Iran and Russia: the problem of solidarity between exiles
" The concept emphasizes the intention of Moscow to strengthen relations with far abroad, in particular, "to develop full -scale and trusting cooperation" with Iran and other states, dissatisfied with the Western policy on them. Despite the fact that the Russian-Iranian friendship has been stronger for the first year, this document testifies to the deepening of the Alliance, especially in connection with the war in Ukraine.
Focus translated the article by Matthew Druen and Nicole Gryaevsky about the complexities of relations between the Russian Federation and Iran. This partnership is not just a mutually beneficial union, but complex and multifaceted relations with a long history. Over the last 20 years, Russia and Iran have observed common views on many global problems and cases.
First of all, they are associated with a joint dislike for a "collective event", whose values and strategic goals, in their opinion, are an ideological challenge that can jeopardize their social cohesion and political stability. Russia and Iran also combine a common concern for the survival of the regime. Both regimes deal with internal upheavals and international sanctions, which forced them to develop mirror narratives, in the center of which - stability, self -sufficiency and resistance.
This led to the rapprochement of two states. Not wanting to resist this partnership by military means, Western countries pursue a policy of sanctions, economic breaks and diplomacy aimed at isolation of these two countries. Commentators and officials characterize Iran and Russia as "exile states" for the West. However, the declaration of Russia and Iran "exiles" and their economic isolation will not necessarily make them.
Since the early 2000s, Iran and Russia have worked in tandem on the creation of a global solidarity network with other countries excommunicated from Western powers, such as Venezuela, Syria and North Korea, which contributed to their stability.
Despite the "maximum pressure" that Donald Trump, for example, is exerted on Iran or European "sanction packages" to Russia, the Western powers have not been able to change the strategic course of these regimes or completely deprive them of their domestic and international support. Therefore, the event should be considered how effective such a policy of ostracism is.
Although Western powers must protect their interests and values, they must also admit that they may not be able to share Iran and Russia. Instead, Western powers have to cultivate "strategic patience": to engage in dialogue with Russia and Iran, as well as to respond to their provocations. Such confrontation ultimately confirms their narratives.
The event should be followed by a tripartite approach: first, to insure against threats from these regimes by increasing restraint, increasing stability and readiness to unforeseen circumstances; secondly, to attract the diaspora and civil societies of these two countries in their side to clarify that they do not oppose their homeland or fellow citizens, but against the regimes that oppress them; Third, continue to interact with the club of "neutral states" that provide vital support for these regimes.
Russia and Iran are somewhat unexpected political allies, considering that serious contradictions are historically present in their relations. After Peter I came to power, the fall of the Sefevages in the XVIII century of the dynasty of the Russian and Persian empires, which changed each other, were mainly in hostile relations, which were marked with five wars, which ended with the victory of Russia.
Throughout the twentieth century, the change of regimes in Russia and Iran - the formation of the Soviet Union, the coming to power of the Pahlev dynasty, and then the Iran Islamic Republic, led to hostile relations between the two states. Only in the Gorbachev era, from 1985 to 1991, Moscow and Tehran began to develop diplomatic, military and economic ties, which include the sale of weapons and cooperation in civilian nuclear energy.
In the 1990s, relations between Russia and Tehran changed with how post-Soviet Russia sought to build closer relations with the United States. In 1995 However, after coming to power in 2000, Putin changed his attitude to Iran. He resumed the sale of Iran's weapons and in 2001 concluded a 20-year cooperation agreement with Supreme Leader Ayatola Ali Khameney.
In the early 2000s, the exposing of a secret nuclear program in Iran in the early 2000s created Moscow's problems with the United States, and Putin restricted relations with the Islamic Republic. He and his government have also supported several UN Security Council resolutions that require Iran to suspend Uranus enrichment. Moscow's concern intensified in 2009, when the United States, the United Kingdom and France revealed Tehran's plans for the construction of the Second Enrichment Complex.
Russia for President Dmitry Medvedev has imposed additional sanctions, including a ban on the sale of Tehran S-300 systems. However, in the first decade of the 21st century, it became increasingly obvious that Russia and Iran are experiencing a similar dissatisfaction with the international system and set a goal for changing regional order.
Iran, whose president from 2005 to 2013 was a rigid Conservative of Mahmud Ahmadinezhad, took a confrontation position on the event and pursued opportunistic regional policy. He took advantage of chaos in Iraq and Lebanon to strengthen his influence through his intermediaries in these countries, in particular through Shiite paramilitary formations such as Hezbolla or Asaib Akhl Al Hak.
