Russia's tank troops are broken. Restore them on their own is almost impossible

From Ukraine, Oryx portal has demonstrated new record losses of Russian weapons - from February 24 to November 20, the loss of weapons of Russia amounted to 8 023 units installed for photos and videos from the Internet. That is, it is the minimum confirmed losses that are currently being tested. And the anniversary figure on November 20 - exactly 1,500 combat tanks lost Russia.

Of these, at least 516 tanks of modern modifications with the thermal imaging sights "Sosna-U" and "Essa", which were produced after 2000-T-72B3, T-72B3M, T-80BM, T-90A, T-90M-were identified. Almost 200 destroyed tanks are not identified after explosions, and there are probably new types. According to the Military Balance Directory for 2022, 3 417 tanks were armed in the Russian Federation. Of these, tanks produced after 2000 - 2 357.

According to Militation Balance, Russia lost 40% of the tank park compared to their presence at the beginning of the war. On the other hand, according to the Russian researcher Altyyn73, which counted the actual number of tanks in accordance with public photos and videos, tanks produced after 2000, in the service The production plan in 2021 was not fully implemented. In this case, the weight of actual losses is much higher. It is not capable of restoring these losses of the Russian Federation.

In 2021, Russia planned to produce a record number of tanks - 240 units, but the plan was not fulfilled. First, the Russian tank industry is forced to quit its stocks of nodes and spare parts to restore the disrupted tanks, and given the scale of hostilities, most of the Russian tanks need repair. Old T-62 and T-72 early series are supplied to the forefront.

That is, irreversible losses even in 40% mean that a comparable number after 9 months of active fighting requires replacement of engines and other units, ie the real combat composition of the enemy has decreased much more. Secondly, the Russian Federation is forced to use an emergency to restore the staffing of supply from the reserves of the Armed Forces of Belarus.

Third, the war has shown the low technical reliability of many nodes of Russian tanks, especially electronics, and Russia is not able to increase production due to sanctions restrictions. Due to low reliability and poor logistics, Russian tank troops cannot keep even the available cars in a proper readiness. That is, it also reduces real combat capability.

Fourth, a considerable number of tanks should be involved in the restoration of large losses of tank crews, to prepare mobilized, so tanks are distracted by training tasks. Low qualification and motivation of new crews will not allow you to restore combat capacity without long and resource practice. The inability to restore the tank park does not allow the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to plan large -scale offensive operations again.

Mobilized infantry is not capable of deep breakthroughs. Therefore, Russian tank troops have now significantly changed tactics, all over the front are used by tanks with extreme caution, one or two machines, avoiding the concentrations of equipment and lesions of high-precision weapons. Special armored vehicles are used to evacuate the crews of the tanks.

In some sections of the front, the Russian command generally refused the use of armored vehicles to avoid losses, and attacks only infantry with "penalties". The defeat of Russian tank troops in the "first and second stages of special operation" is so heavy that the Russian army will not be able to recover from it for a very long time, if he can at all.