They will gather and share the world: will the Helsinki Agreements end the war in Ukraine

Will the Russian Federation be compelled, as the USSR once, not to divide the world and not break the borders? The 1975 Helsinki Agreements suggest an acceptable compromise to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. Negotiations on the end of the war between Russia and Ukraine have accelerated after the Summit on August 15 between Presidents Trump and Putin in Anchorge.

Discussions continue this week, when members of "people's coalitions" meet in Paris to discuss the so -called "security guarantees" for Ukraine. It is still unclear whether the measures will be agreed to Russia. It also remains a serious stumbling stone requirement for Putin to withdraw Ukrainian troops from the rest of the heavily fortified Donetsk region as a preliminary condition for ceasefire.

Focus translated the article of analysts George Biba and Zakari Pikin for the National Interest portal, which mentions the Helsinki Agreements in the context of the end of the Russian Federation. The article "To end the war in Ukraine, to return the Gelsinki's spirit" reminded that the meeting of US leaders and the Russian Federation in Alaska took place on the anniversary of the Agreement. Analysts have explained how the Helsinki concept can be used to achieve peace in Ukraine.

The summit of Trump and Putin inadvertently, but symbolically, took place only two weeks after the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act (also known as Helsinki Agreements). This document became the culmination of discharge in relations between the US and the USSR, playing an important role in the final completion of the Cold War.

At the beginning of the summer, Finland held a conference to celebrate this anniversary as the current head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2025. In Washington, this important milestone remained virtually unnoticed. The lack of celebrations is quite clear.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which occurred after decades of distrust between Russia and the West, clearly demonstrates how far we are from creating a common security system based on common instruments and principles in the broader Euro -Atlantic and Eurasian space. However, the adoption of Helsinki agreements in 1975 gave us lessons that remain relevant to reach peace in Ukraine and stability in Europe.

First, as it is known, the Helsinki Final Act led to the mutual recognition of two blocks of the Cold War and the adoption of territorial status quo after the Second World War. [It may be a recognition of the division into a Member States of the Warsaw Treaty, founded by the USSR, and NATO member countries, created with the participation of the United States-Ed.

] Today we are dealing with a similar problem: revision of post-Soviet territorial status quo and annexation of part of the sovereign territory of Ukraine. The recognition of these annexation should not even be discussed because they contradict the basic norm of territorial integrity (although Trump raised the issue of US sovereignty over Crimea).

However, the principle remains unchanged: can Ukraine and Russia agree for some time disagree and postpone this issue for future negotiations? Neither Russia nor Ukraine could realize its territorial claims. Ukraine cannot really return all its sovereign territory by force.

Meanwhile, Putin took the first step in the direction of compromise, abandoning his former position, set out in June 2024, according to which Ukrainian troops should leave Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions, which Moscow considers annexed. However, he still insists on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donetsk region. Kiev will be extremely difficult to agree with this requirement, especially given the strategic importance of the region and the amount of blood spilled for its defense.

Due to the fact that retreat from the Donetsk region will significantly increase the vulnerability of Ukraine before the next Russian attack, Kiev wants to receive from the event "guarantees" of security in exchange for possible territorial concessions. This leads us to the second lesson - the importance of diplomatic creativity and compromise. The Helsinki Final Act began with the Decalus of Ten Principles, which all the participating states were to follow.

These principles inherently contradict each other: non -interference in internal affairs and respect for human rights, territorial integrity and self -determination of peoples. But despite the constant differences regarding the relative weight of different principles, the states of both blocks were ready to accept a package that included heterogeneous elements.

With the end of the Cold War and the onset of the "end of the history" of the West, they began to consider diplomacy as a reward, which should be given to undemocratic countries for good behavior and to take away for disobedience.

In addition, when it was an OSCE in the field of human rights and democracy, the West paid close attention to Russia's deficiency, and often closing his eyes that governments that were considered friendly - in Ukraine, Baltic and Georgia before the election of a "Georgian dream" were not fulfilled. Diplomacy should not be equal to idealism.

On the contrary, it should be understood as the most important tool for overcoming the inevitable ambiguity and managing conflicting interests without resorting to war. Neither the Russian nor the Western elites were able to learn it over the years that preceded a full -scale invasion of Ukraine, preferring to refer to the principles and claims to each other and to reduce diplomatic contacts so that not to do "case as usual".

The years of infertile negotiations have led to hundreds of thousands of deaths, even against the background of obvious compromises - including the Minsk agreements, adopted neither many nor the UN Security Council. Is it possible to find a compromise today that would allow Moscow to declare that its political goals have been achieved and at the same time gave the West the opportunity to claim the reconciliation of sufficient "guarantees" of Kyiv's safety? Certainly.

But for this purpose it is necessary to abandon unrealistic options, including Ukraine's membership in NATO and the presence of large European forces in the Ukrainian territory - both of these options threaten to involve the United States in the future war.

In exchange for the proposal that the European restraint forces will be placed outside the territory of Ukraine, and the external military presence in the Ukrainian territory will be limited to exercises and repair work, Moscow could agree to mitigate its demand for the withdrawal of Kiev troops from the rest of the Donbass.

The efforts to ensure Ukraine's compliance with the OSCE's obligations to minorities could also help Russia show some flexibility in the territory of the territory and at the same time accelerate the process of Ukraine's accession to the EU. In addition, the best guarantee of Ukraine's security will be the permission of Kyiv to maintain large armed forces, capable of holding on a new invasion of Russia, although with some restrictions on "round -shaped" weapons.

It is worth considering the pressure on Moscow in order to review its requirement for "demilitarization" of Ukraine in exchange for accelerated withdrawal of sanctions. Finally, as Michael Kotie Morgan described accurately, the Helsinki agreements were not least concluded because Brezhnev eventually sought to recognize the USSR as a legitimate European Great State.

Many analysts ask whether Putin wants a similar agreement or seeks to restore the sphere of influence that is incompatible with the norms of sovereign equality. But there are many incentives for settlement. If the position of all parties fails, and the current diplomatic process fails, it will quickly become clear that the military decision remains the only option. This result will be associated with unacceptable risks.

Russian troops can break the Ukrainian defense lines more decisively, imposing even more disadvantages to Kiev, which will dramatically increase the feeling of threat throughout Europe and eliminate the possibility of limited restarting relations in the interests of global security between the two largest nuclear states in the world.

On the other hand, if the Ukrainian troops manage to keep the defense line through increased support from Europe, Moscow may conclude that the escalation of the conflict is the only way left to achieve its political goals. The protracted war will also continue to fuele the growth of populism throughout Europe, influencing the EU in the most unforeseen way.

In short, the inability to find a compromise that will allow all participants to keep their faces threatened with a sharp deterioration in the safety situation in Europe, a potential sharp increase in the number of casualties on all sides, significant destruction in Ukraine, which will exclude the real possibility of its accession to the European Union, and the other. Trump's diplomatic process was, to put it mildly, unconventional.

Turning directly to the leaders of the states in the early stage, it increased the likelihood of misunderstandings that can disrupt the entire initiative. But the failure of this initiative will be so painful that this perspective should encourage such development.

While the Western governments and the military are discussing what "security guarantees" they are ready to offer Ukraine, they should avoid "bitter pills", which, as they know, will not accept Moscow - or be ready to review their initial proposals in exchange for other measures that will strengthen both Ukraine and Europe. In other words, they should mention the spirit of Helsinki. Zakari Paykin is the Deputy Director of the Better Order Project at the Quincy State Policy Institute.