Despair in the Kremlin: why Putin goes along the weapon to Kim Jong -in

The rapprochement of Russia and North Korea, which has come, looks like a gesture of Putin's despair, says The Guardian Sergey Radchenko. What really is it and what can mean in the future? The report that North Korea dictator Kim Jong-in can soon visit Russia to meet Vladimir Putin-it is likely that it is possible to discuss the supply of North Korean weapons for Putin's war in Ukraine-indicate a sufficiently remarkable transformation of Russian-noctual Korean relations.

During the Cold War, North Korea was a key ally of Moscow in Northeast Asia. But at that time, the North Koreans were at best the bad requests of a powerful superpower. Today, Kim's Heritage Hermit is proud that he is an accomplice to Russia's crimes. Putin's interaction with North Korea is as old as his presidency. But the relationship was generally exotic than practical.

The real partner of Russia was South Korea, which was constantly part of the ten largest trading partners with almost $ 30 billion in trade in 2021. North Korea has never been an attractive partner, and it has suffered very restrictive sanctions that Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, helped to develop. Until it invaded Ukraine, Russia tried to adhere to their letters and spirit. Everything has changed with the invasion.

In May 2022 - which can mark the beginning of the end of the North Korean sanctions regime - Russia (and China) vetoed the resolution of the UN Security Council, which would punish Pyongyang for the next round of missile tests. In July 2022, Pyongyang recognized by the Russian -occupied Donetsk and Lugansk Republic. Then, in July this year, Russian Secretary of Defense Sergei Shoigu arrived in Pyongyan and met an unprecedented reception.

It has been observed that Kim proudly shows him the latest models of North Korean weapons. Among the smiles and societies, new relationships were born. Russia's desire to obtain North Korean weapons and ammunition (in many respects similar to the purchase of Iranian drones) provides a high degree of despair in the Kremlin.

As the praised military machine of Russia turned out to be something like a paper tiger in a collision with Ukrainians, the purchase of weapons in places such as North Korea, in the best times of a despondent state of satellite, involves humiliation. There are also important practical considerations that Putin should weigh before hugging kim. The first is the violation of the sanctions regime that Russia has helped to create for many years - is probably the least of the obstacles to Putin.

Now that Russia itself has become a label state, which is spread by major Western sanctions, it is reasonable that the Kremlin can turn to its brothers. Of course, you can deny that (partial) dismantling of the sanctions regime buries all the hopes for the denuclearization of Pyongyang - the goal to which the Kremlin is theoretically still affectionate. But Putin may well decide that this is the smallest of his problems now. The second reasoning is potentially more important.

Exaggerating with North Korea, the Kremlin risks to undermine its relationship with South Korea. Of course, the war in Ukraine has already affected this relationship, as Seoul joined Western sanctions against Russia. South Korea exports to Russia in 2022 fell by 37% (imports decreased by 15%). But Seoul reluctantly joined these sanctions, and many South Korean companies continue to work in Russia.

South Korea is something like the weak link at the Front of Western Sanctions, and the Kremlin could use this situation in its own interests if it had tactical insight. However, Putin may conclude that, by establishing a new relationship with Pyongyang, he will be able to strengthen his influence on South Korea. He can assume that the closer the relationship between him and Kim, the more southern Korean politicians will be able to maintain a dialogue with Russia.

It was this logic in the late 1980s that prompted the President of South Korea, where to start the Nordpolitician policy-an appeal to Moscow to put pressure on Pyongyang. In fact, Putin's courtship to North Korea at the beginning of his presidency followed this logic. The third consideration that Putin may worry is whether North Korea is a reliable partner. In fact, this is probably not true. Pyongyan won the Cold War, using differences among his allies and adjusting them against each other.

North Korea proved to be well-known and unpredictable and more than once (for example, during the capture of the US warship by Pueblo in 1968 and the knocking down of the American EC-121 scout aircraft 1969) resorted to the tricks that could involve Moscow in unwanted confrontation with the United States. North Korea is also well known for becoming an economic burden for their friends and partners.

It is unknown what Kim Agreement will try to enter into with Russia, but it is unlikely to sell himself cheap. Despite these considerations, Putin has already made a strategic choice in favor of rapprochement with North Korea. In part, this is the result of a new situation in which Russia is. The collapse of the world after the Cold War and the return of the block mentality, as a rule, contribute to this kind of regrouping.

The elephant in the room is the ancient sponsor of Pyongyang China, which also approaches Russia with the logic of its deepening US conflict. The last three countries were in the same wave in the late 1940s-early 1950s, which cannot be called a happy time for North-East Asia. It is unclear whether Kim and Putin will meet, but relationships between their countries clearly change. And not because North Korea changes, but because Russia changes. It is beginning to resemble North Korea.