The armor is still strong. What will be the role of tanks in the wars of the future

" Like, tanks, along with fighters and warships, "grow old". Focus has translated the new material of Rob Lee analyst about the role of tanks in the wars of the future on the example of events in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Russian-Ukrainian War. The tank is too early to write off the accounts, and it is not necessary to draw hasty conclusions about the future of military affairs on the basis of a conflict, the lessons of which are not yet fully understood.

About this war (the author implies the invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine - Ed. ) There are still many unknown from open sources, and there is every reason to believe that the conditions characterized by its early phases will not necessarily be relevant for future conflicts. Specific weapons can be ineffective due to improper use, not due to their disadvantages.

The available data on Ukraine, as well as the recent war in Nagorny Karabakh show that tanks still play a crucial role in the modern war, and their vulnerability is exaggerated. The severe loss of Russian tanks can be explained by inefficient use, poor planning and preparation, insufficient infantry support and the work of Ukrainian artillery.

The use of "Javelins" and other light anti -tank systems in Ukraine indicates an aging of the tank nothing more than the success of Sagger's anti -tank guided missiles in the war of Judgment Day in 1973. In Russia's initial operation, speed and secrecy were over all other factors. As they did not expect serious resistance, Russian troops almost tried to conduct a consistent general military operation that would require careful coordination and planning between air, land and naval forces.

Russian land parts simply moved to the cities without preparing for battle. In addition, Russian troops were not given enough time to prepare for such a complex operation. Probably, this decision was made at the political level, since in the doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces, priority was given to general military operations in the exercise and previous conflicts.

As a result, the initial phase of this war is hardly indicative of the efficiency of tanks and other systems in the better organized military operation. Many of the so -called weaknesses of piloted terrestrial, air and maritime platforms were the result of these mistakes, not a reflection of their technical importance in modern war. The Oryx Blog, which uses open source tools to calculate the destroyed Russian equipment, recorded 994 lost Russian tanks.

At least 340 - or 34% of them were thrown (this figure increases to 38%, considering damaged tanks). The percentage was the highest in the first month of the war. For example, in early April, 53% of registered tanks of Russia were thrown. In addition, many tanks that are considered destroyed were initially thrown by crews and then destroyed by Ukrainian soldiers who either could not or decide not to capture them. This means that up to 50% of documented lost Russian tanks could leave their crews.

In other words, the problem is not in the tanks themselves, but in the fact that they were inefficiently used, which led to heavy losses. Tanks are one of the most logistic units of equipment. They require regular maintenance, spare parts and a large amount of fuel to maintain in working order. Due to these requirements for the planning of logistical support of tank battalions and regiments, it is more important than virtually any other type of military units.

But the unorganized invasion of Russia increased these logistics problems. The "special operation" of Russia was extremely secrecy - most soldiers learned that they went to the war, just a few hours before the invasion. As a result, commanders and logists were not likely to do planning and training. The tank parts were not enough time to plan proper maintenance or buy enough spare parts, fuel and other items necessary for a conventional war that provided long distances.

In addition, the Russian plan envisaged too many directions of the offensive, many of which were not complementary, and the units of the Land Forces of Russia were tasked with an extremely fast pace. As a result, Russian troops often proceeded from the cover of artillery, radio electronic struggle and air defense, which further exacerbated the problems of logistics.

Quick promotion also meant that long and unprotected supply lines appeared in Russia, and the columns of rear was ready for the territorial defense forces. Not surprisingly, at the beginning of the war tank units showed relatively low results, as they require more preparation and planning than light parts. Logistics problems were also what Russia lost at the beginning of the war. Most Russian tank forces make up T-72 or T-90 with diesel engines.

However, there are a large number of T-80 tanks, which are often based in very cold regions, where their gas turbine engines are easy to operate than diesel. The percentage of abandoned T-80 tanks was higher than T-72 or T-90 options. Of the 85 tanks of the T-80U series, which Russia has lost, according to Oryx, 50 (this is 59%) was thrown or enthusiastic. Of the 34 lost T-80bm tanks 19 (ie 56%) were left/captured.

