Mobilization in the Russian Federation: Whom they will be sent to Ukraine and who will get to the strategic reserve
One of these, and in his opinion, is the formation of so -called "strategic reserves". Within this task, in the occupied Ukrainian territories and the territories of the Russian Federation, the formation and deployment of a number of new parts, connections and associations of its Armed Forces continues. Therefore, it would be quite appropriate to look more closely at this process and at least to imagine - what and who will have to face our army in the future.
Before we look at one specific example, we need to make some remarks, so to speak, of a general nature. Considering and evaluating the prospects for the deployment of Russian strategic reserves, one significant factor should be kept in mind, which will decisively influence their quality and volume - the probability of carrying out the next stage of mobilization in the Russian Federation. As for me, it is better to think that it will happen than to hope that it will not be.
Of course, the main events, in this context, will unfold after the "electoral act" in the Russian Federation, which is scheduled for March 17, since its main deterrent will disappear. As far as I know, the bulk of organizational and staff measures to deploy the bulk of new military formations by the Russian command is planned to be completed in the period "end of spring-beginning of summer". Adding to this point, about 1.
5-2 months required for the process of prompt deployment of the main groups of troops (UVs), or shock groups in certain areas, it is possible to say that the enemy is about to use the bulk of its strategic reserves not later than the middle-late summer of this year. When you hear that a division, the army or the army corps of the enemy is formed (unfolding), you do not have to tear your hair at once and make it a "missing", "they will never end.
" The limits of the capabilities of the Russian army in matters of mobilization deployment are quite clear, evaluated, and most importantly - not as "vast" and "infinite", as it seems to us. They are quite marginal and capable of exhaustion. Moreover, in many parameters. On the basis of the 21st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (OMSBR) from the 2nd "Guards" Army (GV.
The forces of this brigade, which took active participation in the battles in Avdiivka, were brought to the reserve in order to complete and restore and restore and further use in the attacking \ assault actions in the Pokrovsky direction. It is obvious that at this point, the command "Center" can be used directly in the fighting in the above mentioned direction of no more than one erected reinforced motor -rifle battalion (IAS) from this OMSBR.
The brigade has suffered sufficiently significant losses in the process of previous battles (although not as significant as the 15th OMSBR or 114-A OMSBR), and at this point it clearly needs replenishment. However, it is possible that the brigade will be fully displayed in the base area, where its units will be used to complete the 27th ISD.
It is assumed that the newly formed motorized rifle division will be included: the division should also enter: what does it pay attention? Well, I would say a few things at once. To date, in the 21st OMSBR and the units and divisions of the divisions, there are 1959 units of weapons and military equipment (these are all types and samples, as well as both good and faulty). And it is necessary at a staff of 6840 units (starting with tanks and SAU, ending with road transport and special equipment) . . .
That is, in order to fully complete this division, the enemy's command must be completed by the units and units of the 4881 unit of OVT. However, having evaluated their needs and capacity more or less realistically, the Russian command decided that during 2024 he would be able to manage this division by a full-time DIA.
But, not completely… instead of the 4881st unit, they will allegedly be able to put 4285 units (it is planned to do this from OWT manufacturers), which will provide 90% of the staffing of this connection with a full -time DEC (6244 units). But, as for me, even these, quite bold, plans for the Russian command, regarding the formation and deployment of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (even in its "optimized" form) look too optimistic. Now I will explain why.
With regard to this connection, the Russian command plans to put the bulk (up to 87%) of the OWT he needed during the second or fourth quarter of this year, and at the expense of state defense order (doses). That is-if there is money for it in the Russian budget, and the specified amount of OWTs needed to complete this division will "fit" into the real capabilities ), and most importantly - to equip and teach.
According to my information, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the timing of formation \ deployment of a number of parts and compounds was already forced to significantly review due to the inconsistency of its ambitions on increasing the number and volumes of the Russian army - the real capabilities of the system of its mobilization deployment, and most important Technically, this “Sdvig by Time” touched almost half of the parts and connections planned (from 45 to 50 percent of those that were included in the plans of the Russian Security Service of Ukraine).
Of course, the appropriate plans can be recorded anything and whatever . . . and accordingly, "detach" Puyla, which is not even aware of cases of the current retail price of ice cream in their country, these bold plans. But if you, at your largest tension, do not produce more Motorized rifles) You cannot afford… at least at one time.
And, by the way, the 27th MSD, which is now in the process of formation, when a considerable number of its parts and units should be completed, in the sense of OWT, as they say . . . "almost 0"-a vivid illustration of this thesis. For example, its need for only one tanks is at least 102 units.
At the same time, it should be remembered that the desire of Russian planners in the Tamoshnyh HS to form 4-5 new tank battalions in 2023 (30 tanks in each) on the new “material part”, and not immediately, but during the year, called The "certain stress" of the entire "tank industry" of the Russian Federation . . .
And if we take more complex (first of all, technologically) weapons systems that need to be completed this division, it will become clear that the desire of the Russian GSC in the summer of NR. The mother of the next "ready for battle" is a new full -fledged motor -shot division, let's just say, looks too optimistic.
Well, judge for yourself, for the full equipment of parts and units of the 27th ICD, it is necessary to no less than 12 units of mobile PTRC type "storm-C", at least 6 units of the TOR-M2 SPR and SPGC 2C6 "Tunguska".
Considering that it is necessary to complete the already deployed regiments, brigades and divisions in the already operating groups of troops, where the level of equipment of RAM in 30% of the need is already considered "high", but also the fact that is formed not only the 27th MSD, but but Another number of compounds and even associations, and that all this is a technologically complex OVT Russian MIC is not able to click dozens of units a month . . .