In Russia, Putin was outraged by a wave of anti -regime performances in Central Asia, known as "Color Revolutions" and the expansion of NATO east in the former Soviet republics, which he perceived as hostility to Russia, incited by the United States. As he stated at his annual press conference in December 2021: "You promised us in the 1990s that [NATO] would not advance to the east of an inch. You have deceived us with no way.
" The nature of the cooperation of Russia and Iran changed during the Civil War in Syria. In the context of the Arab Spring, which resulted in the early 2010s in the Arab world, several autocrats were thrown away, Iran and Russia did not want the President of Syria Bashar al-Assad and his government to have the same fate.
Both regimes maintain links with Assad regime since the 1970s, and the geographical location of Syria makes it extremely important for both regimes: for Russia it provides a single direct access to the Mediterranean through the Tartus naval base, and for Iran, the country serves as a land connection between Iraq.
In 2013, Iran and Russia were confirmed that Western countries would not enter the military confrontation with the Assad regime after the retreat of Barack Obama Administration from the Red Line on chemical weapons. The road to Damascus was opened. In 2015, two countries decided to coordinate their military operations in Syria - in September 2015, Russia entered the Syrian war with Iran as an ally, changing the balance of power.
Strategic success on the battlefield, when it was possible to stop a number of armed opposition groups and to recruit large territories, strengthened Russia and Iran in their confidence in their own military advantage. In the context of war in Ukraine, these two regimes are cooperating closer today than ever.
Although Russia has long retained bilateral relations as a military and economic player, as well as a key exporter of oil and gas, its struggle for victory in Ukraine has led to a change in balance in relations. Now Moscow had to seek help from Tehran. In July 2022, Putin visited Iran, which became his first trip to a foreign country outside the former Soviet Union after the start of the war in Ukraine.
There he received strong support for his war: Hamenei spoke in a sharp form, stating that Russia's confrontation with NATO was a "defense act". Iran provided hundreds of drones to Russia and sent to the Crimea instructors from the Corps of Guardians of the Islamic Revolution for the training of the Russian Armed Forces of fighting through UAV. Instead, the Islamic Republic probably receives complex military platforms, including satellite images, fourth generation Su-35 fighters and air defense.
In addition to the war, Moscow and Tehran are also working to strengthen the 20-year strategic partnership, which should update the agreement signed in 2001. The two countries have signed a key memorandum on mutual understanding between the Russian State Energy Giant Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company for exports of liquefied natural gas, and also established direct links between their banking systems.
However, the deepening of bilateral relations is not enough for these countries to resist the influence of Western sanctions and ostracism. Therefore, to bypass sanctions and strengthen the multilateral order, these two countries resort to a very similar strategy. In order to eliminate the consequences of sanctions and policy of ostracism, both countries sought to create their own international solidarity networks.
Together or in parallel, they acted in two directions: they turned to the East and used dissatisfaction with other countries in the existing international order. First, with how Russia and Iran became exile for the West, they sought to strengthen partnerships in the south and east. The Iranian Strategy for the East (Negah-E Sharg) was developed under the mandate of Akhmadinezhad in 2005, and the Russian strategy "Turn to the East" was declared Putin in 2012.
China is now the most powerful partner of both modes. Beijing left Russia and Iran the opportunity to wage their own local wars - in Syria and Ukraine, without participating in them directly and without interfering, but not maintaining neutrality. China is the main beneficiary of dumping oil and gas that Iran and Russia cannot export to other countries because of international sanctions.
The sponsoring of China with the convergence of Iran and Saudi Arabia and the visit of the Secretary -General of the China Cinpin to Moscow are also clear signs of increasing China's authority as a "main Eurasian state". Thus, Iranian and Russian regimes will be increasingly dependent on China in matters of survival. Russia and Iran also manage to maintain a balanced relationship with both Pakistan and India.
Russia became the main supplier of oil to India in 2022, remaining a major supplier of weapons for India, but while maintaining a close relationship with Pakistan. Iran's trade with India and Pakistan has been affected by US sanctions, but it remains significant and grow. Tehran also has common interests with New Delhi in Afghanistan and in regional ties, in particular through a strategically important port of Chabahar, located on the shore of the Indian Ocean, where India built two terminals.
