We lose them - how Russia works with the occupied territories and how it would be worth answering Ukraine
At the same time, some cities have been occupied since 2014, part of 2022. People live there and there are some processes. In the end, Russia, stating that it has "grown up new regions", pursues a policy on their "de -Ukrainianization". And this is extremely important given the conversation about the possible freezing of war. How to evaluate? Any action, any policy requires resources. Resources are a budget. And, analyzing Russian finances, you can reach quite interesting conclusions.
In particular, what areas of the Kremlin are "ready to trade" if the events are negative for the Russian Federation with script and freezing will be needed quickly. Let's start. After the occupation of the territories and holding "referendums", several political tasks were faced with the Russian Federation: under item 1, the information sometimes passes. For example, the same railway branch to the Crimea or the highway.
But for Russia, people are the key (in particular, in the maintenance of the situation). More precisely, their demonstrative support of the Kremlin as an unnecessary argument of "validity" of occupation and confirmation of territorial claims to Ukraine. Therefore, I will focus on the mechanisms that can provide the results of PP. 3 and 4. Such can be attributed . . . saturation with their managers.
Russia does not trust the "alien" leaders too much - and the occupied territories (even occupied in 2014) have not yet become their own. In addition, the Russian Federation pursues a policy to minimize the independence of the "subjects of the Federation". In this case, it would be naive to assume that Putin will bet on the local elites. Even if they are 1000 times in loyalty to the king. What happens. Since 2023, mass import of Russian managers began to key positions.
Local, for the picture, of course, remain. But they cannot act on their own - at every stage of spinning decisions (and their implementation) there are visiting personnel. Some of which use the work "in the new regions" as a springboard for career growth. These chicks of the Kiriyenko (he is a curator of personnel policy and policy in the occupied territories) after 4-5 months "business trips" go to promotion. The second group is those who came for a long time.
The level of representatives of this subgroup is lower, but they do not require high business qualities. Need diligence, detachment from local elites and loyalty. Often thanks to the Kremlin, since the previous place of life and work could not be too comfortable (even compared to the frontline regions). The issues of demonstrative loyalty in the short term are resolved through the policy of population replacement. Part of the pro -Ukrainian residents left the territory.
Those who remain, are forced to take Russian passports. Initially, this became mandatory for any real estate transactions (including confirmation of ownership) for work. Further - Putin's decree, which requires "the legalization of citizens of Ukraine who are illegally in the Russian Federation" with a term of 10. 09. Simply put, the inhabitants are offered to get a Russian passport or leave. And finally, stimulating the reverse process is the return of refugees to the occupied territories.
There is a whip and a gingerbread here: the threat (realized) nationalization of "non -burning" real estate, and on the other hand - budget compensation for the property damaged as a result of hostilities. But the rate on the local population is risky. The Kremlin understands and implement the old imperial policy of "replacement". When, instead of deported or destroyed (in our case, refugees in Ukraine and Europe) are brought a loyal population from the depressed regions of the Russian Federation.
And these newcomers, citizens will be grateful to Putin and will perceive the threat of territories to Ukraine as a threat to their vital interests. In Crimea, by the way, the Russian Federation managed to replace up to 20% of the population. Assimilation. The most difficult and long -lasting project. The task is to grow a new generation of Russian citizens.
This policy of the Russian Federation without restrictions was pursued in the Crimea and, with its specificity, carried out relatively successfully in the so -called. LDNR (there at the initial stage created regional but no longer Ukrainian identity). For these purposes are required personnel - teachers, university teachers, libraries, cultural homes and more. Such people should be brought and, preferably for a long time, leaving them to live in the new region.
And finally, just regular events (starting from the holidays to the design of the streets), which create the necessary and, most importantly, constant background. The time works. All of the above is possible only in the presence of resources. First of all, monetary. Therefore, it is appropriate to estimate the planned costs of the Russian Federation in the so -called "new regions".
More precisely, subsidies coming from the center - their size and specificity allow you to judge the outlines of policies in the occupied territories. The financing of Russian policy in the occupied territories occurs in several directions, recorded in the budget of the Russian Federation for 2025: the latter just give an idea of the specifics of work on the transformation of the occupied territories into "their own".
And both from the point of view of priorities and from the point of view of the stage of implementation: in part of the directions the figures of costs are indicated approximate - simply equal particles for each of the areas. Which indicates an understanding of the need for costs, but the lack of an idea of how much money is needed in reality. But some of the directions were calculated and planned in detail.
