From Selidovoy to Pokrovsk: why the Russian troops will not be able to pass this distance in the current state

Analyzing the current situation in the Pokrovsky direction, the military analyst Konstantin Mashovets emphasizes the slowdown of the Russian offensive. In addition, he claims that without additional reserves, the enemy will still not be able to storm Pokrovsk.

The command of the enemy's troops continues to make considerable efforts to realize its plan for the displacement of the advanced units of the Armed Forces from the bridgehead of the East River Vovcha, on the site from Halytsynivka to the area of ​​the north of Krasnogorivka.

According to this plan, for several extreme days, the enemy of the advanced units of the 90th Tank Division (TD), as well as, apparently, regrouped on this direction of the 9th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (OMSBR) persistently attacked the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces. Lisivka, as well as Kalinovo - Halytsynivka, trying to bypass (cut) our units that defended themselves in the village. Karlovka.

As a result, obviously, the advanced units of the Armed Forces were forced to leave both Karlovka itself and to leave the area east… In addition, the enemy obviously managed to occupy at least the northern part of the village. Halytsynivka (which, in fact, prompted the Armed Forces to leave Karlovka). At the same time, to the north, in the direction of Selidovo, obviously, the enemy is not yet able to displace the advanced units of the Armed Forces from the area of ​​the village.

Marynivka, despite its stubborn attack by the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (MSD) and the 114th OMSBR from the north, from Novogrodivka, as well as from the village. Mikhailivka (probably attack the units of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment \ SME of the 90th TD). The maintenance of the Armed Forces with.

Marynivka begins to significantly interfere with the enemy to attack directly towards the city of Selidovo, as well as to expand its inquiry in the area of ​​Novogrodivka in the Pokrovsky direction, to the south.

Obviously, in the near future the enemy will be forced to narrow the area of ​​his offensive even more along the front, choosing one thing - either an offensive in the village of Selidovo, or the continuation of the covering of its advanced units against the Armed Forces bridgehead on the Wolf River, located east on the site of Halytsynivka. to the northern outskirts of Krasnogorivka.

By the way, apparently, in the near future it is worth expecting a "revival" and advanced units of the 110th OMSBR of the 1st Army Corps (AK) UV "Yug" of the enemy in the area of ​​Krasnogorivka. Most likely, its units will try to overcome Lozov River in the northwestern direction, towards the villages of Zhelan (first and second).

It is also possible that the 5-A OMSBR of the enemy within the framework of the "general plan" will also make an accentant attempt to "bring the Southern Flang" by a break from Krasnogorivka in the western direction-towards Alexandropol and Kurakhivka. It would be quite logical.

That is, at this point, we have a clear attempt of the Russian command at once two groups of troops (UV) "Center" and "Yug" to implement on its general adjacent flank a plan for the displacement of Ukrainian troops west of the western Wolf. What is it about Pokrovsky? Directly.

While the Ukrainian troops are "conditionally speaking", the east of the Ukrainian Rubezh - sharp, as well as control the area of ​​Selidovo, the continuation of the Russian offensive on Pokrovsk will be connected for Russian troops with some risk.

At this point, apparently, the Russian command, aware of such a tactical "peculiarity" in this direction, seeks to remove all possible flank risks from the south for its group (the 2nd general military army \ name), which, in fact, is aimed at Pokrovsk. In this context, you should pay attention to the following.

Obviously, the enemy can no longer move at a more or less high pace both directly in the Pokrovsky direction and towards Selidovo, and still displace the Ukrainian troops south of the general directorate "to Pokrovsk". For several extreme days (just during the period of activation of the enemy towards Selidovo and in the direction of Halytsynivka) its promotion directly in the Pokrovsky direction was limited to the expansion of the "control zone" in the village.

Novogrodivka for several hundred meters and promotion from the village. Merry in the village. Grodivka by 250 meters.

Although he is constantly trying to attack the 27th MSD, the 15th and 30th OMSBR and part of the 114th OMSBR forces in directions: at this point I have no information that the advanced units This direction managed to break through the barrier border at the Zhuravka River and the Kazenyna Torets, with the exception of the area of ​​the Novogrodivska -1 \ 3 mine near the Pokrovsk -Avdiivka railway.

Obviously, the Ukrainian command seeks to take advantage of the same "chance" that I mentioned earlier in my reviews about the ability to "expel" the attack of the enemy directly in the Pokrovsky direction (well, it would be "a little strange" if it did not do it) This natural border. And it should be emphasized that time, obviously, clearly plays "not for the Russians".

The longer and longer they will be distracted by the flanking of their Pokrovsky group, in particular, trying to "quickly capture" Selidovo, the more this "chance" of the Armed Forces will grow. But now they cannot spit on the flanks and rush the head of the Pokrovskaya storm. Without the flanks, it will be clean water with an adventure.

That is, apparently, this "dilemma" a couple of weeks ago came to the Russian command in all its height, and in this situation, it decided to act "by textbook": as far as I understood, the calculation of Russians is based From the defense "directly in the Pokrovsky direction of the Armed Forces should be equipped as long as they" solve the problem of settlements and flanks ", will not have time.

To guarantee this, they are trying to continue intense attacks now, in fact, in the Pokrovsky direction in the same composition and the means (reserve) in the "Center" for solving "flank problems". Well, a very clear and logical solution.

The problem is the "only" that even if the enemy manages to displace our troops from the bridgehead on the Vovch River, somehow "be" in the town of Selidovo (BA, even to seize it), then he still directly for "Pokrovskaya" storming " Additional forces and means will be required. Moreover, not in small volume.

And here we return to the same "general" (strategic) situation (and at the same time - the question "needed" was needed "was a Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk province of the Russian Federation), in particular in the key sphere - the area of ​​the presence of the opponent of strategic reserves. And also, to their real state, regarding the sphere of their combat and operational capabilities.

If in the Russian GSC "pushed" on the summer-autumn of 2024 under this term mainly troops (forces) in "Sever" (read-Lenvo troops), then I have bad news for the Kremlin. And on many grounds, it is. That is, some other strategic reserves than Lenvo troops (one all -military army + 3 Army Corps) is somehow not "visible". Otherwise, the Kharkiv adventure with the "sanitary area" in the form in which it is now, it simply would not happen.

For a greater understanding of what I mean, I recommend to the Russian Genorals and Colonels, read the memories (memoirs) The "Wehrmacht Center" (which is an interesting military-historical and eloquent coincidence) to Moscow. The basic principles of "chiefs of the military", both at the time and current, of course, corrected to the modern technological way, in this sense, well, very similar in their "effective" part.

Once again, the numerous Russian "passionate", when your political leadership (which considers yourself to be aware of the strategy of warfare) puts clearly false (unlikely, about the chances of success) the task of strategic scale, without taking into account the whole. Factors of the same strategic scale, you would not hurt at all - to ask your management a number of relevant issues. Among which the main thing should be: "Are you sho, yob . . .