Kissinger's Method: Four Trump Tips in Putin's Situation

Their official purpose was to establish constructive relations between the two countries, which were in a state of enmity for a long time. However, they failed. When I joined the National Security Council staff Henry Kissinger in 1969, he was just beginning to pay attention to relations with China.

Analyzing the results of diplomatic activity over the last fifteen years, the statesman described this series of negotiations as "barren", calling them "the longest continuous negotiations that have not led to any important achievement. " Serious progress was made only after Kissinger and Prime Minister of China Zhou Enlaya joined the process, after which US President Richard Nixon made his historical visit to China to meet Mao Jedun's head and start a improvement in relations.

Of course, there were deep differences that had to be settled, but both sides were ready to try to solve them. Watching the equally unsuccessful process that is now unfolding between the United States and Russia, I remember fifteen infertile years of negotiations that preceded US rapprochement with China. The lack of progress is largely explained by the position of the Russian side: Moscow puts absolutely unreasonable requirements.

Russian President Vladimir Putin hypobelly stated his desire for peace and then intensified attacks on Ukraine. The Kremlin still denies the legitimacy of President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Government. However, the lack of real progress is partly explained by a sluggish and unclear US response to new sanctions against Russia and new supplies of modern weapons to Ukraine.

Judging by his actions and the tone of his rhetoric, it can be assumed that Putin does not intend to negotiate at present to achieve a constructive result. He uses these negotiations as an excuse to delay the time, trying to seize even more Ukrainian territory, discredit the Ukrainian government, divide the West and weaken NATO, hoping that the United States will lose interest and determination to support Kiev.

Following negotiations with US President Donald Trump on Alaska in June, Putin only intensified his attacks on Ukraine. I had the opportunity to work closely with Kissindger as his senior economic advisor for five years in the White House. Many of the above actions of Putin and Russia would not be a surprise for Kissinger, who was a realist, although it took some time in the last years of his life before he reached the final negative conclusions about Putin and his goals.

Earlier, he hoped that the United States would be able to establish cooperation between Moscow and Kiev, recognizing Russia's position that the history and culture of the two countries were interrelated, and for this reason - as well as through the position of Ukraine on the border with Russia - the Kremlin has special interests there.

Although Kissinger was not a supporter of this view, he also understood that Putin did not want Ukraine to become too close to the West and to achieve economic success (unlike Russia) through adaptation of market practices and close trade relations with the European Union. But when Moscow's desire to influence in Ukraine has grown into aggression, his attitude changed dramatically.

Here are some steps that Kissinger could advise the current White House: Kissinger believed that negotiations between US officials and China should be aimed at strengthening trust as a common goal, not to hold empty, theatrical meetings. His partner in negotiations, Zhou, had the same opinion. Each of them had very different views on most key issues. But they were very serious about negotiations that were carefully planned.

Both came to the conclusion that in order to achieve productive results, each country must find ways to reduce, if not completely eliminated, ancient differences. They believed that the obligations and specific actions of both parties were crucial. For example, in trade, both parties reduced a number of barriers and initiated a series of high -level consultations on major geopolitical issues and threats to the stability of that period.

During recent talks with Russia, the United States went to a series of concessions, often to the detriment of Ukraine. However, no reciprocity was revealed from the Kremlin. Russia does not want to return any part of the Ukrainian territory that it has seized and occupies it now. It is not ready to accept the requirements of the event for reliable security guarantees to Ukraine and the whole region as a whole and requires the veto for these guarantees.

She is also not ready to agree that Ukrainian and European leaders are of great interest in negotiations and, therefore, should play a key role in them. Putin is a smart and experienced person; No one should underestimate either his or her foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, who lived in the United States and realizes that Americans often get tired of long, indecisive and expensive wars. Both of these people clearly hope that it will happen again.

During my communication with Putin, which began in the early 1990s in St. Petersburg, I found that he was also a convinced nationalist. He feels a deep image that, in his opinion, the United States and the West played a crucial role in the collapse of the Soviet Union and used the weakness of Russia for more than ten years.

Subsequently, I witnessed how at the Group of Twenty Groups, "Group Eight" and bilateral summits, he paid great attention to the restoration of the lost influence of Russia and the return of the lost Soviet territories, some of which belonged to tsarist Russia. In his opinion, it was necessary to push the Western power and influence from the Russian borders and to weaken the military potential and will of the West in Europe.

Moreover, Putin was increasingly considering Russia's grandeur as inseparable from his own. Therefore, Putin gladly accepts all the concessions and enjoys symbolic gestures from Washington. For his part, he corresponds to the escalation of the war, the denial of the legitimacy of Ukraine and its president, and the requirement of new impossible concessions from Ukraine, the US and NATO.

Can negotiations in such circumstances ever lead to the establishment of trust between the parties and constructive and trusting, actions from Russia? If the answer is negative, as it seems, there are only a few options, except to significantly increase the pressure from the event, in particular in the form of much tougher sanctions, further and strengthened military support of Ukraine, as well as tangible evidence of strong determination of the United States and the West.