To begin with, it is worth mentioning the investment programs in the "Change" picture. The program (logically) provides for the purchase of medicines, subsidies to medical institutions. But in addition, financing of various sports structures and even "ano" - so called non -profit organizations in the Russian Federation. For example, the funds for the participation of "national teams" in the region in competitions. Further, the arrangement of gyms, open areas. Naturally, schools.
And, for example, public transport and school buses. And here the first "but". It is strange that public transport for the so -called. LDNR, and in the program of school buses "forgot" Kherson region. The same for ambulances. Again "without Kherson". Looking ahead, I will say that these are not unique with such distortions. In short, the costs that can be "shown" to locals are about $ 75 million in equivalent.
At the same time, for example, the program of arrangement of "rural territories" demonstrates the lack of real plans, but the availability of money - allocated "500 million" to each of the regions. Without detail and specifics. Naturally, someone has to tell about success. Therefore, regional information systems will be created for the money of the federal budget. With the total budget of the program 1. 688 billion Russian rubles. It is also worth adding another 1.
15 billion grants and subsidies to different "at the Center" to work in "new territories" and create "patriotic content". The total on the creation of the success of the "peaceful life" of the Russian Federation will spend about $ 401 million in dollar equivalent. But this is not enough. The Kremlin needs to be replaced by the population - part of the occupied territories, part, on the contrary, return. And bring your own. This is where the fun begins.
Russia has launched a compensation program for damaged and destroyed as a result of hostilities. Of course, you need to have a Russian passport and contact local authorities to obtain payments. It is planned to spend more than 21 billion Russian rubles ($ 226 million) for these purposes. Of which 16 are in Donetsk region. The program is designed for at least three years. The budget plans have similar costs for both 2026 and 2027. A good "stimulus" for those who think to return.
The question raises only a disproportionate small proportion of Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions. But why so - a little later. The next stage is the involvement of new residents. Managers, teachers, propagandists and more. Simply put, those who will rule and educate the local population. Such providers are provided for wages compared to "northern coefficients". And also a one -time payment of "lifting". Including young professionals.
In Sumy, it looks like this: if you think it is all, there are also benefits for payment for utility services. The privileges, of course, include "new inhabitants". For these purposes, the Russian Federation is ready to spend another 819 million. It is total for surcharges and benefits at least $ 19 billion or $ 190 million. At the same time, it enters the eye in Sumy, which are allocated to "cultural workers" - most in Lugansk and Kherson region. Not the most densely populated.
But perhaps the most problematic in terms of the perception of the inhabitants of "great Russian culture". Such a disproportionate distortion, but only in the Luhansk region, applies to incentives to move teachers. And finally, housing. Three programs are key here: the first two programs provide a clearly defined target group. It is logical to assume that it is not "veterans of WWII" - there are very little such. Instead, it can be "veterans of your own", just military retires.
More than 1 billion Russian rubles will be spent in four occupied areas in 2025. And here again the amazing distortion - the biggest expenses fall on . . . Zaporizhzhya region. The smallest are Lugansk and Kherson. But according to the program of construction of housing by the local authorities even more spicy. It is planned to allocate money to Lugansk and Donetsk region. At Zaporizhzhya in 2025.
Surprisingly, isn't it? Speaking of distortions in budget financing, it is noticeable that the cultural and educational components are sharply intensified in the occupied parts of the Kherson and Luhansk regions. There, there is probably not everything smooth with the Russian peace. With the Zaporizhzhya region there are plans for a dramatic change in the demographic picture of the region by bringing "young specialists" and military retirers there.
Simply put, the creation of some analogue of "Crimean". But at the same time the Russian Federation is in no hurry to capital investments in the Kherson region and transfers the costs of Zaporizhzhia for 2026. Which allows for the perception of these regions to the Kremlin as a "exchange coin" if the war goes on extremely undesirable scenarios for Russia. Of course, it is not about the whole Zaporizhzhya region - not for that the military is brought there. And Kherson no one will "turn" so simply.
But until there are no contours of transactions, Putin is in no hurry to spend money. At the same time continuing to work on the replacement of the population and growing loyalty of locals. What of this Ukraine? At least to evaluate which programs are leading and to respond in a timely manner: any other real (not simply media) projects that will strengthen Ukraine's positions and complicate the implementation of Russian policy control over regions. If not work now, tomorrow may be late.