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In order to win Russia, Ukraine should obtain the mobile division as quickly as ...

To give Ukraine part of the US Army. Why is this the only recipe of victory in the war with Russia

In order to win Russia, Ukraine should obtain the mobile division as quickly as possible, military expert John Ferrari thinks in the Defense News column. And in his opinion, the United States can pass it right now . . . Some criticize Ukraine for going to victory for so long, while others are wondering if they will be able to win at all.

The conflict seems to have come to a dead end - the battle of exhaustion on the model of the First World War, in which there is a lot of fire, but had little maneuvers. Why is this so, given that many Ukrainians have been trained in allies by NATO standards? The answer is one: we did not give the Ukrainians enough technique for maneuver. In order to wage this war, Ukraine must be able to shoot, move and communicate.

Despite the lack of ammunition, NATO gives Ukraine the opportunity to shoot, even if, taking into account the cost level, there are more and more shells and missiles. Starlink gave Ukraine the opportunity to communicate. What is missing is a sufficient amount of protected mobility, also known as "all -military maneuver".

The US Army has the following formations: armored divisions, consisting of three to four shunting brigades of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, artillery brigade, logistics team and another brigade of other means of providing such as engineers, communications and air defense. Production and supply of so many equipment for Ukraine will take many years - the time for which Ukrainians pay the blood of their soldiers and civilians.

And even if the Congress approves the funding requested by the President, problems with the industrial base mean that it will still not be received on time. Therefore, the solution is to transfer this equipment from the US Army today and then buy new equipment for the US army over the next few years. To put it more specifically, the army should transfer to Ukraine a division.

This will not only help Ukraine to break through Russia's defense lines, but will also help to modernize the US army, increase the industrial depth and increase the combat readiness of the army in the near future, ensuring the 100 percent staffing of existing units. The equipment of the division is not some arbitrary figure. This is directly related to the current size of the army, which tries to preserve the structure, as it is in the midst of one of the most serious crises with a set of staff.

The lack of soldiers in the units of the army is so large that the service has to reduce the structure of their forces of special operations. But these abbreviations are only the beginning, since the ultimate number of real service servicemen has fallen by about 7%over the last few years, out of 485,000 people in the 2020 financial year to 452,000 today. The transfer of this equipment will help modernize the army.

Many weapons have been weapons for several decades, and after all, they will have to be replaced with modern versions of Abrams and Bradley's combat vehicle, as well as a new multi -purpose armored car. Due to the existing budget pressure on the army, it will not be able to afford the necessary modernization of equipment on its own. By passing weapons and equipment to Ukraine, the army will receive more modern weapons instead.

In addition, the transfer of this equipment will provide an industrial depth, supporting the lesson which army and other services should be learned from the experience of Ukraine: we may not be able to be re -armed during the war. The departure of these weapons, as well as innumerable weapons, through permanent Pentagon assistance packages, forced the army to quickly increase its own capabilities for the production of war tools. Take, for example, 155 mm artillery shells.

Without war in Ukraine, there would be no great incentive to increase the production of shells from 14,000 shells a month over the past year to 28,000 shells a month today and up to 57,000 shells a month before the next spring - and even more, up to 100,000 artillery shells per month by 2025. This is a wonderful growth, and the transfer of even more equipment to Ukraine will consolidate this lesson among the army executives to expand the production of other necessary equipment.

Finally, the army should reduce the number of its parts, otherwise it will empty-the phrase that appeared in the late 1970s, which denotes an army that exists only nominally. Owning too large structure and insufficient number of soldiers is the fastest way to get an empty army. Thus, the withdrawal of today's equipment to Ukraine makes the army more ready. When and if the staff set recovers, new equipment is replaced.