Front Russian throws. Why is Avdiivka more important to Bakhmut for the Russian Federation

The Russians want to maintain the intensity of the offensive near Avdiivka at all costs. Therefore, notes the military observer Konstantin Mashovets, they throw units here even from such an important area of ​​the front as Bakhmut. In the Donetsk direction, the enemy's command continues to "successfully complete" operation on the environment of the Avdeevsky district of the Armed Forces. However, it is obviously faced on this path with some difficulties.

First of all, to maintain the dynamics and intensity of their attacking \ assault actions immediately in several areas and directions that have a key nature to continue the offensive. After all, this requires at least one "small" nuance - the presence of enough forces and means capable of this kind of action for a long time.

That is, having an appropriate level of combat capacity (in all its dimensions-level of staffing, its professional training, moral and psychological state, volumes of staffing with the main samples and types of OVT, quality and quantity of logistics \ MTZ and more…). In other words, "fresh" (that is, more or less capable) formation-regiments, brigades, as a last resort, battalions and mouths . . . And here, it is now and for a long time.

In this sense, among the considerable amount of information from the area of ​​hostilities that comes to me, my attention was attracted by 2 messages: who has forgotten, I will remind . . .

in the Avdeevsky direction of the enemy's command has at least 3 motor -shooting regiments (SMEs), not Less than 7 rifle and motor-raimen reserve battalions, as well as up to 3 formations of the Battalion of the Barce Battalion… Therefore, there is a logical question-why move from one active direction (and under Bakhmut the same intense battles continue under Bakhmut as Under Avdiivka), immediately two formations of "brigade level" (the same "Vitrans", at one time, were also recorded to the north of Bakhmut), because from a formal point of view under Avdiivka and so focused and deployed enough strength and means, even, "with a stock "? Do the command of the troops (UV) of the enemy "Yug" simply "bored" and he has nothing to do, how to weave his brigades in and forth along the front? As for me, there may be two answers: as for me, one thing does not exclude the other .

. . I have already written that the desire to advance immediately and everywhere . . . Can play with the Russian command "Evil joke". The principle of concentration in martial arts, no one has yet been canceled, figuratively speaking . . . Of course, to attack on a wide front, with significant forces - it is quite possible. And at first glance, it looks very "tempted" and effectively (because it allows you to potentially achieve a large amount of result quickly).

But it becomes a very significant and painful problem when it does not produce a result or brings a small (minor) result. For, in this case, your percussion groups (grouping) troops continue to "become loss) in a large amount, while not bringing" dividends ". . . In doing so, you are forced to" naturally "or reduce the scope of your offensive (gradually narrowing it along the front), or reduce the intensity of their aggressive actions (implies, the intensity of attacks and storms) . . .

as well as the size of their forces and means that are directly involved in them. Under Avdiivka, we are currently seeing an attempt by the Russian command to keep the planned scope and the amount of its offensive. In particular, by moving additional, and most importantly, more or less capable formations, even at the expense of other active areas and directions . . .

But I think they will soon encounter another "rigid necessity"-to increase, the so-called "operational pauses" (mean, intervals between periods of activation \ attacks). That is, the periods of regrouping their advanced units directly involved in attacks and assaults will begin to grow, as well as the time required on their completion . . .

For their part, sooner or later, the enemy will also have to move from the scheme "immediately and everywhere "On another -" alternate activation "in certain areas and directions. Just because the first tactical scheme - it will be very value for the Russian command (it also costs them not cheap, and will become even more expensive, including in "general dimension").

At this point, the Russian command believes that it still has the strength and means, resources and everything else to adhere to the first "scheme", that is, to lead the offensive with "given parameters" with the desired pace and scope. But the first "bells" in the sense of changing the situation are completely the other way, are already calling . . . The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.