Technology

Can save Ukrainians but there are conditions: how the IE systems affect Russian missiles

As for rockets, the military uses self -alienation with the help of an active radar head, which can be blinded by a radar station to deprive the missile capacity of navigation and aiming. It is possible to counteract the Russian drone-Kamikadze and rockets with the help of radio electronic fight, but not in all cases. This is stated in Defense Express, published on Wednesday, January 24.

The possibility of influencing the RBs on the enemy's technique is due to the fact that, for example, "Shahaned-136", Iranian Dron-Kamikadze, uses a simple navigation system based on satellite and inertial systems. Satellite navigation can lead to a deviation on the flight path 5% of the distance traveled without GPS. However, during the navigation signal recovery, the inertial system errors will be compensated, and the aircraft will be able to fly again on the exact route.

Supporting satellite navigation is also not a simple task. A possible solution is not to suppress the satellite navigation, but to substitute coordinates using the method of purging. In this case, the navigation system will consider that the coordinates obtained are "real", although they are transmitted by the means of HR. But special software solutions are used to combat such attacks.

It is important to understand that in order to effectively counteract navigation, it is necessary to use the "field of HR" instead of protecting individual objects. Covering only the last kilometer, the navigation error will be approximately 50 meters, which may be sufficient to protect one object, but not enough to protect the city. Winged rockets, such as X-101, use a complex of navigation systems, including satellite, inertial, radio hat, Tercom and DSMAC.

These systems are not ideal and can be exposed to various factors, such as light levels. Therefore, although suppression of satellite navigation can reduce the efficiency of rockets, it can not completely eliminate the threat. Media also notes that not all missiles depend on navigation systems, some missiles use self -alignment with an active radar head. For example, X-22, X-35, Onyx and P-35 have such a guidance system.

If the obstacles are put on a rocket radar station, it will lose the ability to navigate and aim. The air forces have already reported the possibility of counteracting such rockets. Radio -electronic fighting systems (HRS) developed in Ukraine and the US may be effective in combating hostile replacement missiles. These systems are designed to dazzle radar heads of missiles that can be used by the enemy.

However, these systems can only be effective against the southern regions of Ukraine, which contain whole hostile missiles. At the same time, other Russian missiles, such as Iskander and Dagger, use radar heads of homing, but more prolonged. These heads are used to reach the rocket to the target on the terminal area. Although the EWS can affect such missiles, they have their restrictions and need constant development, as the enemy is constantly modernizing his missiles.

In general, these systems of the HCV are an important component of counteracting threat and increased air defense, but is not an absolute panacea against all types of hostile means. We will remind, on January 24, the media wrote that the Ukrainian IEC was able to "neutralize" 20 of the 21 means of attack during a rocket attack. The Armed Forces Command for the first time stated that it could "neutralize" two dozen Russian missiles not by air defense, but the EW.

Western analysts talk about the "turning point" on the protection of the sky of Ukraine. And the day earlier, on January 23, the speaker of the Air Force Yuri Ignat said that not all 20 missiles, which had not been intercepted by Ukrainian air defense during the attack of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, reached the goals. According to the military, the Armed Forces uses EW to suppress navigation, which is used in the guidance of "high -precision" Russian missiles.