Putin is in discomfort. Why Russia is not a profitable war on exhaustion

The number of Russians who adversely perceive the war grows, but does not become critical, writes Vadim Denysenko. In this case, Putin feels uncomfortable in a long war and is unlikely to delay it. Why Putin is important to end the war before the US elections. A look from Russia. Paradoxically it may sound - Russia (Putin) does not want, and maybe even afraid of war for exhaustion. Although Putin demonstrates to the world that he is ready for this war.

Over the last two weeks, a number of Russian liberals (and not only) have published pseudosensational news that in Russia the number of those who want war and those who do not want war have been changed for the first time - and now those who are against. In fact, sociological surveys show it, but they show it not in the fall, but from the spring of 2023 (I have been based on those studies that I have done and do the Institute of the Future).

However, we need to understand that the core of active supporters of the war is 10-12% of Russians, and consistent "not supporters of war" (that's what they can be called, not opponents of war), is about 20%. And these values ​​remain virtually unchanged, at least for the last six months. And the division of Russians into a category for/against war is conditional and not entirely correct. Russian society from 24. 02.

22 was divided exclusively by the age category of 18-30 and all others (it is a real two different Russia, although even in the age category 18-25 are just over 25% are supporters of war). What really happened in the last six months is the beginning of a shift of a generation of 30-50 to the direction not so much "anti-anti-" as "something is wrong, but I'm still afraid of talking about it. " As long as we can only state that in this generation, on certain grounds, it can mature dissatisfaction.

The reason for this dissatisfaction is simple - the war and the deterioration of life begin to be formed in one puzzle, and all this is against the background of uncertainty with the picture of the future. Until they have started thinking so far as to connect the war with the absence of their children, and this is the information reserve that all of us have. It is not necessary to overestimate the level of deterioration of life in the Russian Federation.

Recent studies show that 18% say their lives have not worsened. 40% that the financial condition has not changed, 42 &% says it was worse to live. However, those who complain that there is not enough food and medicine - only 15%. But even these figures are important-the generation of 30-50 is the nucleus of this deterioration, and everything we see in the Russian budget for 2024 shows that it will be worse.

But here we approach one of the most important points: who would say something, but in Russian society now there is a certain consensus of unification around a not very popular war. And this consensus can be deformed only by three things: sometimes (all information works by accumulation), the lack of victories of the Russian army and a deterioration of life. Each of the three factors can play on its own, but the cumulative effect is, of course, the most important.

Everything is clear about the time. As for the victories (Avdiivka, Kupjansk, Bakhmut), for Putin now is Alfa and Omega, on the one hand, given the elections, and on the other, based on the prospect of deterioration of budgetary opportunities, starting from June-September 2024. All surpluses of the budget go solely to the war, to maintain a ruble, the minimum increase in prices before elections can power.

She will be able to do it another couple of months after the election, but you will then need to release the ruble and do unpopular things with the prospect of unlimited war. And these things, in certain coincidences, can be a threat to the regime. There is another side of the coin - as long as there is a war, it is believed that the Russian authorities can reject the economic well -being of the population. And so far it is absolutely true. However, there is one "but".

The repressive apparatus is ready for minimal projections, but, as Prigogine and Dagestan showed, serious challenges of the FSB, Rosgvardia, police - miss. There is another aspect - Putin's psychotype. He does not like and afraid of long wars. In this situation, he feels uncomfortable. His tactics are always one: raising the pond - Blitzkrig - the stage of reassuring - revenge with a durable in time. Yes, he is able to wait. But wait in a state of relative rest.

Therefore, the current state is clearly uncomfortable for him. Although this point should not be overestimated. The fact is that the compensator now has become absolute paralysis of the elite. If at the beginning of the war there was a certain paralysis of Putin himself and even the appearance of collective Putin, then after Prison, Putin realized: there is no polls of elite, there is no competition, and he can (and in reality - he should be preserved) to start emitting elites again.

And he began to do it. And the murder of Prigoine opened a box of Pandora: Putin promised Prigogine life and, for the first time in the inner field, did not adhere to the word. But at the same time, the economic situation is such that in the middle to the end of next year most Russian citizens will start talking about a deterioration of living standards (only space prices for oil will be able to save). And Putin (his closest environment) is afraid of this moment.

There is another important aspect: the desire to become third in the negotiations of the US - China. So far, the economic dependence on Beijing (this will be a separate report next Tuesday), complete confrontation with the US and most importantly, the inability to show anything in the Convention War and the technical lag of the Russian MIC do not give Putin even hope for the opportunity to become a third (virtual summit in India, By the way, it showed very clearly).

Actually, this aspect is one of the decisive (on the basis of today) time frames of war. Summing up all this, we have to understand a few things: summarizing, we with a great deal of likelihood, we can assume that Putin has put two rapper points in front of us: taking something (preferably Avdiivka) until 17. 03. 2024 (election Day). The second rapper point is August-September 2024 negotiations on suspension of war before the US elections.

I will remind you of three factors of deformation of military consensus in the Russian Federation: time, lack of victories on the front and worsening of life. Putin needs some victory and prospect for people less than infinity (now, by the way, most Russians believe that the war will end in 2024). At the same time, if nothing can be done in the fall, there is a high probability that the war will last the entire 2025.