Conclusions from "Errors of Ukraine": Why smaller states are preparing for a race of nuclear weapons

How to protect themselves to states that are smaller than aggressors do not have a nuclear arsenal and doubt security unions? From the war between Russia and Ukraine, small states can conclude that their safety will depend on nuclear restraint. The expansionist ambitions of the three most powerful states - China, the United States and Russia - undermine the current world order.

Since its inception, the People's Republic of Ukraine has shown interest in Taiwan; Beijing is now on the verge of trying to win this island. In January, the newly elected President Donald Trump announced his intention to include Canada and Greenland in the United States, which looks a little less serious. Focus has translated the article "New wave of pursuit of nuclear weapons?" Andreas Umland's analytics for The National Interest.

The author explained what the effects of a nuclear state attack on a non -nuclear. At the same time, a non -nuclear state voluntarily abandoned nuclear warheads, "bought" to the guarantees of the safety of world leaders. The most significant factor that has influenced the collapse of the post -war order over the last eleven years is Russia's behavior. Since 2014, Moscow has launched a campaign to seize territories, and from 2022 - an invasion with signs of genocide into the territory of Ukraine.

As the former Soviet Republic, Ukraine was one of the UN founders in 1945. Since 1996, it has not officially owned nuclear weapons, in accordance with the Nuclear Weapons (Day) Agreement. For more than three years, politicians and strategists from other Relector States have been watching Russia's attack and evaluating the reaction of other states and international organizations.

The weaker countries from the experience of Ukraine conclude that they cannot rely on international law, organizations and solidarity, and should not repeat the mistake of Kiev, trusting "assurances of security", "guarantees", "contracts on friendship", "strategic partnerships", etc. Such agreements are not of great importance, as evidenced by the inactive agreements of Ukraine with Russia (1994, 1997), China (2013) and the USA (1994, 2008).

The standard security dilemma for small countries is to join defense unions, which ideally include at least one nuclear weapon state. But, as Tbilisi and Kiev, in particular, have been convinced of their bitter experience, obtaining full membership in a powerful defense union is not so simple and quite risky. In response to the applications of Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO in April 2008, the Alliance told them that they would "become members".

As a result, neither their joining NATO nor the beginning of the process of admission to the Alliance, that is, a plan of action on membership (MAP), has taken place. Instead, Georgia was framed by Russia in 2008 and Ukraine in February 2014. The only consolation for these two countries may be that the Moldova, as well as the former Soviet Republic, but a constitutionally neutral state that has no ambitions to join NATO, also attacked Russia more than 30 years ago.

Finland's fate, which has a long border with Russia, shows the opposite example: unlike Georgia and Ukraine, Finland successfully initiated the NATO accession process in 2022, which ended with its entry in 2023. Examples of Finland and Moldova show that the intention of the former Russian colony to join NATO is neither sufficient nor a prerequisite for the Russian invasion.

Under other things being equal, Georgia and Ukraine, like Moldova, would probably become the targets of Russian expansionism, even without the desire to join NATO. They could avoid the loss of territories in favor of Russia, only having obeyed the Kremlin, joining Moscow -headed the Eurasian Economic Union and organizing the Collective Security Treaty. Ukraine would probably be forced to sign the 1999 Union Treaty between Russia and Belarus.

The experience of Ukraine and Georgia with NATO and Russia's response indicate the risks associated with an attempt to join a powerful international coalition. External balancing is a complex process and can provoke the invasion that it is designed to prevent. This is especially true for the countries that most need safety guarantees.

The current geopolitical upheavals were the result of the confrontation between Russia, China and the USA - the three most powerful countries, permanent members of the UN Security Council and the largest officially nuclear states within the framework of the day. This undermines trust in the future behavior of stronger states and the further relevance of international law and organizations to protect relatively weak countries from the great states.

In terms of Beijing, Washington and Moscow, current transformations may not be problems. But these changes are concerned about nuclear weapons and have low integration into international structures. Countries bordering expansionists and not in NATO or other defense alliances should now review their national security strategies. China, US and Russia leaders can ignore, reject or take these reactions to their expansionist ambitions.

Until they take preventive measures to counteract, sooner or later it is possible to expect a response from the smaller states. One of the possible reactions to the collapse of the post -war order can be an increase in the procurement of weapons of mass destruction for restraint and defense. Such decisions, in turn, can call similar steps from neighboring countries that do not like the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction near their borders.

The flow of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons into state arsenals, in turn, increases the likelihood that such weapons will fall into the hands of non -state entities. Changes in the global security policy caused in recent years by Russia's territorial expansion and numerous military crimes are raised to the small states of existential issues. This effect is increasing every day of the continuation of the war.