There will be no deep advance of Russia. Why the Russian Army urgently changes tactics

Russia has to abandon its main military theory of deep offensive operations, evidenced by military expert Konstantin Mashovets.

The enemy learns and tries to adapt to the modern war, the Russian military command continues in the process of organizing and planning the use of troops at the operational level to rely on the so-called "deep offensive operation" theory (if simply, it is a theory of how quickly and effectively to break through The enemy's defense system to the operational depth and where to "engine" their troops to achieve a successful end result - the defeat/environment of the enemy).

It considers it as the most effective and complete means of achieving the most decisive defeat of the enemy's troops and consistent fulfillment of the tasks set before the troops at the operational and strategic levels. However, under the influence of existing realities, during the current Russian-Ukrainian war, it is forced to partially review the basic practical techniques and methods of its use. Especially in the interconnection of its individual stages and elements.

As it turned out, a number of its provisions and principles formulated before the Second World War, now simply does not correspond to reality, in particular: - the real firing capabilities , and, not only at the operational level, but even in the tactical zone. And this, in turn, is the Russian command of the opportunity to quickly and at all depth make its breakthrough, which is a "basic" condition for conducting such an operation.

In other words, the real ability of the Russian troops at the tactical and operational levels existing at the tactical and operational levels, starting with the firing suppression of the enemy at the forefront, ending with the fire damage to the goals in the operational depth of enemy troops - KP, enemy reserves. In terms of volume, scale and intensity, simply does not allow the same "operational offensive operation" properly.

This situation is even more complicated if the opponent has the ability to fight an effective counter -battery and, in fact, can inflict effective fire damage to the entire depth of the operational construction of the Russian troops.

In other words, Russian operational groups of troops, to date, cannot, at the specified speed and efficiency, break the enemy's defense, which at least comparable to them with fire capabilities and has become defensive actions at the prepared boundaries and positions. In particular, this applies to the so -called "standard" parameters of offensive actions that fit into the concept of "deep operational operation" (corresponding pace, scope and speed) . . .

- achieving such an important "deep offensive operation" of an element as an operational suddenness of troops. , in the current realities, it is also impossible at all or only "conditionally possible". Especially in those conditions where the enemy has quite effective means and methods of intelligence, which allow him to understand the meaning of regrouping of Russian forces and means not only at operational-tactical, but even, in fact, at the tactical levels.

In other words, any concentration, deployment, or simply moving the "battalion" formations and above, to date, it is very difficult for the Russians to hide. And this is also a problem for organizing and conducting a "deep offensive operation".

- the latest "technological changes" in the complex of weapons and military equipment (OVT), which significantly changed the very essence and content of actions of forces and means, not only at the operational level, but also at the tactical, also significantly changed the "technology" of organization and conducting any organization what offensive operations.

Unsuccessful attempts by the Russian command to act within the framework and templates of previously existing theory (fire suppression of the enemy + "pressure and maneuver") without taking into account the technological factor we could repeatedly observe during the present war (yes, these are the same "onset of Russian divisions, brigades and regiments dense battle order ", after intensive fire training, which simply did not ensure the suppression of the defense system of the Ukrainian troops).

The last example with Avdiivka in this respect is very indicative. Sometimes the impression was that the Russian command, when organizing and conducting offensive actions, simply does not take into account a number of technological factors-from the fact that it is possible to install mine-explosive barriers (Ministry of Internal Affairs). The fact that now hang in the air, figuratively speaking, a whole cloud of drones, and combat management is carried out online.

Moreover, this is not only true of the tactical zone. Even a trifle as a significant reduction of the time of the battle reaction of Ukrainian troops (if simply, it is the time between the moment of detection of the enemy before the moment of firing on it) for some reason by the Russian command during the organization indirectly. " They continue in a classic format to move quietly on the weekend of columns, quietly unfold in combat orders and act as "written in a combat charter".

The fact that they may now be seen from afar, during the nomination, or in the area of ​​concentration (and apply the appropriate fire damage to them), Russian commanders are often not taken into account, or taken into account only formally. However, unfortunately, the Russians learn very quickly.

The above described and a number of other objective changes that affect the practical application of the Russian command of the theory of deep operation, recently prompted the enemy to introduce a number of "innovations" into their actions at the operational level. In particular:-the Russian command as part of increasing firing capabilities of its operational groups began to form enough powerful new parts and connections, including even artillery divisions (2 brigade composition).

There is a significant increase in the quantitative composition of the already expanded artillery component of these groups. It increases in its quantitative measurement of the proportion of large caliber artillery (the so -called high capacity artillery). - The enemy is actively trying to counteract our army intelligence at an operational level. Moreover, it uses a whole range of methods and tools. Sometimes, quite non -trivial.

For example, he is quite seriously engaged in the legend of certain movements of his formations, actively uses misinformation, including in the public-information sphere, "crush" the movement of any of his more or less significant formations by the "scatter 'connections and associations of troops move more "small" parts, different routes, to different areas of concentration, etc. ), actively implements in operational and tactical rear filtration-reprimand measures, is engaged in radiography, etc.

- there is a redistribution between the structural parts of the enemy operational groups in accordance with the innovations. We can observe the bulk of the parts and compounds of the enemy that have a fairly high level of mobility, in the organization of large -scale offensive actions is kept "in the second echelons", and attacking and assault actions in the tactical zone for breakage of the defense system of Ukrainian troops conducts mainly infantry ( Various shooting/assault units and parts).

In this respect, it is worth noting the growing level of flexibility of the Russian command, which it demonstrates in some cases. If they quickly and deeply break through "significant moving units and parts, they are unable to go to the method of" biting "(assault infantry + massive artillery support), removing the bulk of armored vehicles from the front edge.

However, there is no doubt that if they manage to "bite" somewhere, then these mechanized and tank units will be immediately introduced into this "hole". - Russians are quite intensively trying to adapt to their own "technological" changes, from the active development of their own remedies of the HRs, ending with attempts to introduce robotic weapons systems. For example, they are now actively developing their own "sea drones", new combat management systems, including software.

Looking at our "nettle" and other combat programs, they try to "make" something similar to themselves. As for me, in the medium term, we can quite face the "creative processing" of the Russian command of their basic "theory of deep operation" in the modern system. Obviously, our enemy gradually "ripens" to these changes. Moreover, it can relate to a number of its elements, both at the tactical and operational levels.