Secondly, Russia and Iran are trying to use dissatisfaction with the existing international order in Latin America, Africa and Asia with low and middle and medium income known as the Global South. Both countries have a long history of cooperation with countries such as North Korea and Belarus, which are considered exiles in the world diplomatic community. However, in recent decades, both countries have directed special efforts to create alliances in Latin America and Africa.
In the first case, they established close connections with Venezuela. In 2022, three countries conducted joint exercises, and Karakas and Tehran signed a 20-year-old cooperation plan. The main allies of Moscow and Tehran in the region are also Nicaragua, where in June there was President of Iran Ibrahim Raisi and Cuba. Russia and Iran are also actively trying to develop their influence on the African continent. Both countries pursue three main goals.
Attempts to kill a wedge between Iran and Russia have not ended with success, since the common interests of the two countries significantly outweigh their differences. Therefore, the "exile partnership" between Iran and Russia is likely to persist until the current regimes exist. In view of the sustainability of these regimes, Western countries should not sit, but show "strategic patience" and admit that they have little levers to change the strategic path chosen by Russia and Iran.
Instead, they need to redeem their energy to the parties that can actually affect these regimes: civil societies in Russia and Iran, as well as global partners who support these two regimes. When working with regimes seeking to attract the attention of the world public, Western countries should avoid interaction with them, which enables them to either "save" or "lose their faces". In the first case, they indulge in hostile modes, in the second - encourage them.
The 2015 Minsk Agreement with Russia to end the war in Ukraine or negotiate with Iran on its nuclear program show that interaction may slow but not change the plans of these regimes. This is not because the initiatives were false, but because the modes themselves are not programmed for concessions and compromises.
Therefore, instead of achieving changes in behavior, the Western states must show "strategic patience", that is, to retain the position of force, avoiding political steps that could nourish the narratives of Moscow and Tehran regarding the hostility of the West. At the same time, Western countries should be insured against the most pressing threats to their safety by Iran and Russia.
To do this, it is necessary to take a wide range of efforts, starting with a reliable nuclear restraint, including the subsequent deployment of aircraft carriers and placement in the dual-use aircraft in the region, despite the priority that the United States shall give the Indo-Pacific. It will also need to solve technological problems by developing new high -power tools, such as hypersonic weapons and direct energy weapons, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles.
Finally, it is necessary to increase resistance to cybernetic and hybrid threats, as well as the fight against misinformation and destabilization campaigns. According to Agata Demar in his book "Backward", attempts to separate people from their regimes through sanctions that affect their daily lives, usually set up people against the state that has imposed sanctions.
Western powers must review their approach and support civil society in Iran and Russia, which will be the key to possible changes in the event of weakening or collapse of these regimes. Strengthening civil society can be achieved through more proven public communications that clearly distinguish between the population and regimes, or through more active interaction with the diasporas of both countries.
Finally, if the Western powers really want Russian and Iranian regimes to become exiles, they must interact primarily with those countries for which Russia and Iran remain key allies. The US and their closest partners should focus on large-nuclear states: countries that value liberal-democratic standards and at the same time understand the dissatisfaction of Russia or Iran with an existing international order.
This club includes eight countries in the Great Twenty: Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and South Africa. These are the large -growing economies and the Moscow, Beijing and Tehran are actively trying to influence in one way or another. According to Tim Swiss and Michael J.
Mazarr, in his article "Mind The Middle Powers" on the War on the Rocks, the Western powers need to rebuild their relations with these countries "towards a more inclusive and less forced approach," considering them as equal, not as variables. Their interaction with the West should not resemble a "new Cold War", which forces countries to accept one side or another with the help of "gingerbread and whips".
On the contrary, it should be a strategic dialogue aimed at understanding the basic motives that encourage sub-scenery states to maintain ties with Russia and Iran, and to evaluate whether the West can offer something more attractive. In the short term, these efforts may have virtually no effect, but in the long -term game, which Russia and Iran are conducted, they will prevent the strengthening of the "multi -party order", which are being built by these two regimes.
Matthew Druen is an invited researcher of the program from Europe, Russia and Eurasia of the Center for Strategic and International Research (CSIS). Prior to his arrival in CSIS, Mr Duven held the position of Deputy Head of Strategic Issues in the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France (Foreign Ministry). Раніше він працював у посольствах Франції в Кувейті, Іраку та Об'єднаних Арабських Еміратах.
Ніколь Граєвскі – постдокторантка програми Стентона з ядерної безпеки в проєкті "Управління атомом" Белферського центру з науки і міжнародних відносин при Гарвардській школі Кеннеді.