Recent negotiations are now seemed nothing more than a mirage. The United States should avoid the capture of this mirage and constantly misleading. For many years, the United States has overestimated the power of the Russian economy, while Moscow skillfully masked its significant economic weaknesses. Kissinger was well understood. And those of us who traveled with it by the Soviet Union, especially outside Moscow, felt acutely how weak the Soviet economy was based on oil.

As an economic advisor to Kissinger, I had to inform him, among other things, about the state of the Soviet economy. We have discussed many times the consequences that I and a number of my colleagues considered it weakness, despite the fact that Soviet propaganda told us. Kissinger quickly understood the essence and importance of these realities, as well as their connection with foreign policy and strategic goals of the United States.

He regularly informed the President about the weakness of the Soviet economy and the corresponding fragility of the Soviet leadership. In the early 1970s, Kissinger also regarded this weakness as an opportunity to improve US-Soviet relations. The United States and the West are constantly covered with Russian propaganda, which states that the Russian economy is strong enough to endlessly support the current war. It's not.

Inflation in Russia is about five times higher than in the United States or most other Western countries, and the budget deficit this year is higher than ever since the start of a full-scale invasion.

If Russia begins serious peace talks about war in Ukraine or a certain retreat in this country, then it is likely not so much the result of successful decommissioning by Ukrainian troops of Russian forces abroad (although the United States should support this purpose, supplying additional weapons to Kiev), as a result of additional measures.

This process would have accelerated significantly - and with him, Moscow's willingness to negotiate a fair peace - if the United States, their allies and partners introduced much more rigid economic sanctions against Russia. The US should also make more efforts to ensure that you comply with the available sanctions.

As it is likely that Kissinger would say, relying on his experience in international power policy, the decisive point here is not something that is doing or not doing several other countries, but what the interests of the United States are. The support of free and democratic Ukraine and the termination of war in this country are definitely in this category.

Insufficient measures to immediately reduce energy imports by a small number of other NATO countries should not be a reason for the US to delay the imposition of stringent sanctions. Russia cannot fight the war endlessly, especially if rigid additional sanctions are imposed. More than a thousand transnational companies have already left Russia or have reduced their activities in this country, which, according to estimates, has led to the loss of 14 million jobs.

More than two million highly qualified technology workers have left the country, taking with them a large amount of capital. Foreign investments decreased from about $ 100 billion a year to almost zero; There are no signs of new investments on the horizon, even from a close ally of Russia - China. This result was well documented by researchers under the leadership of Jeff Sonnenfeld from an Yale Management School.

Ukrainian missiles and drones have significantly worsened the economic situation in Russia, especially in oil and gas infrastructure, which led to an increase in budget expenditures. The support of Ukraine in strengthening such measures will increase this loss and these costs. It should be recalled that one of the main reasons for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 was the prospect of bankruptcy.

The Kissenger view on diplomacy with Russia recognizes the need to avoid further infertile negotiations similar to Warsaw. Without producing any results, such negotiations undermine the authority of the United States and give Russia time to create even more chaos. The United States must send the Kremlin a clear signal that his refusal to honest negotiations, unacceptable requirements that are ongoing, and a deadly wave of attacks will be expensive to him.

Trump's statement after meeting with Zelensky at the end of September that Russia is a "paper tiger" and that Ukraine could return all its pre -war territories, was promising, but it did not promise more direct support from the United States. There is now an urgent moment to restore such support and, thus, increasing assistance from other NATO countries. Moscow's ability to evade responsibility for delays is probably regarded in the Kremlin as a test of the West's determination.

If Russia is convinced that the United States and their allies respond to its actions only with soft sanctions and several supply of new weapons, then the Kremlin will consider it that it can go further in Ukraine and beyond. Recent invasions into the airspace of Poland, Estonia, Denmark and Romania are probably proof of this conviction. Western leaders should expect much more such and more serious provocations if the United States or their allies show indecision.

Subsequently, the security of Europe, along with the security of the United States, will be erosion. The recent US weapons selling and intelligent exchange solutions can help dispel Russia's feelings that will come from their hands, but only if they follow them further, tougher measures and significantly increased and wider sanctions.

Nixon and Kissinger have secured a place in history not only through the establishment of more normal and stable relations with China, but also due to their decisive measures on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. A few years later, the same was done by US President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State James Baker. Most historians and those who rely on the United States as a partner and moral force believe that these leaders were on the right side of history.

For Trump, it is a moment when he can also take the right position in history - to be remembered by generations for taking up an opponent who despises morality and democratic values, seeks aggression and conducts insincere negotiations, declaring his desire for peace, but at the same time, even more people.

Acting boldly - just now - to impose significantly strengthened sanctions, to give Ukraine more weapons of greater power, to expand the exchange of intelligence with Kiev and to provide diplomatic support for this country, which is protected from Russian aggression, Trump will put itself and the United States on the right side of history. And all Americans have to support the President if he or she does this way.