Putin is hung up in Ukraine: as Russia lost the whole world, trying to seize four areas

He wanted to help Russia get out of the international isolation, in which it was after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. He wanted to return Russia's influence in the Middle East, where its presence weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He wanted to approve Russia as a world state capable of supporting its allies and to stop attempts to overthrow friendly governments.

The interference in Syria also made it possible to take on the role of the defender of Christians in the Middle East - the role that, according to Putin, refused the decline of the Western states, and the mission that fully corresponded to Putin's desire to present Russia as the last bastion of Christian values ​​in Europe. After the rapid collapse of Putin's assad mode, almost nothing to show within this triple program.

Russia is threatened by the loss of military bases in the Middle East, and it did not show much care about Syrian Christians, whom it stated, protects when the secular government of Assad was overthrown by the Islamist organization "Hayat Tahrir Ash-Sham". And Russia's isolation from the international community has only intensified after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

At the heart of Russia's intervention was the message of small countries that do not have close ties with the Western powers: join us, and we will protect you from the measures supported by the measures. For almost decades, this message seemed plausible. However, now everything looks different. Putin, who focused on achieving a complete victory over Ukraine, pushed other foreign policy goals into the background of Russia and deprived it of one of the greatest foreign policy success.

The fall of Assad deprives Russia of the right to claim the role of a guarantor of stability of the regime for allied governments. As long as the war continues in Ukraine, it will remain unable to export security abroad. The presence of Russia in Syria has been very in demand from the outset.

Moscow perceived the Arab Spring of 2010s as a continuation of protests on the Maidan in Kiev and "Color Revolutions", which stirred the post-Soviet countries for a decade earlier-all these events Putin regarded as possible rehearsals for the possible overthrow of his own regime. Outside, of course, Putin represented Russian intervention in Syria as an anti -terrorist operation.

Although the West rejected Russia's proposal for partnership in the fight against the "Islamic State" (also known as IDIL) in Syria, he accepted the reality of Russia's participation in the war against the common - or at least the common - the enemy. The United States, Turkey and several Gulf countries have established military communication channels with Russia, which they stopped discussing exclusively as an international rogue, as it was after the annexation of Crimea.

Meanwhile, to support Assad regime, Russia has deepened its relations with Iran, creating a joint military commission, putting Tehran S-300, despite the US objection, and bypassing international sanctions. Putin also did not evade controversy with Turkey regarding the support of Syrian rebels, reaching the imposition of trade sanctions against Ankara. However, his military intervention did not grow into conflict with the regional Sunni states, which provided for Putin's critics.

Although Russian-Turkish relations ranged between hostility and friendship (Putin supported Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan during an attempt by the 2016 coup), the Gulf countries respected the demonstration of Moscow military power in the problematic conflict, which was previously difficult.

Assad was restored in the Arab States League, high -level contacts between Russia and the Gulf countries have become more frequent, trade between Russia and the United Arab Emirates increased, and Saudi Arabia and Russia began to coordinate oil policy. This warm reception spread not only to the Middle East. The countries of Africa, Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, Latin America have found Moscow's ability to protect the union from internal upheavals and overthrows.

Earlier, it was difficult to imagine itself as a convincing investor or exporter of technology, except for the construction of nuclear stations and weapons supplies.

But the successful defense of Assad enabled the Kremlin to sell himself as a safety exporter, both officially through Russian armed forces, and informally, through mercenaries, such as the militarized company "Wagner", which fought on earth with the Syrian army, Hezbolla and Corps Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, while the Russian Armed Forces acted mainly in the air.

The submission was effective: the governments of African countries, including regimes in Burkin-Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambik and South Sudan, as well as secular post-Soviet regimes in Central Asia, such Uzbekistan, used by the proposal of Russian troops and mercenaries in the fight against armed guerrillas, Islamist and separatist groups, as well as for the training of local armed forces and protection services.

For the Central Asian governments, Russia has long been regarded as a defender against internal riots caused by Islamists and a supported event by political opposition, and Syrian intervention has strengthened this idea. Preventing the overthrow of Assad and returning to Assad control most of the territory that Syria lost for the rebels, Russia has demonstrated that it could affect the course of events in the region and even break it.

At the same time, the Gulf countries offered investment projects in Russia and provided diplomatic support from the Kremlin. In 2018, the United Arab Emirates signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Russia, and by 2021 they became the closest partner of Russia in the Middle East, and the turnover between the two countries increased to $ 9 billion in 2022. Qatari investments in Russia reached $ 13 billion.

Earlier, cool relations between the Soviet Union and the Gulf monarchies, due to the Soviet support of revolutionary groups and governments in the region, as well as post -Soviet tension caused by Russia's war in Chechnya, competition in the hydrocarbon market and closer Putin's ties with Iran. Syrian intervention has become a catalyst for a new strong role in Russia in the Middle East.

It is not necessary to ensure Russia's refusal to Assad regime for the sake of attracting additional resources to combat Ukraine clearly demonstrates that Putin is ready to sacrifice everyone for the full victory in the war. Although Putin is trying to portray himself as a realist, he is absorbed by Ukraine, excluding almost all other foreign policy imperatives.

In most countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East of Russia, it was possible to represent its war in Ukraine as a struggle for a common cause: less world -oriented world order, greater independence and decentralization of the financial system, as well as the ability to ignore the event criticism of human rights and human rights violations and Anti -democratic governments, which some non -watery countries consider hypocritical.

