects.
Therefore, the critical question related to the solution about ATACMS is not what ammunition is now allowed to use-in any case, the operational goals within Ukraine's borders were more than available ammunition, but that it should be a priority and how The blows will be synchronized with a wider arsenal of weapons, from Storm Shadow to the actual Ukrainian ammunition. Complex volleys, after all, have a much less chance of being reflected by Russian air defense. There is a strategic question.
In military terms, goals are easy to define. The destruction of Russian ammunition warehouses, gas stations and arms of shock aviation or Russian operational-tactical missile systems will have a useful effect in the reduction of losses of Ukrainians and thus contribute to the stabilization of the front. But these are not the goals that will give levers to negotiations. The goals that will give levers - mostly economic and industrial.
The problem here is that the future administration, which insists on negotiations, is not the current administration that approves the strikes, so it seems unlikely that there is a close strategic cooperation between them on how the latter can contribute to the strategy of the previous one. The question of the risk of escalation is persistently out of this discussion.
Unfortunately, it has been stuck in the debate about whether any use of such weapons to nuclear response, which will certainly not happen. The reality is that Russia can go to escalation, using different ways of imposing a measure of expenses, from underwater sabotage to the use of trusted persons to prosecute trade in the Bab-el-Mandebsk Strait.
The fact that Russia has already tried to secretly carry bombs in Europe, sponsored the murder of European industrialists and involved North Korean troops into the war on European soil, indicates that escalation is happening. And she will discard a long shadow. This does not mean that the risks associated with the approval of the use of ATACMS are unjustified or strategically stupid. But to be effective, their use should be part of a broader strategy aimed at specific goals.
This requires the agreed use of ATACMS and ammunition from other partners, along with their own far strike systems of Ukraine. The Ukrainian military should also have a plan to use the effects achieved. The duration of influence depends on the depth of the resource, which means that, for example, the willingness of Germany to supply Taurus will have a significant impact on how significant the effect of strokes deep into the territory of the Russian Federation will be.
The most important question is to which extent in the last days of the reign of the current US ATACMS administration will be used to implement a broader targeting strategy to achieve military effects and negotiations - whether it will remain a purely political tool. One can only hope that the US decision on the distant missiles will not remain simply a "signal" in response to the appearance of the North Korean troops.