What Russia expects this summer: about the Kremlin's information game

Because it really looks like. Or their intelligence worked poorly. Or - what probably intervened a political factor: Shoigu tried to perform a small feat on the eve of the reassignment of the government and/or prepared the background for a trip to China. Experts say that for increasing activity, Russians will have to involve forces and means in other areas. That on the principle of connected vessels will be reflected negatively.

We have two key tracks: in the coming weeks - critical for the formation of a trajectory: to failure or to crawl. If in the summer there is a saturation of our troops (in addition to what our MIC and what is being purchased separately), as well as aviation will appear at least for the tasks of the air defense on the right bank of the Dnieper, the Russians will have a sad face.

In particular, it will be possible to maneuver the ground aircraft, cover troops, and more effectively solve the problem of reconnaissance drones of the Russian Federation. So everything is very difficult, but there are not only bad scenarios for us. The Russians have already come out of the graph and should adjust the plans.

The usual administration of the Kremlin is to spin a two -factor spiral: to use hostilities to strengthen information pressure and vice versa - information attacks are intended to improve the situation for the military. For the time being, they have one and the other. Until May 21, Roszma rolled a series of publications on the "completion of powers" of the President of Ukraine.

However, in these publications, they even write themselves: the UN Zelensky recognizes, the West recognizes that claims are made only by the Russian Federation and (possibly) Belarus. The visit of the Foreign Ministry of Germany to Kiev once again emphasizes that the topic "May 21+" is exclusively Russian. In Ukraine, there are those who are in synchronous with the Russians for political purposes. But many who criticize power, but rejects this heresy.

In total, in 5 months the Kremlin failed to rock in internal destabilization in Ukraine. On the one hand, the Ukrainians figured out that, on the other hand, there was no collapse of the front, and positive signals from the United States were received, which healed the atmosphere even against the background of serious damage to energy and other problems.

That is, now the political factor with information interventions is not sufficiently helping the Russian plan, and military accomplishments of the invaders do not cause a chain reaction in Ukrainian society. There is a shaky balance. The Russians see it. And take steps to destroy it. The main story is the attempt to "poison" Ukrainian society, the army and political political party called "Fast Peace". Win not on the front, but through expectations management.

The canvas of poisonous history pusted by the Russians is about this: the poison of this illusion is that tired people are offered a short period and a very tangible process. Which causes several consequences. When people are told that after 2 months they will "stop shooting", a huge temptation - not to prepare for challenges, but to try to endure, to stroke. Pressing "Request for Peace" can lead to a sharp decrease in resistance and extremely negative consequences for both the front and the rear.

When "peace" does not happen, there will be frustration and accusation of the Ukrainian authorities. If for some reason it is possible to reach a format of "truce", then immediately attempts to spin political confrontation and arrange in the fall the same destabilization that was able to avoid all this time will begin in the fall. And against her background to return to hostilities, but in much worse conditions for Ukraine with a much worse negotiating position.

A month ago, I gave a list of major events by the end of July with dates. We have already lived a third of this segment. Time is shrinking. The easiest way to not get into the specified trap is to listen and hope for anything, but to plan your actions and make decisions, as if there are no stories with the "fast world". And some lumen is possible in the spring of 2025.

That is, not to loop for two months, but to adapt to tasks for a year in a deteriorating situation, with the risk of sitting without heat and electricity. If done - that's when the chances of real negotiations will increase from adequate positions. Because the same partners actively make mood measurements. When measurements show that the Ukrainian people in tone, ready for difficulty, do not plan to give up and ask for air defense - a high chances of obtaining air defense.

And when the people are shaking and growing up for "let it end no matter how, but fast", there is no chance to get aircraft at all. Because it is easier and logical to seize such a people with shelling/throws and reduce costs . . . Keeping their heads cold, the Ukrainian people block the spiral, which I described above. It is an area where everyone's efforts are important.

Not having the opportunity to get us collected, the Russian Federation is in front of a dilemma - either sharply increases costs (public mass mobilization, which they categorically do not want), or really look for a way out. Yesterday the head of the Pentagon noted that summer is another turning point for Ukraine. I perceive it not only as a figure of language (there were already a dozen one and a half turning points).