The war of cars is getting closer. Why does the robotic not reduce the land troops: the experience of Ukraine
Although the drone they used was autonomous, it could not be done from the remote headquarters by pressing the button. Instead, a column of eight cars and eight people had to work through the "gray zone", to communicate and to keep a position for several hours. Comparing the picture of unmanned operations on Pentagon slides and Ukrainian reality, I mentioned this case. Focus translated Jack Wotling's article about why the robot would not replace a person in the Land Forces.
In the face of recruiting personnel to the Western Armed Forces, it became fashionable to state that military leaders smooth out the consequences of reducing the number of troops by reducing the need for mass due to the prospects that opened robotic and autonomous systems. The problem with this argument is that when it comes to land troops, it has no reason.
As I observed in Ukraine and other theaters of hostilities, the introduction of robotic and autonomous systems in the troops can lead to an increase in both the number of people and the variety of skills required in the troops. To support the drone, it took so many people, because the mission required an operator, a technician and a communication specialist, as well as a means of protection to save their lives while they do their work.
The technology was advanced, but remained time consuming and requires high qualification. Staff requirements were also not limited to people on the ground. To plan the drone trajectory, the OTB operators had to carry out electromagnetic reconnaissance, and to use the resulting picture, experts in the image analysis were required.
The reality of most new technologies is that people are needed for their use, and if the number of soldiers is reduced in one realm, they often move to other parts of the battlefield. Although autonomous systems can often increase the capabilities of the unit, a minimum of people is left in the war to complete the main tasks. Consider the infantry unit equipped with a small autonomous caterpillar machine with machine guns and sensors, as well as a small drone for observation.
Suppose that the number of infantry units without these means is usually 12 soldiers divided into three fire groups. In the case of a detachment with a robotic and autonomous system, it is obvious that two firing groups should remain unchanged. This is due to the fact that autonomous systems have clear limitations. The caterpillar machine cannot storm the trench, get into a building or take prisoners. Yes, the infantry department still requires two assault fire groups.
The third firing group, which is a firing base, can use robotic and autonomous systems. During the tests, these systems have shown that they can provide much more efficient, more prompt and accurate suppression than a machine gunner. However, you cannot leave them on gravity.
Robesized and autonomous systems do not evaluate the context poorly, and without a person that is included in the chain (but not in the car itself), according to my observations, they make a variety of nonsense - from endless shooting for affected purposes to stuck in such simple obstacles as a farm gate . The problem is that if one person is to be near robotic and autonomous systems, then it is necessary for the second person to be next to him.
Leaving someone alone on the battlefield is not the best idea. For example, if he is injured, someone should be close to support him. Loneliness in the face of a direct threat to life affects the moral spirit and decision -making. In addition, there is a problem with unmanned air systems. These drones become critical for tactical actions, which I personally convinced during my many trips to Ukraine. But the operator who uses the drone looks at the glasses or the control terminal.
Operators are devoid of more awareness. They are no place in the assault groups, and it is unreasonable to leave them alone when they act in close proximity to the enemy. Yes, a detachment with robotic and autonomous systems and a drone can be much more powerful than a detachment without them, but it will not necessarily be smaller. If you concentrate new technologies rather than distribute them by detachments, you can achieve some advantage in the efficiency of use of living force.
For example, two people may well control the fighting of a whole anti-tank platoon of robotic and autonomous systems equipped with PTKRAM, or to manage combat actions of a platoon of robotic robotic. Therefore, in the context of the battalion company of fire support per one of the gun -serviced crew, there may be less staff. However, the effect is not to reduce the number of staff required, but to transition to the mouth of support.
While two people may well watch the missile screen, there are many tasks, including the watch during sleep, which require more people. But a real problem is the burden of servicing robotic and autonomous systems. The traditional machine gun in the infantry battalion carries relatively simple mechanical objects that can be maintained in working order with a battalion weapon and its tools.
A machine -gun platoon equipped with robotic and autonomous systems will have to control a whole fleet of complex machines, which consist of mechanical transmissions and power units, complex electronics in sensors, weapons, as well as software and communication tools that ensure their functioning. In addition, if such a machine receives damage to the transmission, it must be repaired. It is too heavy so that it can be lifted.
Therefore, the battalion needs a machine capable of towing the robotic system. I clearly remember the cases where, during the tests on the Salisbury plain and in the United States, autonomous machines fell into too soft soil and remained immobilized. The evacuator also needs operator and maintenance.
It is unreasonable to assume that the same locksmith that controls caterpillars and a power plant will necessarily have experience in reprogramming, updating, adjusting or managing the system software. Therefore, not only the appropriate number of people, but also an extended number of skills, including those who are in high demand in civilian economy, are needed.
Another factor that is rarely taken into account when discussing the effectiveness of robotic and autonomous personnel systems for staff is that more powerful platforms often provide opportunities for the use of working hands. A good example of this is Predator and Reaper drones. At first it seemed that they would save staff. Indeed, they needed two crews - a pilot and an amount of loading operator - and often three or four, given the duration of their flights.
However, compared to the number of aircraft that should be in the air to provide a comparable stable coating, and with the need to have prepared staff in the stock to replace the whipped pilots, they seemed to improve efficiency. But then it was noted that although the crew can watch a specific point through the MX-15 touch ball, the platform can collect images in a much larger area during missions, as well as transmit other data, such as signals.
However, in order to comprehend all the data collected, a large number of analysts and technicians were needed. Thus, by the 2010s, the number of people involved in one Ripera orbit could reach 150 people. Further automation of the analysis made it possible to reduce this number, but the number of support forces in air intelligence is still much higher than before.
The last problem related to the idea of reducing staff through automation and technology is that these ideas are rarely analyzed in confrontation when the enemy tries to violate these opportunities. For example, the ability of drones to make mass accurate strikes on tactical echelons can be an important potential.
However, it is effective only if it is supported by the ability to carry out electromagnetic reconnaissance and other intelligence preparation for the planning of shocks to avoid enemy HPs. Conversely, on the battlefield, where the enemy has such opportunities, the need for low -range air defense and its own radio electronic protection in tactical formations entails the need to involve additional specialists in the city units that were not previously needed.
As a result, there is a redistribution of personnel, not a reduction in its number. Military - often substantiated - see the benefits of new technologies. It is also hoped that new technologies will solve today's problems. Many factors contribute to the cognitive bias of the army top, forcing it to believe that the problem of staffing can be solved through innovation. But when it comes to people, technologies require large labor.
To provide a guaranteed potential to complete the tasks on the battlefield, a minimum of people is required. Technology often displaces people, but does not eliminate them. Today, a handful of experts can organize a survey of a large number of sensors and bring many types of weapons for targets - for example, in an integrated air defense network - but much more staff is required to support this network.
The main conclusion is that the use of technological advantages often creates the need for additional staff that performed tasks that have not been predicted before. In this context, it is extremely important that the military solves the problem of recruitment by assessing their proposals and adapting them to attract the necessary specialists. This is especially important if you need to involve and keep those whose skills are in the military sphere in the civilian economy.