Compared to numerous T-72 and T-90 tanks, which are in service with Russia, T-80 tanks have a higher consumption and other type of fuel. The high percentage of T-80 loss suggests that the fuel was a decisive factor in deciding or seizing the tank. Some Russian parts have suffered much more tanks than others. In the first few weeks of the invasion, two tank regiments of the 4th tank division lost more than 40% of their T-80U tanks.

The 200th Rifle Brigade of the Northern Fleet lost many T-80BM tanks, and the 1st tank regiment of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division lost 45 out of 93 T-72B3M tanks for the first three weeks of the war. Particularly heavy losses of tanks in the 4th Tank Division and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Tank Army suggest that it is a problem of individual parts. It does not seem that the southern and eastern military districts of Russia have suffered similar losses.

In part, this can be explained by the rigid resistance with which the Western military district collided in Kharkiv and Sumy regions at the beginning of the war, but it can also be a reflection of weaker training and management. Indeed, the commander of the Western Military District, Colonel-General Alexander Zhuravlev and Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Alexei Zavizon, were reportedly dismissed, as well as commander of the 1st tank army, Lieutenant General Sergey Kisil.

Many of the damaged or destroyed tanks have been lost because of the initiation of Russia's invasion of the general military operation, and it did not have enough infantry to support the tank units. This is another reason why Russia has lost so many tanks in the first few weeks, but much less after the first phase. More than half of the Russian loss of Oryx tanks occurred in the first 50 days of the war, and it was then that the first articles appeared, which questioned the value of the tanks.

One of the known disadvantages of tanks is that in order to protect them from confronting infantry forces with anti -tank tools, especially in urban areas, infantry is needed. Russia has decided to reduce the number of motor battalions on infantry fighting vehicles (BMP) from 460 to 345 servicemen, and many battalions that invaded Ukraine were completed by only two or three quarters. In practice, this meant that Russian motor -shops did not have enough machines for combat in urban areas.

In addition, Russia has decided to reduce the roller battalion in each tank regiment to one company, which was clearly not enough to support the two battalion tactical groups that each tank regiment had to create. So, it is not surprising that Ukraine has succeeded in counteracting Russian tanks with anti -tank groups. In the presence of sufficient infantry support, unmanned systems and ground intelligence to detect anti -tank groups, the Russian tank park would be much more likely.

Despite its effectiveness, modern anti -tank guided missiles were the main killers of Russian tanks. According to the adviser to the highest military Ukraine: "[anti -tank missiles slowed down the Russians [during the advancement to Kiev], but our artillery killed them. It was something that broke their units. " Numerous videos of the Ukrainian military, including those showing the unsuccessful offensive of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment in Brovary in mid-March, confirm this.

In addition to artillery, many Russian tanks have been destroyed or disrupted by the Soviet era systems such as TM-62 anti-tank mines. Lightweight anti-tank "Javelins" and the system of "Stugna-P" of Ukrainian production were effective, but they are only one of the components of Ukraine's anti-tank success. Obviously, they destroyed a relatively smaller part of Russian tanks during the offensive in the Donbass, where Russia conducted a more consistent general military operation.

It is also important to note that open sources may not give a representative attitude to the injuries of Russian tanks. The tanks lined with "Stugna-P" or "Javelin", are much more likely to be on video and appear on social networks than tanks damaged by mines. Of course, the equipment of artillery battalions is not cheap, so data on tanks in Ukraine is unlikely to confirm the argument that we see "an advantage in favor of more compact and cheap defense weapons.

" Ukraine has also suffered heavy losses - according to Oryx, they make 244 tanks, of which 128 were destroyed. It does not look like most of these losses are caused by anti -tank guided missiles. For all these reasons, we should carefully draw general conclusions from the results of Russian tanks and other weapons in February and March. The risk that NATO military or even China will start an offensive war without conducting a general military operation is extremely insignificant.

In the end, the early stages of the war simply confirm the key components of the US military doctrine: unity of command, mass, decentralized performance, combined armed forces, missions and proper training. Similarly severe loss of Armenian tanks during the Second Karabakh War in 2021 caused a debate about their further relevance. In this war, Armenia and its ally, unrecognized by the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, lost much of their tanks.

But explaining this by aging the tank means that the data is wrong. According to Oryx, Armenia lost 255 tanks, of which 146 (57%) were destroyed. Of these 146 tanks, 83 (57%) in the TB2 account are known to Turkish -made drones now. Others were damaged by Bayraktars or destroyed by artillery and anti -tank guided missiles given with these UAVs. Many of the other Armenian tanks are destroyed by bargage ammunition.

