The new reality of Syria, or that destroys entire army

Over the years, its regime began to control about two -thirds of Syria. Focus has translated the article of the Stuart International Relations Council A. Reed on the situation in Syria. Strengthening in power, Assad began to travel abroad, visiting Moscow, Beijing, Abu Dhabi and Tehran. Everyone seemed to be reluctant to recognize that the rigid security officer would remain in power for a long time, and "normalization" became the motto of not only Middle Eastern but also some Western diplomats.

In September, after a 13-year diplomatic break, Italy appointed its first ambassador to Syria. But suddenly, after a ten-day sudden offensive of the rebel group "Hayat Tahrir Ash-Sham", this stability was spilled on powder. The Syrian Arab army literally dissolved in the air, the soldiers left their posts and removed the form. The rebels took Damascus without a battle, and Assad was taken to Moscow. Even the opposition was surprised at how easy it all happened.

The sudden, unexpected surrender of the Syrian army is part of the ancient tradition, when outwardly strong but internally fragile armies quickly, to great surprise, are destroyed in the face of the offensive of the rebels. More recently, in Afghanistan 2021, the Afghan National Army, trained and equipped with the United States worth $ 83 billion in two decades, collapsed in a matter of months when Taliba came to power.

Prior to that, in 2014, Iraq's army collapsed when IDIL captured most of the country, including Falludzh and Mosul cities. In the same year, the rebels-hosts in Yemen seized the capital of the dignity in a few days and soon overthrew the government of Abdrabukh Manzur Hadi, who fled to Saudi Arabia.

In 2013, the same thing happened in the Central African Republic, where the Coalition of the rebels "Seleka" in a few months declined the government, seizing the capital of Bangi without much resistance. The disgraced president of Francois Boziza fled to Cameroon. In the south, in Zaire, the forces of Mobut Sessi Ceo broke up in 1997, when the country swept the uprising from the East.

When the insurgents approached his palace in the jungle, a mob, which has been in power since the 1960s, fled Morocco. His own dissatisfied presidential guard fired at the fuselage of the flying aircraft. The time of collapse cannot be predicted; In the Jenga game, you never know which of the elongated blocks will collapse the whole tower. However, the causes of collapse can always be fixed. Again and again the same factors destroy the military forces that fight the rebels.

The first is ethnic isolation. Governments often complete their armies, especially the highest team composition, with their ethnic brothers. This approach has its advantages - greater cohesiveness and loyalty, and this is a time -tested way to "protect against revolution". In civil wars with an ethnic component, it is often inevitable that government troops represent one group and the rebels - another. However, this practice inevitably generates dissatisfaction with excluded groups.

In Zaire in the early 1990s, half of the army generals were originally from the province of Mobut, and a third from his relatively small NGBanda ethnic group. In the Central African Republic, one of the main claims of the rebels was that the government refused to integrate some ethnic groups into the ranks of the Armed Forces. The Yemen's Shiites believed that in Sunnit Hadi, their problems were ignored.

Prior to the arrival of IDIL, the Iraqi military for Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki marginalized Sunites. At the National Army of Afghanistan Tajika, at some point, they amounted to more than two -thirds of commanders, although only a quarter of the country's population were Tajiki. In Syria, about 70% of all soldiers and 80% of all officers were members of the Alawit religious direction, as well as the Assad itself, although this group was only 13% of the population.

The dominance of Alavita was almost complete in the Republican Guard, an elite defense detachment commanded by one of Assad brothers. The conscripts from other communities were not interested in dying for the officer corps and a regime that does not represent them. In addition, corruption cannot be written off from accounts - a significant factor that corrodes the armies from the inside.

Weak governments often cannot afford to buy the loyalty of their soldiers because of a decent salary, so they close their eyes to corruption or are not encouraged. Mobuta, who once ordered his followers to "steal cleverly, little by little", twice headed the mass robbery made by angry soldiers who did not receive salaries. In the Yemeni, Iraqi and Afghan armies, they were not most qualified, but those who had ties or were ready to give bribe.

Thousands of "ghost soldiers"-non-existent positions created for the commanders to assign a salary were included in payment information. In Afghanistan, corrupt Air Force officers were suspected of opium and weapons smuggling. Many Afghan Armed Forces commanders were field commanders who were once talked about "Taliban" and whose loyalty was sold at the highest price.

When the Talibi rolled in 2021, in many regions, they did not need to fight - it was enough to pay officials and watch their troops seem. The Syrian army also struck in corruption: from the extortion of small bribes from cars passing through the checkpoint to a multi -billion -dollar enterprise for the production and sale of captagon (variety of amphetamine).

The ordinary complained of officers who stole their fuel subsidies and demanded that soldiers who wanted to take leave paid for this privilege. Corruption in the army worsens the situation of the population, the support of the rebels. It also makes the army less efficient, taking away resources in investments in weapons, equipment and salaries for servicemen, and demoralize the lower ranks.

As one Afghan official said to the authors of the US government's report on the collapse of the Afghan army, "no one wanted to die for . . . people who came to plunder the country. " The same thing happened in Syria. The promises of Assad in the last minute to raise the salary of Syrian soldiers by 50% would hardly be enough to bring them back their fighting spirit. The most significant factor that caused the collapse of the Syrian army is more external than the internal: the loss of foreign patrons.

Weak governments usually need help to maintain control of the territory, and when external forces are left out of the game, refusal to support can become the same Jenonga block. It is no coincidence that Zaire's army collapsed after the Cold War, when the United States no longer needed a mob and unceremoniously threw it as an ally.

France, the former metropolis of the Central African Republic, came to the rescue when the government was struggling with the rebels, but in 2013 it made it clear that it would no longer do it. When the Yemeni Armed Forces were on the verge of collapse, the United States, which helped the government to fight the Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, refused to spread their anti-terrorist activities to fight Hussites.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the withdrawal of US troops led to the collapse of the army (just as long before in South Vietnam). The immediate cause of the collapse of the Syrian army was a sharp decline in foreign support. Hands in Ukraine were connected in Russia; Its Air Force could not repeat the flight of air strikes that rescued Assad in 2015.

Hezbollah swayed after the Israeli blows on it in Lebanon, including attacks with the exploded pagers, and could no longer supply the number of soldiers she had before. Iran, which also licks wounds after the Israeli blows, quickly removed his armed forces from Syria. The army of undemocratic governments is often the microcosm of their regimes. Like the Syrian military, the Syrian state was fragile, devastated perennial corruption and alienation, and was barely at external support.