China's invasion of Taiwan: How did the SI plans change after Putin's failure in Ukraine

The US military officers made gloomy warnings about the possibility of such an attack in the near future. In March 2021, Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the Pacific Fleet, warned that China could perform hostilities against Taiwan by 2027. Admiral Michael Gilda, the head of the naval operations, added that he "did not reject" an attempt to invade China in 2023. Leading experts from China supported this alarm.

During a recent survey, 63% of respondents said that the invasion was possible over the next 10 years. These fears caused a striking political reaction in the western capitals. To persuade Beijing, President Joseph Biden has made numerous statements that explain the United States's willingness to help Taiwan defeat Chinese aggression.

US military leaders, embarrassed by the results of military games, showing that the US forces can suffer catastrophic losses in such a conflict, have decided to carry out a serious modernization of the Armed Forces. Allied governments have also intensified their training.

Japan increased the cost of defense against the background of China's possible attack on Taiwan, and Australia has concluded an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom that nuclear submarines will patrol further from its shores. China's requirements for unification are, of course, are not new. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Beijing insisted on the unification of two states.

But for many years, the risk of war seemed low because either Chinese armed forces were too weak, or Beijing distracted other priorities such as rapid economic growth. However, in the last year, three facts have sharply increased the likelihood of war. Although aggregate evidence seems convincing, it turns out that their value is exaggerated. In addition, there is an obvious lack of evidence that the government has decided to solve the island's military solution.

China may once decide to attack the island, but the most convincing proof of such an opportunity will be evidence that the government has set up Taiwan's unification higher than other political purposes. The United States must continue to maintain their restraint, but refrain from exaggeration of the threat and thus improper assessment of the situation in the strait.

The first and perhaps the most striking proof consists of intelligence reports that China Si Jinping President had ordered the People's Liberation Army to prepare military options against Taiwan by 2027. There is no reason to doubt the truthfulness of intelligence messages. However, the value of the instructions transmitted is far from clear. Where and how did you convey these instructions? What do they mean? The context of such statements is of great importance.

In China's political system, the most important decisions on the national strategy are made by senior executives in the Permanent Committee of the Politburo. The decision to change the current priority of the country's peaceful development in favor of a more aggressive Taiwan conquest strategy would certainly be deserved to hold such a meeting, at least in order to create a consensus illusion that stands on such a radical departure from the current strategy.

However, there is no evidence that such an exclusive meeting was indeed. In support of this view, CIA David Cohen explained that SI "did not make a decision" to attack Taiwan. Although Cohen did not report the details, his comments suggest that SI probably gave instructions at the annual working meeting of the Central Military Commissariat. This makes sense because SI calls the top military leadership annually, where he gives security instructions next year.

Such meetings are traditionally considered the most important meeting of the year for military leadership. At these meetings, the head of the Central Military Commissariat is usually ordered by the military how to support the country's national strategy. The exemplary tasks include the reform of the team structure and improving the quality of learning.

However, it is very important, the Central Military Commissariat is authorized only to prepare and implement strategies and policies that correspond to those determined by the highest civil leadership - namely the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Thus, at the SI meeting, it was obvious to the military to prepare for the emergency situation in Taiwan by 2027, but in the rest to act in accordance with the current Taiwanese strategy, in which priority is given to peaceful methods.

Such interpretation is consistent with the public remark of Cohen that Beijing still "intends to get control over Taiwan" non -military means. " The characteristics of SI statements given by the Chairman of the Joint Committee of Chiefs of Staff Mark Millie confirms this interpretation. Millie commented that SI's instructions seem to be "capabilities, not intent to attack or capture.

" Cohen and Millie's interpretations support the idea that Beijing is currently prefiguring peaceful methods of achieving unification. However, their comments hint at the opportunity that SI intentions can change over time. Many observers have already suggested that SI may go to aggressive methods when the military will complete the preparation by 2027.

Some analysts refer to this opportunity, arguing that it is now necessary to take a strong restraint position in order to deny SI from the consideration of hostilities to this term. But why should China announce the last term of military preparations? May 2027 symbolizes the hope of SI on the unification before it becomes too old, or before it completes its third term as a Secretary General. But this is the only possible interpretation. It is not even true for four reasons.

There is no evidence in favor of the assumption that the goal of "to prepare military options by 2027" is related to the age of SI or the expiration of its third presidential term. These considerations are also speculative, given that SI has sought special care in the use of the Armed Forces. It is true that these oversees the expansion of the "gray zone" against rivals in the first island chain.

