Weapons will not pass by the sea: why Russian ships are afraid to get out of the Bosphorus

The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation is driven into the databases, but moreover - Russian ships that transported weapons from Syria are already afraid to get out of the Bosphorus, writes in the column for The Telegraph former Marine Officer Tom Sharp. Ukraine has won much less forces. The basis of the marine environment is logistics, not war. As a person who was preparing for the last, it is difficult for me to speak, but such a reality.

The warships who fought near Trafalgar, Tsusima, Jutland, Medueus, in the Gulf of Leye, Operations "Bogomol" and the Falkland Islands, are an exception, not the norm. Naval forces spend more time (ideally) first of all on the prevention of conflict, but if it fails, we have to make more efforts to protect the logistics of their party and/or deprive the opponent of his logistics.

The story is full of examples of combatants who have abused their supply chains or have not been able to provide adequate protection for their supply chains. Field Marshal Rommel is the best example for the first, and it is difficult not to mention the battle for the Atlantic as an example of a logistics struggle that determines the war. The same thing happens in the controversial marine possessions of the Black, Red and Chinese seas today.

In each case, the battle unfolds for sustainability, as the enemy seeks to undermine or maintain freedom of navigation. In the Black Sea, Russia's attempts to violate food exports from Ukraine and demand ransom from the world. Exports of grain and other goods through the humanitarian corridor in the West is increasing, as the Ukrainian threat pushes the Black Sea Fleet further and further to the east.

Innovative use of unmanned surface ships by Ukrainians is dominated by headlines, but it is important not to overlook how many different types of attacks Ukraine has made. Only yesterday, a Russian ship that sat on a shallow in the Dnipropetrovsk mouth last year, and since then it was used as a post of listening, was affected by a rocket winged (the exact type unknown).

At present, Putin has no answer to many of these questions, and he has released not only the head of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia, but now, it seems, but also the head of the Navy of Russia. Some of the more important events have taken place out of the media. Throughout the war in Ukraine, Sparta-IV transport ship and Yaz tanker played a central role in Russia's logistics in the Black Sea.

Sparta-IV is one of a series of ships owned by Russia, which previously sent artillery and M-300 air defense missiles from Tartus to Syria to Novorossiysk. These vessels have been sanctioned by the United Kingdom, Ukraine and the United States for "shipping sea goods on behalf of the Ministry of Defense of Russia", but until recently it had no effect.

Turkey, which could prohibit the passage through the Bosphorus Strait in accordance with the terms of the Montre Convention, preferred not to do so. Rusi's research shows that in 2023 Sparta-IV has made six flights to the Black Sea and back, including long periods with a disconnected automatic identification system (AIS)-behavior, often related to smuggling and illegal activity. But last month, both Sparta-IV and the "Yaz" suddenly turned around, approaching the south entrance to the Bosphorus.

They have returned to Tartus and are now heading to Russia through the Baltic. This is a huge delay, but then you have to think about further journey with land required for delivery of goods to the theater of war. The cargo delivered to Novorossiysk remained only a hundred miles to the Kerch Bridge and the battles. What was quite simple navigation has turned into a continental Odyssey.

Initially, it was believed that Turkey finally refused a permit, but during a more thorough analysis it was found that in fact the threat in the Black Sea is now too high - and the Russians do not believe that the risk is worth it, even in the presence of a military escort. As always, the problem is wider than just two specific ships.

It is expected that at least 69 vessels are on the US sanctions list, and if you add vessels suspected of smuggling grain and oil from the Black Sea, the list will be even longer. But "Sparta-IV" is one of the few ships engaged in smuggling of weapons: to make it not enter the Black Sea is as important as the flooding of the Russian flagship "Moscow" in April 2022, and possibly more important. "Moscow" showed Russia's shortcomings in the fighting at sea.

The inability to protect its logistics can now affect Russia's ability to fight in all areas. There will be a repulsion-the nature of the war in cats. It will all begin with improving observation methods, which allow you to more accurately identify and track UAVs, only some of which will be carried out by "visual means". It is likely that more effective ways to combat them, such as a ship's anti -water, will soon appear.

Russia, no doubt, would like to get a capable version of the recently tested British Dragonfire laser system. Of course, logistics works in both directions, and the current disputes about how Germany can supply rockets to Ukraine is an important demonstration that supply is not always limited to the enemy's actions. But now in one part of the conflict, Ukraine has an advantage.

Compare this with the southern part of the Red Sea, where Hutivit continues to successfully violate commercial navigation. Very expensive ships that burn expensive ammunition have not been able to restrain or defeat a cheap threat. It is a mirror of what Ukraine has done with Russia in the Black Sea. "Detators talk about tactics, and professionals study logistics," - an old military saying.

General Robert Barrow from the US Marine Corps said it in the early 1980s, but probably the opinion is much older: even today, Volodymyr Zelenskyy would probably support her. In the last few decades, the Naval Forces have worked hard, above all, to prevent hostilities. This is more and more like an unsuccessful attempt, and therefore the next step is to ensure measures to protect our own maritime communications (and violations of others), and so as to allow us to compensate for some exhaustion.