Peace from Putin: that the Kremlin's head hopes to "squeeze" from Trump
So Peskov states that Russia is ready for peace negotiations without prior conditions, and then Lavrov rolls out a whole list of such requirements. Putin himself announces another truce. In fact, you should not draw big conclusions from individual statements and actions of the Kremlin. It is necessary to understand the more Putin goals and the features of his tactical game.
The main goal of Putin for which he began the war against Ukraine is to destroy the independence of our country, to restore Russian control over Ukraine either through military victory, or through coercion to "peace" on Russian conditions. And yet there is no reason to believe that Putin's intentions have changed dramatically.
But after the return of Trump to power in the US and the demonstration of his intentions to end the war in Ukraine and to settle relations with Russia, a Russian dictator has a new goal - to conclude a great geopolitical (and geo -economic) equipment with Trump and thus split the unity of the Western world, to restore and to reinstate Russia. Putin itself still sought "Yalta-2", the distribution of spheres of influence between the West and Russia.
And now, with Trump's return to the White House, there are some opportunities for this. The Kremlin's intentions on Trump do not in any way contradict his desire to destroy or conquer Ukraine. Just now he wants to do it by using (frankly or hidden) features of Trump's foreign policy approaches. That is, if Trump wants peace, Putin offers him the opportunity to end the war in Ukraine, but mostly on Russian conditions.
The Kremlin wants Trump to squeeze Kyiv to peace on Russian conditions by alleged "peace talks". And if it does not work, then to accuse Ukraine of unwillingness to end the war, push Trump to leaving peace negotiations and the complete cessation of Ukraine's military support. In parallel, Putin will continue to negotiate with the White House to make the same "big equipment" between Russia and the United States, tempting Trump to attractive business projects.
Thus, the ideal scenario for the Kremlin is to agree with Trump and force Ukraine to peace on its own terms, or to agree with Trump and continue the war in Ukraine. Putin uses appropriate tactical tools to implement this scenario. Periodically, the Kremlin, and personally the Russian dictator himself, convinces Trump that Putin sincerely seeks peace, is very good at the current US President, wants to agree with him on mutually beneficial conditions.
For this purpose, appropriate peacekeeping statements are made (lately, and temporary "truce"), the flow is poured into Trump, his portraits are drawn, super-attractive business projects are offered, Trump's special representative Steve Vitcoff is being processed persistently. But then, when specific negotiations begin to end the war, the Kremlin begins to make conditions and demand unilateral concessions from Ukraine and even the US. The tactics of tightening peace talks are actively used.
For Russia, this is not a goal, but a tool. The Kremlin also wants Trump to break patience, but in relation to Ukraine. Different tactical tasks of the Kremlin are performed by different Putin's associates. Kirill Dmitriev acts as a "friendly negotiator" with the US and a "business companion", and Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation acts in the roll of "evil negotiator".
Lavrov became such a "reincarnation" of Andriy Gromyko, a former USSR Foreign Minister, who was then called "Mister No" for his extraordinary negotiation. The presence of negotiators who perform opposite tasks allows Putin to maneuver and pursue double policy in relations with the US around the topic of peace talks. Some observers believe that K. Dmitriev and S. Lavrov represent competing groups in the Kremlin. K.
Dmitriev represents a conditional "consent party with Trump", and Lavrov - "Party of continuation of the war against Ukraine". Their simultaneous or alternate use also allows Putin to keep the balance of opposite interests in his environment. Understanding the features of Putin's tactical tools is necessary in order not to draw premature and great conclusions from individual statements and actions of the Kremlin's official representatives.
Putin's tactical maneuvers with his real policy should not be confused. At the same time, we, and especially Americans need to take into account this duality of the current strategic goals of the Kremlin. It is Putin's interest that can be used in Trump arrangements for negotiating pressure on Russia.
Instead of concessions to the Russians for the sake of their consent to ceasefire, the US should put a rigid ultimatum of the Kremlin - either immediate negotiations and arrangements for ceasefire (and only then negotiations on other issues), or termination of negotiation dialogue between the US and the Russian Federation. Americans do not threaten the negotiation from the negotiations, but to the Russians. And in parallel it is possible to strengthen the sanctions against the Russian Federation.