During SI, there was a deadly collision between China and India, although Beijing tried to reduce tensions later. However, despite the repressive and cruel actions of SI, he did not participate in any of the types of combat operations that Russia conducted in Georgia, Chechnya, Syria and the Crimean region of Ukraine before invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

It would be unprecedented, extremely risky and frankly strange for such a great state as China to refrain from the test of its armed forces in a limited combat operation before the onset of attack, which can develop into a great war with the main armed forces of the world - the United States. It is not particularly remarkable that these were instructed by the military to prepare for unforeseen circumstances related to Taiwan-or any other unforeseen circumstances, if it went.

After all, one of the most important tasks of the military is preparing for unpredictable circumstances. There is nothing unusual that the military leadership views Taiwan as a major threat to security. Taiwan was the main challenge to the safety of the People's Liberation Army for two decades. In addition, all military plan actions in case of unforeseen circumstances, referring to certain potential opponents.

US defense documents clearly show that US military, for example, consider China, Russia and other countries as potential threats and, accordingly, plan actions in case of unforeseen circumstances. This, of course, does not mean that the United States intends to attack China or Russia. Binding the targets of modernization to dates is also extremely common Chinese practice. Reflecting the inheritance of the planned economy, Beijing regularly sets dates for modernization.

For example, in its five -year plans, China regularly aims to modernize the country. But it also establishes goals of development that coincide with special anniversary dates to strengthen the prestige and authority of the Chinese Communist Party. For example, China's development goals within the Chinese Dream coincide with the centennial anniversary of the country's founding in 2049. In the early 2000s, there were reports that Chinese leaders had "secret plans" on Taiwan's capture by 2020.

However, these reports were inaccurate, since Western experts misunderstood the value of this date. In fact, the 2020 date for military modernization was associated with the broader development goals that coincided with the age of establishing the Communist Party of China in 2021. China did not invade Taiwan in 2021, but he held a solemn parade to demonstrate the achievements of the military in modernization and ignite patriotic enthusiasm.

Analysts can make the same error about reports about the goals of military modernization, delivered for 2027. The value of 2027, as explained by Chinese military sites, is that it will be the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army. It is safe to say that in 2027 Beijing will hold an extravagant military parade. The modernization of the Armed Forces pursues a number of political and military goals, none of which intends to solve the war.

The restraint of the potential separatist movement of Taiwan remains one of compelling reasons. But there are others. Although experts are focused almost exclusively on official statements about Taiwan, Chinese leaders put no less emphasis on the purpose of creating a strong army as a sign of a powerful and successful China. Every year, there are many lush military parades and exercises in China, and they are all widely covered in the Chinese media.

This practice, which continues since the foundation of Mao Jedun, plays an important role in strengthening patriotism and legitimizing the reign of the Communist Party. Creating a powerful army is also an important source of political power for the supreme leader of the country. The SI authorities depends partly on his position of the Commander -in -Chief of the Armed Forces, which explains why he is often photographed in a military uniform or a military environment.

Responding mainly to foreign policy and armed forces, the Central Government of China actually controls a much lower share of general government spending than the governments of Western countries. The overwhelming majority of government revenues and expenditures are carried out by provincial governments that have access to the most profitable sources of income and large intercession networks.

Thus, SI has a strong political incentive to cite the glitter on the armed forces to emphasize its power, strengthen public support and suppress elites that are competed and in what much capital and supporters. Another important purpose of such modernization is that the military focuses on the main one - to become more professional and resist trends in corruption and stagnation.

Si instructions to maintain a concentration on the military responsibilities of the army fit into the context of widespread efforts to ensure the overall modernization, competence and efficiency of the government, which the authorities consider critical for the realization of the national revival goals of the country. Accordingly, the wider imperative of SI repeatedly urged the military to increase combat capability - which means that the military should become more competent in their work.

The point is not to wave the instructions of the SI for the People's Liberation Army as a trivial. His instructions deserve attention, but in themselves they do not tell us about China's intention to attack Taiwan. It requires clearer proof of the management of the management to finally conquer the island. In this regard, there is a second element of evidence that is being quoted: statements of the government, which emphasizes the imperative of the unification.

For example, in 2019, SI stated that Taiwan "has and would be reunited with China. " At the 20th Congress of the Party, held in 2022, Xi called "the complete reunification of China" "a natural requirement for the implementation of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. " During the reign of SI, China also released Taiwan's White Book, in which he refused to use force. Again, the fact that these and the Chinese government have made these statements is not in doubt.

