Koreans go to fight for Putin: what is said in the Treaty of the Russian Federation and the DPRK

The military analyst Konstantin Mashovets finds out the possibility of the emergence of DPRK soldiers on the Ukrainian Front. At first, he proposes to see what is said in the Russian-North Korean Treaty-well, to pretend to be logistics, as well as linguistics . . . on the hypothetical "North Korean tourists" . . .

Indeed, in the process of Puyla's visit to the DPRK, between representatives There was a fundamental agreement on the possibility of using the North Korean Army personnel for "providing military assistance" within the framework of the contract "On Strategic Partnership" in the case of "aggression against it". Moreover, we are talking about a formally (officially) request for providing such assistance "if necessary". What the North Korean side insisted on.

However, in reality, some specific decision on the implementation of this fundamental agreement was not made in practice. According to the South Korean TV Chosun TV company, it was agreed in the negotiation process that this would concern first and foremost-the parts and units of the DPRK Army Engineering troops.

Allegedly, it was a contingent in about 5 formations of the level of "Engineering Brigade" (ISBR), which North Korean dictator Kim Jong-in can send Ukrainian territories to his Kremlin colleagues as "military assistance" as "military assistance" to "assist in the reconstruction of M. . What will mean sending to the war of about half of all engineering-and-saplings of KNA (Korean People's Army), since it is in the expanded state at the moment there is only 11 formations of the level of ISBB.

From its Black, the Kremlin allegedly pay the DPRK for providing these "services" about $ 115-120 million, at the rate of $ 800 of a monthly salary of each North Korean serviceman (of which-30% "in hands" + 70%-to the DPRK budget). However, the real state of affairs is such that nowadays "uninnaish grouping of the RF Vorozhuzhny forces on the Southwestern TVD" does not require strengthening of engineering-sapl and units.

Therefore, some of the observers and experts suggest that under the guise of "sappers" the DPRK can send a real expeditionary contingent of troops to the front of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which will participate directly in hostilities. Although, in fact, the likelihood of this today looks unlikely because of the so -called "technological difficulties".

Moreover, if you even allow the reality of the use of North Korean troops on the Kremlin's side in the Russian-Ukrainian war, it is obvious that a number of problematic issues related to this will be raised before the "organizers" and "initiators".

Starting with a very obvious need to work out and establish interaction between the Russian and North Korean army not only, for example, in the field of logistics and logistics (MTZ), but even banal combat management at different levels of organization and fighting (from tactical, to tactical strategic), ending with the need for weapons, equipment and training of North Korean servicemen with those models and types of weapons and military equipment (OVT) used at that moment in the Russian army.

After all, the modern technological state of KNA formations, despite its affinity with the Russian army, one common "Soviet" origin, is still significantly different from the latter. For example, KNA for the main combat tank (VTT) has a tank type "Chhonmako" in a variety of versions of its modernization (this is a license copy of the Soviet T-62) and a certain number (up to 250 units) 915 "-the same copy of the Soviet T-72B), which is considered" the latest "in the DPRK.

It seems at first glance almost the same as in the Russian army, but in fact - not. Because not by the level of equipment of these combat vehicles by means of communication and navigation, but neither by level of protection, nor on the equipment of fire control - they in no way meet the Russian standards, even minimal. The vast majority of modern KNAs, it is simply to put copies of Chinese copies of the Soviet OVT of the 50-60s of the last century . . .

Of course, there is a certain number of exceptions as separate samples of rocket weapons (which is also also copied from old Chinese missiles), But in order to hope for at least some efficiency against the Armed Forces, the Russians will still have to equip and equip these North Korean "assistants" of OWT from their own arsenals. And, obviously, it is also necessary to teach it . . . It is necessary - resources and effort, and most importantly - time.

What the Russians themselves, honestly, are not quite enough. All this complex of problems is further complicated by the so -called "language issue". I, of course, assume that some Russian soldiers speak Korean, just as some part of North Korean soldiers know Russian, at least understands the meaning of what they have told, especially in the case of "unique idiomatic turnovers of Rench", usually accepted for use in Russian troops in the process of combat administration and "Chief of Army".

But, I doubt that there and there - they are enough to quickly and effectively establish the full functioning of the North Korean Expeditionary Corps as part of the Russian group of troops operating in the territory of Ukraine.

Of course, it is possible to "significantly simplify" this - for example, to fit the North Koreans on the front with their own tanks, guns and even dry -ups (for a minute, through Russia), "cut" some individual "operational direction", and let them be at war - as they know - as they know - as they know.

, as they can not "hammer" their head with the need to "interact" with them directly on the battlefield, at the tactical level, and in the case with their headquarters and management bodies of operational level (perhaps in this case, Korean language experts in the Russian army are entirely It will be enough to establish quality interaction). But even in this case, the number and amount of difficulties related to the need to interact - is unlikely to decrease.

Because any military formation, especially the Army Corps Headquarters, if it takes a direct and direct participation in hostilities along with the formation from a completely different army, one way or another is forced to interact during "Life and Boy" with them and its security structures. It is necessary to tas about fuel (let Russian "Obrav"), to carry spare parts from North Korea, to replace the lost or disabled, ammunition, to evacuate killed and wounded, etc. What a lot you do).

And the communications Russian "by the Urals", now, let's say, a little in a specific state (according to the head of "Sberbank" Grefa, the average speed of movement of railway echelons in both directions there is about 30-40 km \ ). In other words, because of the "sharply altered" Russian logistics (export-import of goods, from western to eastern) and a couple of main rail communications that act there "clogged" almost tightly.

To add to all this "holiday" from the hundred or two "unplanned" echelons with the North Korean Chucheist-internationalists with their all military junk will be right.

In short, to "allow" the participation of the North Korean soldier in our war on the Kremlin's side, of course, perhaps, or, as they say in the Pentagon, even "carefully track down" the moment of appearance of these Chucheists on the front, but, in fact, for the Kremlin actually in this There is only one issue-an opportunity to cover the urgent need for the amount of managed "meat" for their numerous and planned "offensive operations" in more or less volumes.