Many countries, including China, India, Vietnam and former Soviet republics in Central Asia, have seen opportunities in the isolation of Russia from the West. When Western firms and investors have closed their stores in Russia, non -western players went to the Russian market and helped Russia bypass sanctions. The fall of Assad will not have an immediate impact on the attempts of these companies and governments benefits from Russia's isolation.

But the spectacle of rapid collapse of the Russian ally can change their willingness to cooperate with Russia to the detriment of relations with the West. Russia's ability to give military power to its allies meant that its security services were in demand both in the Middle East and Africa, but the fall of Assad would probably lead to a decrease in this demand. Russia's military bases in Syria, which it could lose, enabled it to fill ships and planes and supply troops to both regions.

Without physical presence in the Middle East, it will be much more difficult to make. The success of the rebels in Syria also demonstrates the limited Russian security and economics proposals for allies around the world. Moscow has successfully helped Asad to restore military and political control over most of the country, but it was not possible to strike a decisive blow to resistance in the long run.

Russia was also unable to promote the economic development of Syria and replace Western investments, which flooded into the country in the first years of Assad's reign and then exhausted during the Arab Spring. Syria was not able to get out of the economic black hole, into which it failed during the Civil War, when GDP decreased by the population two to three times.

In areas controlled by Islamist rebels, supported by Turkey, the standard of living has ultimately exceeded the rates of regions led by Damascus with the support of Russia and Iran. Idlib -controlled rebels include electricity, fuel, water and much less food shortages. The total volume of Russian trade with Syria has never exceeded $ 700 million a year - less than Turkey's trade with relatively small areas of the rebel -controlled territory.

Monomania Russia will eventually survive the fall of Assad and the possible loss of its military bases in the Mediterranean. The Russians have always treated the Syrian expedition with caution and indifference; The idea of ​​sending soldiers to a distant Muslim country has never been popular and aroused memories of the Soviet War in Afghanistan. The Russians were satisfied with a small, high -tech, mainly air war, which is conducted with limited forces on Earth.

The coverage of the Syrian intervention has helped to form the expectations of a "special military operation" in Ukraine as a quick victory somewhere far away, a rapid source of pride that does not require victims by society or the participation of unprofessional soldiers. When the invasion of 2022 was not crowned with immediate success, remote successes in Syria became an unpleasant contrast with the gloomy reality of war in Ukraine.

Now that the war has been going on for the third year, Putin has lost another Syrian effect: the belief of its citizens in Russia in the ability of Russia to quickly win war through technological superiority. Russia, Iran and many other countries criticize US military interventions as arrogant, such that do not know local conditions and are unable to create neither stable regimes nor effective security structures.

It could be expected that Russia, which plays the role of counterbalances in the Middle East, and Iran, which is a regional heavyweight, would understand local dynamics. But they could not stimulate economic growth in Syria and attract others to the side of Assad. Investors from the Gulf, India and China have not reached for Syria under Russian and Iranian security guarantees.

Now that Russia appeals to Erdogan for help in evacuating its military and civilian staff from Syria, she finds herself in the same role in which she once accused the United States: countries far from affairs and dynamics of the region, displaced by local political players, not interested in the presence of foreigners.

Russia's focus in the war in Ukraine will help Putin and Russians in general to ignore the inconvenient questions about Syria, for example, what happened to the money and resources that Russia has invested in this country, or why Russian security services, which are now effectively managing the country, have been repeatedly frozen: Ukraine's readiness for resistance, rebellion of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigogine in June 2023, the invasion of Ukraine into the Kursk region last fall, and now the rapid collapse of Assad regime.

However, these questions will also ask Russia partners in other countries. It became clear that Russia is not able to provide its allies with military support and economic development while it was leading the war, and the regimes that have previously appealed to Russia will pay attention to it. Now Russia is promoting the fact that it saved the life and freedom of Assad, thus fulfilling its guarantees, depriving him of Muammar Gaddafi's fate in Libya.

But Moscow's allies clearly expect much more than the exporter of stability and safety of the regime. The rulers who hope for the help of Russia can be unpleasantly surprised at how quickly it seeks to make contact with the new leaders of Syria. Even before Assad's departure, Russian television ceased to be called "Hayat Tahrir Ash-Sham" a terrorist organization.

Recently, the head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, clearly from the Kremlin's approval, suggested that the Tahrir-Sham "Terrorist" "Hyatrist" "label" and the government allowed the Embassy of Syria in Moscow to raise the rebel flag.

Moscow now establishes direct contacts with the new Syrian government, trying to gain his commitment, emphasizing that, despite his previous attempts to support a secular leader against religious fundamentalists, she sees herself as a global bastion of religious conservatism. Putin tried to present Russia's failure in Syria as a victory, claiming that Russia prevented the creation of a "terrorist enclave" in the country.

However, the fall of Assad (and Russia's indifference to the collapse of his regime) indicates that the care of Syria or any other client state was subordinated to Putin by his main desire to cause a decisive defeat to Ukraine. At the same time, Putin's decision to prioritize Ukraine should not be seen as a complete refusal of Russia from ambitions outside its immediate environment. The loss of Syria, most likely, simply raised the stakes in the war in Ukraine.