Ukraine needs urgent air defense supplies to consolidate victories on land

If it were not for the Soviet SPR, the Russian military could overcome Ukraine's defense in the first weeks of the war. However, Russian air and space forces will be a major threat if the Ukrainian air defense systems end with ammunition and they will continue to work for wear. Ukraine is undergoing permanent missile and rocket-tight punches that deplete Air Force ammunition and cause electricity and water to shut off all over the country.

Therefore, the Western partners of Ukraine should prioritize such assistance as NASAMS, as well as portable anti-aircraft missile complexes and modern anti-aircraft guns-for example, Gepard German production. Focus has translated the new text of Justin Bronka, dedicated to enhancing Ukraine's air defense.

When, at the end of February, Russia launched a full -scale invasion of Ukraine, a picture of hostilities for outsiders was the dominance of offensive Russian terrestrial forces and hundreds of punches of winged and ballistic missiles. The fighters and bombers of the Russian Air Force in the first few days of the invasion seemed to be practically absent, and then, in early March, they began to suffer losses during bombing blows in Ukrainian positions and besieged cities.

Since then, Russia's inability to gain an advantage in the air over Ukraine has become a major factor that has identified the invasion. In the absence of the opportunity to use air power on a wide scale on both sides, the war was still resolved by artillery fire of land troops, which were directed by drone against maneuverable armored vehicles and infantry.

However, the new Rusi report, based on field studies conducted in Ukraine in October 2022, provides that Russia conducted much large -scale shock and patrol operations using its combat aircraft in the first days of the invasion, than it was recorded earlier.

According to an interview with the commanders of the Ukrainian Air Force, the Russian HRs, the effective use of false air targets and the strikes of long -range missiles suppressed or damaged most of the terrestrial air defense systems of Ukraine at the beginning of the invasion.

As a result, Ukrainian fighter pilots who are inferior in size and weapons tried to protect the sky on their own and suffered significant losses until the ground defense systems were restored to effective work after the third day of the conflict. During the first three days, Russian shock aircraft made hundreds of departments for bombing of targets up to 300 kilometers within the territory controlled by Ukraine.

They would continue to do so if Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile complexes such as the C-300 long range, CA-11 Beech "Medium-range and CA-8" OSA "Low Dar And high altitudes are very dangerous for Russian aircraft. As Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile complexes returned to the system, Russian aircraft and helicopters were unable to find, suppress and destroy them effectively.

Therefore, they were forced to fly very low, which made them too vulnerable to portable small range anti-aircraft missile systems, which the West supplied to Ukraine in large quantities. However, the Rusi report also showed that Russian fighters flying near the front line continue to cause serious losses to Ukrainian pilots, who are forced to fly on technically outdated Soviet fighters.

In fact, the Russian Air Force could not win the air over Ukraine only because of its inability to track and destroy Ukraine's mobile anti-aircraft missile systems. However, it is difficult for Western partners to replenish their reserves, as these are Soviet systems that the event has never done.

It is also difficult to replace them with Western systems, as the Western military has a small supply of anti -aircraft missiles and limited rockets as a result of guaranteed air advantage in conflicts after the Cold War. This is important because Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile complexes that are so important for deterrent to the Russian Air Force not only are slowly depleted, but also have limited ammunition.

Western military assistance is still aimed at land equipment, such as tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers and anti -tank missile units. This was made in vain-the Russian army was still the greatest threat to Ukraine, especially because the Russian military-air forces could not effectively operate from the first days of invasion. For all, Russian Air Force remains a serious threat to such work with Ukraine's progress on Earth.

If Ukraine does not provide urgent additional support in the form of missile ammunition for its anti -aircraft missile systems of the Soviet period, as well as new Western systems, such as NASAMS, in a significant number, Russian aircraft will receive much more freedom for bombing of Ukrainian troops, cities and infrastructure in the near future months in the near future months in the near future months in the near future near the front line.

Ukraine is also undergoing new and potentially very serious shelling of Russian winged missiles, ballistic missiles and ammunition by Shahd-136, which Iran supplies. The Russian military has not been able to concentrate their limited arsenal of expensive winged and ballistic missiles for no purpose to have a strategically decisive effect. Ukraine, after all, is a huge and stable country. However, with the addition of the ShahED-136 rocket, this last shock campaign became more threatening.

Small self -drawn ammunition is relatively "dull" of weapons: they are slow enough, they are relatively easy to knock down separately, and they are able to securely impress only fixed goals. However, they are cheap-about $ 25,000 for ammunition-and their 20-40-kilogram warheads are enough to cause serious harm to small infrastructure and homes.

Russia uses this weapon to defeat Ukrainian electrical and water supply networks on the eve of winter, using the left expensive winged and ballistic missiles to damage large goals, such as large power plants and power plants, and hundreds of Shahd-136 missiles to damage small substations and pumping stations. After about a month, it has caused serious consequences. In most Ukrainian cities, electricity and water are supplied for only a few hours a day.

The Ukrainian forces continue to knock down the majority of ShahED-136 missiles and more than half of the winged missiles. However, these efforts quickly deplete the reserves of portable anti-aircraft missile systems and other air defense missiles of Ukraine.

To defeat this ruthless Russian strategy aimed at throwing millions of Ukrainian citizens in the dark, cold and thirst this winter, Ukraine needs to urgently replenish the reserves of portable SCRs and additional anti -aircraft tools with radar guidance such as German Gepard ShahED-136 at the modest cost of each interception.

Although the general idea of ​​the ineffectiveness of the Russian air-space forces during the invasion is mostly true, it should not close the real threat they still pose if Ukraine's air defense is not urgently exacerbated. During the first three days of the war, the Russian aircraft made hundreds of fighter departments, and the pilots of the Air Force of Ukraine suffered serious losses, trying to restrain them.

The reason why Russia's air power proved to be so ineffective is that Russian air-space forces are not able to plan, execute and reinforce large-scale and complex complexes required for effective suppression and destruction of air defense in the form of Ukrainian mobile anti-aircraft missing . complexes.

However, they still have modern fighters and shock aircraft with high firing power, which can be a formidable weapon if they are allowed to restore the ability to steadily operate at medium heights above the Ukrainian territory. If the Ukrainian SAMs are allowed to be destroyed by drones and artillery without reinforcing or replacement, and their ammunition is exhausted, the Ukrainian Air Force will not be able to restrain Russian air power over the fronts.

The number of Western anti-aircraft missile complexes is limited, and the purchase of missiles and spare launches and radars for Soviet-production systems in other countries of the world for supply to Ukraine is politically complicated, so in the medium term it will be a serious problem. After all, Ukraine will also need at least a few Western fighters capable of combating Russian fighter jets to create a stable air defense of Ukraine.

Such fighters should be able to act with small, minimally equipped dispersed air deves that use Ukrainian fighters to avoid getting into Russian rocket strokes. The military dynamics on Earth has changed strongly in favor of Ukraine, especially after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kherson, and has a real chance to displace Russian troops from the occupied territories in the spring and summer of 2023.

However, this will require not only stable support for the Land Forces, but also the urgent supply of Western air defense so that the Russian Air Force remains as ineffective and to reflect the attacks on critical infrastructure, from which Ukrainian citizens depend in terms of heat, light and clean water this winter . . Justin Bronk is a senior researcher on air power and technologies in the Military Sciences Group of the Analytical Center for Defense and Security of Rusi in London.