Introduction of Sweden and Finland to NATO: What answer to expect from

However, it is not necessary to assume that the Russian Federation refrain from actions in response in the future. The Kremlin clearly marked its position many years ago: NATO's membership and Sweden will have consequences. Finnish President Sauli Ninstio in an interview in February 2022 illustrated the approach of Russia, reminding the warning of Vladimir Putin from 2016: "When we are looking across the border now, we see on the other side of Finn. If Finland enters NATO, we will see the enemy" .

Focus has translated the article by Nicholas Locker and Helie Hautala about changing the situation in the region through the accession of Finland and Sweden in NATO. As we claim in the recent report of the New American Security Center, the future of NATO's expansion will forever change European security architecture and undermine Russia's geopolitical positions.

Moscow will perceive these changes as a threat to its safety and will probably answer them so that it will create problems for NATO both in the short- and long run. In the short term, the Allies will need to resist Moscow's attempts to undermine NATO's positions in the Northern Baltic and Arctic region, in particular with the help of various tactics of the "gray zone" and more aggressive nuclear positioning aimed at compensation for losses in ordinary military potential.

In the long run, NATO should plan actions on Russia, which is being reborn as this country will eventually restore its conventional forces in the north and adapts its military position in response to NATO's presence in Finland and Sweden. Following Finland and Sweden, the Northwest Flang of Russia becomes more vulnerable to NATO. Its border with the Alliance will stretch from the Arctic Ocean to the Baltic Sea, which will be almost completely open to NATO countries.

Moscow is worried, the Alliance territory will expand near a strategically important Kolish Peninsula in the north and will approach the second largest Russian city of St. Petersburg, located on the Baltic Sea coast. Russia may suspect that the Alliance concentrates more military resources along the Finnish-Russian border.

In addition, Russia will consider it more risky to carry out its naval operations in the Baltic Sea or worry about threats to its Kaliningrad exclusive, which will soon be surrounded by NATO member states. The increased vulnerability of Russian military objects on the Kola Peninsula is of particular importance for the perception of Russia's threat. Located east of Northern Norway and Finland, the Kolish Peninsula is of key importance for Russia's national security.

This is based on the Northern Fleet of Russia, which includes submarines with ballistic missiles that guarantee the country's nuclear potential for the task of the second impact, as well as shock submarines and surplus ships equipped Europe. The losses caused by Russia's Convention in Ukraine will increase Moscow's dependence on its nuclear forces and therefore increase the importance of the Kola Peninsula for Russian military planners.

In addition, the location of the Kola Peninsula, next to the western end point of the northern maritime path, will contribute to the fact that the security of the region will become a vital interest in Russia in the coming years. One example of the view of the Russian military at Finland and Sweden's membership in NATO can be found in the publication of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation of December 2022.

The authors of the article dedicated to the modern challenges of Russia's military security in the Arctic note that even if Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO is mostly legal formality, since their relations with NATO have already been established, this should be considered as a direct call for Russia. They give two reasons for such an assessment. First, NATO troops and equipment may be placed in Finland and Sweden.

Secondly, NATO can accommodate "Operational and Tactical Missile Complexes" in Finland, which will threaten both the military-industrial complex of the Arkhangelsk region and for transport infrastructure. The article states that Russia should prepare for these possible risks, increasing its strength in the area, as well as planning long -term high -precision blows for purposes in Finland and Sweden. We are already seeing the signs of appropriate actions of Russia.

Russian politicians and high-ranking officials have long been threatening to take "relevant military and technical measures" if Finland and Sweden try to join NATO. In December 2022, and then in mid -January, Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu indicated what changes could happen.

The reforms scheduled for 2023-2026 will include the creation of the Army Corps in the Republic of Karelius near the border with Finland, as well as the reproduction of Moscow and Leningrad military districts by disbanding the current Western military district.

Shoigu stressed in December that the reason for these changes was "NATO's desire to increase his military potential near Russian borders, as well as to expand the Alliance through the annexation of Finland and Sweden", which forces Moscow "to take measures in response and create a suitable group of troops in the northwest of Russia" .

Although Finnish analysts do not consider these events dramatic, they demonstrate that, despite Russia's focus in Ukraine, it does not stop responding to changes in the North European security environment. Despite the fact that these proposals testify to the intention to respond to the intended threat derived from the entry of Finland and Sweden to NATO, in the short term Russia is limited to Russia with the help of ordinary military equipment.

Given the constant need to engage in war against Ukraine, as evidenced by recent reports of troops from other theaters of war, in particular from districts located near Finland, Moscow will still rely on the tactics of the "gray zone" to undermine NATO positions in the North region Europe, Baltic and Arctic. Recent events show that these can be attacks on critical infrastructure, such as pipelines, submarine cables or oil and gas fields, as well as terrorist acts against Western officials.

The fears that Moscow will again use weapons against the asylum requests, as it was in 2015 and 2016, have already prompted Finland to start the construction of fences along the border with Russia. Cyberattacks and misinformation campaigns aimed at Sweden, Finland and other countries located on the NATO fortified northeast flank cannot be excluded.