The tanks were lost after Azerbaijan, according to reports, destroyed 60% of the air-and-Karabakh Republic and 40% of its artillery in the first hour of the war. As soon as Azerbaijan achieved the preference in the air, it was focused on the defeat of tanks, artillery and other armored vehicles. After a few weeks of heavy loss, Armenia has become much less commonly used because of a constant threat that comes from TB2.

This significantly complicated the strengthening of Armenia's position and counterattack. The only exception was the battle for Shush, when the cloudy weather did not allow TB2 to play a significant role. For several days, Armenia used tanks and armored vehicles in counterattacks to the city, but it was too late to return it. Instead of demonstrating the aging of the platform, Armenia's losses have shown how important tanks are in the modern war.

As soon as Armenia was unable to use her tanks effectively, she was in a disadvantage. These severe tank losses preceded the breakthrough of Azerbaijan. It was the tanks that played a crucial role in the success of Azerbaijan in the breakthrough of Armenian defense lines and the use of this success. Baku has only achieved limited success in the storming of Armenian defense at most of the control line, which is mainly made up of mountain or elevated terrain.

It is no accident that the breakthrough of Azerbaijan occurred in the south, where the terrain was even and where Baku could use the most advantage in armored vehicles. The ability of Azerbaijan to protect their tanks and use them effectively, as well as the inability of Armenia to do so was one of the main factors that explain the success of Azerbaijan in the war. The war did not show that the tanks were outdated.

On the contrary, she demonstrated that Armenia's air defense was insufficient to protect her tanks and artillery from Azerbaijan aircraft. Wars in Ukraine and Nagorno -Karabakh show that mobile armored platforms with considerable fire power are still important. Both wars also show that tanks should be used with adequate general support. Otherwise, tanks, like any other weapon, will be vulnerable.

The Russian tank units did not have enough infantry, which made them vulnerable to anti -tank groups, and the outdated air defense of Armenia could not protect its tanks from Azerbaijani "Baractares", which led to heavy losses. The war in Ukraine has denied arguments that the drones made tanks outdated in Nagorny Karabakh. UAV TB2 is very effective in Ukraine, but they did not pose a serious threat to Russia's tank park.

In addition, considerable logistical support is required for the efficient operation of the tank units. These are well -known lessons learned by the commanders of the tank units during the Second World War. With the growth of the threats facing the tanks, there were also measures of counteraction.

Although many articles have been written about the disadvantages of Russian tanks, there are many examples from Ukraine when Russian tanks were affected by anti -tank weapons, including anti -tank guided missiles, but the crew remained alive. The Oryx list, which includes only observed losses, undoubtedly lowers the number of Russian tanks that have been damaged but as a result restored by Russian troops.

Strikes can disable the armament of the tank or its engine, but the survivability of the tanks is much higher than that of other armored vehicles. Without tanks, the military involved in the Great Grand Terrestrial War would have to rely on armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles to perform the same role that would lead to more catastrophic losses and severe casualties.

One Russian military correspondent even argued that Russia needs more heavy BMO-T armored personnel carriers on the T-72 tank chassis because infantry fighting vehicles are not armored. In fact, both Russia and Ukraine were convinced of the benefits of tanks in this war. Although Russia has developed a number of unmanned terrestrial machines, they were used only to dispose of mines far from the front line in Ukraine, which indicates their unwillingness to replace tanks on the battlefield.

It would be more profitable for the Russian military to have more infantry and less tanks in Ukraine, but tanks will remain important systems in terrestrial fighting. They remain a key terrestrial component of the All -Military War, which other types of weapons become more vulnerable. The infantry is vulnerable to attempting to capture defense positions, so tanks still play an important role in offensive operations.

Anti -tank guided missiles, of course, cannot replace the tank in maintaining maneuver. It is especially important that NATO tanks are usually better protected than Russian tanks. In addition, NATO military is unlikely to give up combined weapons, as the Russian soldiers did in the early stages of their invasion. Therefore, not all lessons of this war are applied directly to NATO. To draw similar general conclusions based on the loss of Russian tanks during this period would also be a mistake.