North offensive is Putin's farce. As a poorly calculated operation of the Russian Federation turned the failure

It is a symbolic day for the choice of choice, which is connected not so much with the territory or resources, but with the idea of ​​Russian leader Vladimir Putin about himself as a new emperor who rules a prosperous Russian Empire. But Putin's new empire is a farce, though it is a nightmare bloody. And his offensive on Victory Day is also a farce.

Less than two weeks after the first Russian platoons crossed the northern border of Ukraine with Russia, north of Kharkov, the Russian operation stalled in just a few miles. Even worse for the nearly 500,000th occupation army is that the northern offensive led to excessive expansion of Russian logistical and armored support and forced unprotected infantry to attack on foot. Before victory, the level of losses among the Russians was high.

It is now catastrophically high because the Ukrainian mechanized brigades strengthen the Northern Front. It is possible that the wolf for the entire 27-month war Russians experienced when the northern offensive reached the climax. According to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, on May 12, the number of victims among Russians was a record 1740 people. This is hundreds more than the Russians had in the previous weeks.

No one outside the Kremlin knows what the actual military goals of the offensive were. But from a purely military point he was almost worth it. The Russians not only could not get control over any important area, but also spent the offensive fire that could have more importance in other places along the 700-mile line of the front. The Russian command may have hoped that their 30,000th Northern Group breaks Ukraine's defense and moved towards Kharkiv, located 20 miles south.

On the other hand, they may have wanted the Ukrainian command to think that the Russians are targeted at Kharkiv - all this to force Ukrainians to relocate all available brigades from the east to the north. It is also possible that the Russian command intended to remain flexible - and move from one goal to another, depending on the reaction of Ukraine to the first attacks across the border.

In any case, as the northern offensive approaches the third week, it becomes obvious that the Russians have not been able to achieve any goal. At the cost of several thousand victims, the new northern group of Russian troops has moved to about five miles south. In the first days of the offensive, the Russians seized a chain of poorly protected small settlements.

But when they reached the outskirts of the first large settlements in the northern axis - Lipka in the west and Vovchansk in the east - they were faced with a stringent Ukrainian defense, strengthened by several mechanized brigades of 2000. There, on the approaches to Lipts and Vovchansk, the offensive of the Russians slowed down as much as possible.

In cruel city battles, "successful" for Russians can be considered a day when they will pass along one city quarter and seize one large building - a building that Ukrainian Armed Forces can simply bomb in ruins as the Russians take it. It goes without saying that the capture of Kharkiv for Russians in these conditions is almost impossible. Now about another possible goal - did this offensive forced the Ukrainian General Staff to weaken the Eastern Front to strengthen the Northern Front? Not yet.

Several Ukrainian brigades left the east to the north, joining other brigades that the Ukrainian command apparently kept in the reserve for this northern script. But the Ukrainian defense in the east is maintained, and the pace of Russia's promotion has actually slowed, since the focus of hostilities has moved north.

As Ukraine stopped the offensive of Russia in the north, not sacrificing Ukrainian defense in the East, now remains an undisclosed history, the keys to which are Ukrainian intelligence, ammunition reserves and the location of Ukrainian reserves, but equally - Russian planning, leadership and fire. It was likely that the United States was of great importance to provide new US military assistance after a six -month legislative blockade by Republican friendly Russia in the US Congress.

In recent weeks, Americans have hastily crossed large batches of ammunition and armored vehicles. It is also likely that, as it happened in this war, the Russian army was simply not as powerful and stable as Putin could think before the northern operation. The fact that he has planned an offensive on Victory Day must tell us everything we need to know. The offensive, like the whole war in general, is a political theater. And in the theater visibility is more important than reality.