Not on Kharkiv and not in Kiev: where will the Russian Federation come in the next weeks

Let's try to understand - where? I can quite share the point of view that if the Russians themselves said "on Kharkiv" or even "to Kiev", then, in fact, it will be. I can, but I don't share. When planning and organizing a more or less large-scale offensive operation (at least an operational level), obviously, the enemy's command will be forced to take into account a number of objective factors that those people who continue to say that will be "in Kharkiv in Kharkiv.

"Or" to Kiev ", they think little, or at all - do not think: in view of this, it is worth putting yourself in the place of command of the enemy and try to determine its logic of making appropriate decisions. To deny the enemy this kind of ability, believing that he makes the appropriate decisions, as he pleases, or "exclusively for political reasons", as for me is not a very reasonable way to determine the meaning and content of his further actions.

Below, I will try to give at least two operating areas that in this context, I currently consider the most likely directions of the adversary of the offensive actions of the appropriate level. In my opinion, it is: of course, both have, both "+" and "-" in this respect.

However, before we evaluate them, we will try to understand more "general" strategic grounds to consider them: the liquidation of the Kurakhov - the Coloral speech (bridgehead) of the Armed Forces will need from the enemy to solve at least two previous tasks - to advance in the Kurakhovo area, as well as to focus on the lane 29 -A ZVA (approximately, Novmayorsk -Shevchenko -Petrovka -Yevgenivka) another offensive group.

Moreover, in the volume - not less than the army corps (AK), and according to sober evaluation - not less than another general military army. At this stage, obviously, the enemy has already partially solved these tasks.

In particular, his 8th name, by the 1st AK, 20th and 150th Motorized Rifle Divisions (MSD), with the effective participation of additional forces and means-155th separate Marine Corps (MP) and 39th Brigade Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (OMSBR) of the 68th AK strongly tries to break in the direction of Marinka-St. Novomikhailivka - Konstantinovka. The current meaning of these actions is quite understandable - to force Ukrainian troops to go for the road Marinka - the coal over its length.

However, as for me, there is no doubt the fact that in the case of reaching the enemy the previous goals I mentioned (especially, with respect to the breakthrough in the Kurakhovo area), the Russian command will obviously begin to consider in this direction the opportunity and chances of conducting a "deeper" operation … For example, through the district of Uspenivka. Moreover, it is obvious that active actions in this direction for the enemy are "acute and intensive".

Further "hanging" of this bridgehead of the Armed Forces on communications on Donetsk-Mariupol, Donetsk-Volnovakha (and accordingly, the existence of the possibility of inflicting damage to them, including M. Mariupol, the distance from the leading positions of the Armed Forces to its northern outskirts is 63-65 km. and M. Volonovakha, the corresponding figure is 16-17 km, a wide enough spectrum of firearms) well-in-one "dislike" enemy.

Therefore, the need to carry out active, offensive actions in this direction is urgent for him. In turn, in the sense of the process of prompt deployment of offensive groups, this direction is quite convenient, of course, to some extent (especially to hide it - it will not work, the terrain, both on the front land and in tactical and operational rear - is quite open and accordingly, "Overlanded high blows of the enemy of long -sight").

However, in terms of convenient communications (including rock, for the front and regroup maneuver), as well as comprehensive transportation and accumulation of MTZ items, including the maritime version, through the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk - there is a sufficiently branched network.

Moreover, the enemy has the opportunity to carry out the process of prompt deployment of his offensive groups in this direction, relying on the first position of his main border of defense, which stretched from Novopetrikivka to Volnovakha and from Volnovakha to Alexandrovka.

The only, but significant difficulty - that all this will be proved mainly by motor transport, the railway network is small here, and the directions of its functioning are quite limited, and mostly it is also "the" argument of the enemy of the enemy. " The main nodes of the enemy MTZ in this sense - Dokuchaevsk, Volnovakha, Starobeshevo, Petrovsky district of Donetsk, Yegorivka.

Now, regarding the assessment/calculation of the volume of the required troops (forces) to accomplish this task (a dacha - Shakhtarske). As for me, the enemy, at least based on the experience of past "operations" of the Russian command, will need to be created additionally (to the troops already deployed in this direction of the 8th and 29th ID with downtime and means) 2 groups. Approximately, in the general military army (of course, in the current, modern Russian sense of this term) every one.

To do this, there is, according to a sober estimate, exactly 2 ways: as for me, the first option is more realistic than the second. Mainly due to the main factor - time. In this sense, it is much shorter, more efficient and allows you to use a smaller volume of forces and means than the second (which, in turn, will allow you to use the same strategic reserves, but not in full \ what is difficult to make, but partially) .