Quotes can be read in public media reports. But what do they mean? Leading experts from China say that these statements show that these are seeking to "complete the association by 2049". Such statements, of course, have a convincing appearance at first glance, but in closer consideration it turns out that their value is exaggerated for several reasons. First of all, it should be noted that all Chinese leaders have regularly made similar uncompromising statements.

Jan Jemin at the 16th Congress of the Party in 2002 stated: "It is impossible to allow the Taiwanese issue to be prolonged for an indefinite time," and promised that the "complete reunification of the Motherland" would be reached indefinitely "early". Hu Jintao stated at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 that "China's full reunion is an insurmountable historical process. " He added that "any separatist attempts to gain Taiwan's independence" doomed to failure.

" As in the last "White Book", the previous versions also did not exclude the use of force to resolve the issue. If the tone of the government's government is different from its predecessors, then it is insignificant. Secondly, no less or even more noteworthy that the government has not said and did not.

Neither in the report of the 20th Congress of the Party, none of the speeches of SI, there would be an opinion that China has reached the "limits of its patience" or would require any immediate steps towards unification. There is also no evidence that the government has started taking practical steps to prepare for a military conquest. As far as third -party observers can be judged, Beijing did not give instructions to the relevant ministries to conduct occupation planning and Taiwan management.

Central leaders also did not start the personnel indoctrion about the need to conquer Taiwan by the military, as needed. Such an explanatory work is necessary for the personnel to realize that and why they must change in their duties to prepare for a potentially catastrophic military situation. Beijing also made no effort to set up the public in favor of the war against the island.

Central leadership needs to clarify people with the importance and potential danger of war in order to get a public support for a course of action, which is likely to shock the public, lead to serious economic upheavals and will force many people to postpone serious trials or die. National association can be a popular idea among Chinese citizens, but the war is not.

Of course, people's opinion data are difficult to obtain in view of a controlled political situation, but existing surveys of Western scientists show that the vast majority prefers peaceful methods of achieving unification with Taiwan. If Beijing begins the war without working out to get the support of the population, it risks bringing the country to full chaos.

In addition, there is no evidence that the government is seriously considering the possibility of abandoning a peaceful association strategy. Such priorities would be necessary, because the current approach, in fact, in words supported the imperative of the unification of Taiwan, giving priority to other goals such as economic growth and maintaining a stable international situation to promote national development.

Xi called the desire for national renewal "Chinese Dream", but his vision has much with the vision of his predecessors. As in previous governments, the requirements of the SI coincided with tolerance to the actual independence of the island, as long as it aimed at other more pressing goals, such as the revival of the weakening economy, the fight against corruption, suppression Projects like the "belt and path" initiative.

Given these most important priorities, these, like his predecessors, have still made little effort to unite. The lack of evidence that China has revised its national strategy for the benefit of unification is especially important because the third proof, which is widely quoted, is the growth of the Chinese Armed Forces Mix - remains unconvincing.

In recent years, China has created a huge arsenal of modern aircraft, warships, rockets and land forces, which in all parameters exceed the stagnant armed forces of Taiwan. China's improved capabilities also pose a more powerful threat to American forces that can interfere with the Taiwanese conflict.

За останні два роки військові ігри, в яких перевірялося протистояння американських військ оновленій Народно-визвольній армії, давали невтішні результати.

Численні ітерації, проведені в різних аналітичних центрах, показали, що Китай може завдати величезних втрат американським військам у війні за Тайвань, а в деяких випадках і перемогти американську інтервенцію.

Немає причин сумніватися в попередженнях американських військових керівників про те, що Китай є все більш грізною загрозою в будь-якій ситуації, пов'язаній із Тайванем. Однак тут значення цих тенденцій може бути перебільшено.

Незважаючи на зростання військової сили, Пекін не може з упевненістю знати, що станеться в разі початку війни. Навіть якщо припустити, що Китай здобув військову перемогу в районі Тайваню, це дає набагато менше переваг, ніж здається.

Росія навчається в Україні, Сполучені Штати нещодавно навчилися в Афганістані, а військові історики давно зазначають, що війна включає так багато факторів, що неможливо передбачити розвиток або завершення бойових дій.

Наголошуючи на цьому, можна сказати, що у військових іграх, яким віддають перевагу американські аналітичні центри, зазвичай досліджуються руйнівні перші кілька днів конфлікту, але рідко розглядається те, що може статися потім.

Аналітики майже не вивчали, як американо-китайський конфлікт може перерости в масштабнішу системну війну.

