Do not underestimate the enemy: how the Russians learned the lessons of Bakhmut and learned to fight

I'm looking at some assessments of the actions of the Russian command by a considerable number of our so-called "informants" (I won't even dare to call them journalists or experts) and I'm a little "offing" (feeling surprised) at their content related to this war.

If you listen to them, look at them and read them, you may get the impression that the Russian command is such a bloodthirsty, stupid and unscrupulous monster that constantly drives its own personnel "to the slaughter" and does not know other techniques and methods of organizing and conducting military operations.

Perhaps from an informational and psychological point of view this is appropriate, but from the point of view of a rational assessment and analysis of the enemy's actions - categorically not. This creates a chill, contributes to the creation of a distorted view of the enemy's real capabilities and capabilities.

We have somehow decided that the Russian command does not learn anything and does not take into account the experience (including its own) of the ongoing war when planning and organizing combat operations at the tactical and operational levels. The imaginary "scheme" drawn for us by such domestic experts and "informants" is simple.

The Russians allegedly drive a bunch of personnel to the chosen direction, create a multiple advantage in it, and then try to break through the defense system of the Armed Forces with "meat assaults". Everything is supposedly clear, understandable (especially to the average Ukrainian citizen) and fits into the canons, which, according to our "experts", are accepted in the "Soviet-Russian General Assembly".

In fact, in reality, everything is much more complicated and, to put it mildly, in a different way. . . Russians are learning, and at all three main levels of management — tactical, operational and strategic. For example. . . Everyone remembers the assaults by Russian troops on Bakhmut and Avdiivka, Toretsk and Chasovoy Yar. . . How they were organized by the Russian command, how they happened in reality and what they cost them. But compare it with what is happening now in Kupyansk and Pokrovsk. . .

Compare the methods and tactics used by the Russian command at the tactical level now with those they used before.

Remember that, instead of frontal attacks and assaults of urban blocks, Russian troops had to be trained in these methods of "infiltration" and "covert penetration" (and in a mass order), and at the same time, they also had to organize interaction and stable command of troops (at least at the tactical level) and do a lot more so that it would have the desired effect (and, judging by the current situation, it does exist). . . Therefore, dear colleagues, do not underestimate the enemy.