Nuclear weapons will also take a prominent place in the Russian strategy until the country is able to restore its forces, which will last decades or more. Due to the more aggressive nuclear rhetoric of Putin, after the defeat of the Convention on the Armed Forces in Ukraine, Russia has increased its nuclear positioning in the Far North.

Moscow was reported that several bombers with nuclear warheads to the Kola Peninsula before nuclear training, which included the test of all three supports of the Russian nuclear triad in the Arctic in October last year. As Russia is trying to resist the obvious threat in northern Europe, while its army is tight in other places, it will probably double the aggressive nuclear signals in the region. However, in the end, Russia recovers.

Although its military weakness can be temporary, changes in the architecture of European security caused by its invasion are not. Therefore, in the long run, Moscow is likely to constantly adapt its military position in response to NATO's presence in Finland and Sweden. One of the latest Finnish research states that Russia will eventually respond to Finland and Sweden to Strengthen its forces near Finland, though not on a scale such as during the Cold War.

According to the author, due to the losses suffered by Russia in Ukraine, and delays in the creation of new forces, most likely, by the 2030s, there will be no significant increase in military capacity in the nearby suburbs of Finland.

According to Shoigu's statements, Russia will seek to strengthen the usual restraint on its northwestern flank, as soon as it appears for it, and it is quite reasonable to expect such actions as strengthening protection in the area around the Kola Peninsula, as well as strengthening the border with Finland in Finland the St. Petersburg district. Moscow also will probably take effect in Northern Europe after the restoration of its forces, if not earlier.

More frequent provocative air training along the borders of Finland and Sweden or persecution of Western ships in the Barents and Baltic seas may be aimed at helping NATO's defense and intimidating the Alliance, which will help Russia to restore an advantage in the region. Moscow can concentrate these maneuvers on strategic points, such as Danish Strait and Water Around the Gotland, Bournholm and Aldo Islands.

Demonstration of military skills can also serve as a reason to confirm the revived status of a great state, which was undermined by the unsuccessful actions of Russia in Ukraine. Such demonstrations increase the risk of accidents that can provoke a conflict. Restoration of military threats to the Baltic countries that have been afraid of the Russian invasion for a long time is also quite likely.

On the other hand, Swedish and Finland's accession will facilitate the protection of the Baltic States for NATO, thereby increasing defense and restraint in the region and contributing to regional stability in Northern Europe. Any new NATO infrastructure in Sweden and Finland-for example, modernized airfields, intelligence facilities, or, most importantly, nuclear weapons-will only strengthen Russia's aggressive position in the Baltic States and Arctic.

Finland has already announced the placement of F-35 aircraft in Lapland since 2026, and over the years in Northern Europe, NATO's large-scale training can be increased. With the restoration of Russia after the war in Ukraine, these steps will further increase Moscow's perception of threat and make it pay more attention to its northwestern flank. The new NATO enlargement round creates the need to control both short -term and long -term evolution of the Russian threat.

In the short term NATO, together with the European Union, national governments, private companies and individual citizens, should plan an increase in protection and resistance to hybrid threats. NATO should continue to demonstrate its willingness to respond proportionally to hybrid attacks attributed to Russia.

In response to the strengthening of the Russian nuclear challenge, NATO should review its nuclear position, including the role of nuclear weapons in expanding restraint and escalation management, as well as preparation for fighting in the conditions of probable nuclear precipitation. At the same time, the Alliance should plan to counteract the conventional threat from the reborn Russia at the North Baltic Theater of Military, without taking unjustifiably provocative steps.

The integration of highly efficient Swedish and Finnish armed forces in NATO by itself will strengthen the regional potential for deterrent to the Alliance, but more can be done.

It is necessary to change the command structure of the Alliance, to review the planning of emergency situations in the region, to modernize the Swedish and Finnish infrastructure of reinforcement, to conduct new large -scale exercises in Northern Europe and to improve the means in the Far North, such as anti -vocational and anti -rocket defense, intelligence. It would also be wise to create a NATO air defense mission in the Baltic Sea region, based on the existing Baltic Air Policing operation.

Allies should also work on the creation of a comprehensive northern Europe security strategy, which views the region as a single theater of war, which covers not only the far north but also the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic. These efforts may include a joint definition of the goals of regional potential within the NATO defense planning process, as well as to combine the possibilities of Northern European allies in maritime and air surveillance.

It is also important to convince Poland and Germany to take an active part in ensuring the security of the region, encouraging them to take their identity as the Baltic Sea. Finally, NATO should contribute to the formation in Finland and Sweden's sense of more solidarity with the Allies to facilitate the transition from the rooted neutrality habit.

Helsinki and Stockholm have been concentrating on their own territorial defense for a long time, but as new NATO members, they will be responsible for protecting the territory of the Allies in a broader sense. In order to facilitate this adaptation, other NATO allies must encourage Finland and Sweden to make a significant contribution to the mission not only in the Eastern but also on the Southern Flanging of the Alliance.

The accession of Finland and Sweden can significantly increase regional stability. However, the Alliance cannot afford to ignore the accompanying risks. The steps offered above will help NATO's readiness for any answer that Russia has conceived. Nicholas Locker is a researcher at the Transatlantic Security Program of the New American Security Center. His work is devoted to the policy of European integration and security, Russia's foreign policy and transatlantic relations.