Одним словом, війна зі США залишається настільки високоризикованим та потенційно катастрофічним розвитком подій, що навіть із урахуванням військових досягнень Китаю лише готовність ризикнути всім і радикально переглянути політичні пріоритети може виправдати готовність Пекіна розглянути таку можливість.

Докази, що Китай серйозно розглядає можливість нападу на Тайвань, на сьогодні залишються слабкими, але це не виключає такої можливості в майбутньому.

Як визначити, що Пекін почав серйозно розглядати можливість нападу на Тайвань? Найважливішими показниками були б ті, які пов'язані з політичним рішенням домагатися об'єднання за допомогою військових варіантів і відповідним чином підготувати націю.

Свідчення того, що вищі керівники погодилися поставити об'єднання вище за численні цілі внутрішньої та зовнішньої політики, які зараз складають основу "китайської мрії", матимуть першочергове значення.

Ознаки ухваленого рішення будуть помітні в кроках, зроблених урядом для підготовки до війни.

Наприклад, центральні та провінційні міністерства, ймовірно, почали б створювати запаси, зміцнювати оборону та вживати заходів щодо захисту економіки країни від зовнішніх потрясінь.

Партійні кадри, мабуть, зазнали б великої індоктринації про важливість возз'єднання та їхній обов'язок підтримувати військові зусилля належним чином.

Пропаганда, масові мітинги та полум'яні промови вищих керівників будуть спрямовані на зміцнення громадської підтримки та психологічну підготовку населення до майбутніх труднощів.

Політичні приготування повинні були щонайменше відповідати тим же видам діяльності, які характеризували підготовку Китаю до останнього великомасштабного конфлікту — війни в Кореї.

Зрештою, небезпека масової загибелі цивільних і економічних потрясінь сьогодні набагато вища, ніж під час Корейської війни, завдяки реаліям глобальної економічної взаємозалежності й появі сучасних військових технологій, таких як ракети далекого радіусу, здатних уразити безліч цілей уздовж густонаселеного узбережжя Китаю, не кажучи вже про руйнівний потенціал кібервійни або небезпеки ядерної зброї.

Володимир Путін, чий напад на Україну багато в чому спричинив занепокоєння можливим нападом Китаю, є прикладом поведінки автократа на кшталт Сі або його наступника напередодні війни.

Західні аналітики не надавали цьому значення, але Путін протягом багатьох років проголошував дедалі більш пронизливі та грізні тиради про Україну. Китай у часи Сі не робив подібних жестів щодо Тайваню.

Для деяких можливість війни, хоч би якою віддаленою вона була, є достатньою причиною для посилення позиції стримування США. Безперечно, сильна позиція стримування може спонукати Пекін уникати навіть думки про напад. Але точна оцінка намірів Китаю також є важливою.

Недооцінка противника, яку допустили США та Захід щодо Путіна, може призвести до неадекватної підготовки та потенційної катастрофи для жертви агресії, як це мало не сталося з Україною. Але переоцінка готовності держави-противника йти на ризик конфлікту має недоліки.

Перебільшене почуття небезпеки може посилити напруженість і посилити сприйняття ворожих намірів. Це, зі свого боку, спонукає суперника до агресивнішої поведінки та цим прискорює виникнення дилеми безпеки.

Крім того, Сполучені Штати можуть надати Китаю більше важелів впливу на відносини, аніж це виправдано. Через бажання знизити ризик війни, який сприймається як вищий, ніж він є насправді, Вашингтон може піти на непотрібні поступки.

Нарешті, інші витрати, пов'язані з перебільшеним страхом війни, також є значними. Враховуючи конкурування потреб у військових ресурсах і бюджетні обмеження, що посилюються, це важливий момент.

Масштабні інвестиції в потенціал стримування поблизу Тайваню доведеться робити за рахунок ресурсів, які б могли бути спрямовані в інші місця.

Незважаючи на зростання військової сили Китаю, залишаються серйозні перешкоди для того, щоб Китай розглядав можливість піти цим шляхом.

Ризики та невизначеність війни великих держав залишаються величезними, а потенційні вигоди від завоювання Тайваню — спірними, особливо з огляду на можливість ескалації війни до катастрофічного рівня.

Важливо уважно стежити за військовими подіями в Китаї та забезпечувати відповідне стримування. Але також важливо не перебільшувати загрози й адекватно оцінювати ситуацію.

Точніше розуміння сенсу та логіки китайських заяв і поведінки може допомогти Сполученим Штатам і їхнім союзникам вжити добре поінформованих і розумних заходів у відповідь на події в Тайванській протоці. Тімоті Р.