The decisive summer of 2024. Why for the Armed Forces of the RF Extension of the offensive can become fatal

In the central part of the city, where the advanced assault groups of the enemy managed to break through a few days ago, obviously, he had to leave a number of positions and move to the north (somewhere to Korolenko Street). Active battles continue in the area "Position", "Oasis" and at the intersection of ul. Gogol and farmer.

In this regard, it is worth noting that the enemy has not yet managed to force the river Vovcha (neither within the city nor in its surrounding areas), which is undoubtedly one of the key factors about it. The result of battles in the Volchansk area during the extreme days.

Obviously, the enemy command (UV "Sever") is unlikely to refuse to achieve the goals of the operation set before him and in the near future it is worth expecting: at this point, from the leading positions of Russian troops in the area of ​​the village. Lukyanets to the northeastern outskirts of Kharkiv (Basin Street)-about 20-21 km.

Considering the fact that using an enemy in 10-15 km of adjacent tactical zone its heavy range artillery for her "abdomen and baked" (because, of course, her firing positions will be quickly discovered by Ukrainian troops and they will be inflicted on a pre-emptive fire) , the enemy, and so it is possible to cause fire damage to Kharkiv by certain artillery with a certain extent safe distances, in particular: therefore, dear citizens (especially Kharkiv), to the northern and northeastern regions of Kharkiv, the enemy may try to reach Arta, of course, provided certain conditions are met.

Of course, the hypothetical appearance of all these artillery systems (AU) of the enemy in the respective zones and on the corresponding limits that threaten Kharkiv will not remain unnoticed for the Armed Forces, and the attempt of the enemy to organize regular artillery blooms in those areas of the city to which it can reach, it is We will meet, let's say, "active counteraction" of the Armed Forces, but keeping in mind the above comments are still worth it.

Obviously, the enemy's actions in the Kharkiv operating direction in the general canvas of the "Summer Campaign" of the enemy of 2024 were of greater importance than the results he had now achieved. Therefore, I would not have hoped that the enemy could completely abandon the "implementation of his plan" in the near future, in particular in the part concerning the Kharkiv operating direction. It is possible that he will make some adjustments, and it is quite possible in content and volume.

But the main "canvas" - a breakthrough on the operatives of our Kupyansky group - will obviously be preserved. In this sense, I think the attempts to "control" the city of Vovchansk and the forcing of the Vovch River (in one place or another) by the enemy will be continued. Moreover, I do not see until the enemy of the beginning of implementation of some measures aimed at "fixing and transitioning to defense" in the specified direction.

Much more is another question - what will happen in a strategic sense? While the enemy's command implements its plan in the Kharkiv operating direction (UV "Sever") troops (forces) of two "full-time" districts-Leningrad and Moscow-which are actually intended for action in the North-Western and Western strategic directions. And he is going to do with these forces.

But, if it is in that dilemma that is now apparently faced after the first "intermediate" results in the Kharkiv operating direction (which clearly, to put it mildly, "do not coincide" with his initial plan) between -This to turn it into a "main content" of a summer campaign, and that "somewhere else" to try to achieve prompt success will choose the second option, then it will clearly affect the sense of the whole so -called summer campaign on all without exception of operating directions ( One of the main elements will be the obvious strategic regrouping of Russian troops).

And so, it will all significantly affect the course of the whole war. At the moment, the risk of "breaking off Bosch" in the same summer campaign is obviously increasing for the Russian command. And with the receipt of the main volume and establishment of a systematic, systematic nature of military and technical assistance by our adolescent countries, it will increase even more. The cinat, in this sense, is clearly far off for the Kremlin.