Model War: As Israel showed Ukraine an example of a well -organized combat operation

If you try to evaluate them in general, you should talk about the kind of "lessons" for our country. They can be divided into two large groups: this group of "lessons" applies to several parameters (factors): it is obvious that the strategies of long -term "exhaustion war", which is now being implemented by the Kremlin against our country, was not and is not desirable for him.

Rather, the language should be made about the forced choice (or, more precisely, change) of such a strategy, because of the Kremlin's inability to implement a more effective and faster version. For example, in the form of "rapid hybrid capture", or short-term air-name "blitzkrig". After the failure of such an attempt in practice, realizing that "longest and effective" does not work, the Kremlin went to a significant change in its strategy of war, changing it in the form of "war on exhaustion".

The military-political leadership of the Russian Federation, planning the war against Ukraine, clearly wanted to achieve its military-political goals in this war without all this protracted "hemorrhoids", which today already sensitively complies its financial, economic and socio-political state. As it turns out, the "war on exhaustion" for the Russian Federation - such has its own borders.

For its part, the Ukrainian military-political leadership, in general, before the beginning of a direct large-scale military invasion of the aggressor had no strategy for such a case. Moreover, in the process of warfare, some "layered" from extreme to extreme, which, by the way, resulted in the failure of the notorious "counter-offensive" of 2023 and a number of defeats (albeit operative-tactical level) during 2024, during the so-called strategic operation.

It is clear that the main cause of errors in strategic planning and in general in the choice of a strategy, both from the Russian Federation and in our part, was an incorrect assessment of both own and enemy, capabilities. And it was based, in particular, on a mistaken assessment of the role and place of certain means of war. In particular . . .

From the theory and practice of modern wars, it is well known that any modern "Blitzkrig" as a prerequisite for the general strategic victory begins with the conquest of domination in the airspace of the enemy. "Infamily" the Russians in this area had many reasons to hope for their success: it concerned both combat and auxiliary (providing) aircraft and a missile long -range high -precision weapons.

However, after the first two weeks of the Russian invasion, it became clear that the "tolerance" of the air defense system of Ukraine in a sufficient extent, which would become possible to "" plowing "our state from the war and the complete neutralization of its combat aviation was not possible. The enemy began to suffer sensitive losses in his own combat aircraft, and the percentage of intercepting air defense system of Ukraine of other air attacks gradually began to increase.

Therefore, the enemy failed to completely suppress the state management system (meaning, Ukraine). Just as to apply a tangible lesion to the main grouping of the Defense Forces of Ukraine. Moreover, over time, the Ukrainian Air Force began to cause a sufficiently effective damage to the enemy's groups that invaded the territory of Ukraine. That is, the decisive and main condition for the success of the "blitzkrig" at the strategic level, the enemy could not be created.

It became clear that it would be predominantly "legs" and "wheels". And here, Ukraine is more likely to have a successful defense. The main reason is the underestimation of the opponent of the level of combat capacity and combat readiness of the air defense system of Ukraine and its combat aviation.

Obviously, with a specific planning of the outfit of forces and means for the first "disarming" and further blows, in particular, to support the actions of their terrestrial groups of troops, the enemy's command proceeded from some sufficiently strange estimates of these parameters. Moreover, it has sufficiently low estimated the general ability of the Ukrainian air defense system to counteract such blows, to respond flexibly to increasing their volume and intensity.

Simply put, the enemy did not count on a high level of adaptability of our air forces under his massive blows. He clearly hoped that after his first massive blows, "everything would fall apart. " Did not collapse. Moreover, it is obvious that in the list of initial strikes of the enemy the domestic air defense system for some reason did not occupy a priority. It was affected at the level with the defeat of goals and objects of another character, sometimes surprisingly surprisingly.

As a result, the air defense system of Ukraine has received such a "precious" elementary time to respond properly to the enemy's attempts to win the dominance in Ukraine's airspace to the entire strategic depth. Yes, the enemy has received a short time in the airspace in separate directions. But, the further, the more this domination was reduced, as the air defense system of Ukraine after the first massive blows of the enemy "came" and increased its combat capabilities.

Moreover, the Russians also planned the ground part of their "blitzkrig". I suspect, the task of a defined grouping of troops at the operational level was formulated like - by that time to go out on the border, to occupy the area, to take control, etc. At the same time, the expected resistance from the Armed Forces and other Ukrainian formations was also expected at the minimum level, or was not expected at all.

In this sense, it is worth mentioning one of the "Poule's appeals to the Ukrainian military" during the first weeks of the invasion, in which they were offered to the "gang of drug addicts and Nazis" and "to take power in their own hands" at the "Serjozny Shchis". The Kremlin (and accordingly, its generars) was clearly in captivity of some of its misconceptions about the level of combat capability and combat readiness of the Armed Forces, their moral and psychological state.

In practice, as soon as they went into operational distances, they began to cause lesions from the flanks, from the rear and in general, within the so -called "decentralized defense". All these bulky armor columns, with long columns of security, looked terrible and "crush", but in practice were ineffective against the fleeting high -mobility of the Armed Forces.

Yes, they were able to occupy and keep some area, a line, but after their rear and columns began to be sensitive, and in their rear and flanks, moving parts and units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine appeared, their position became worse. And now compare all this with the planning and implementation of Israel's military command of its appropriate strategy. I have already wrote about it that it refused to "put a cart ahead of the horse.

" At first it was the Iran's air defense system, and only then (in the following "waves") - other priority goals for damage. Moreover, evaluate - as and under what conditions these lesions "connected" the United States. In today's war, the whole complex of air aids, especially with air defense, should be attributed to strategic weapons.

Accordingly, the whole process of formation, equipment and in general preparation for combat application of the relevant element of the national defense system should become a compulsory part of the strategy (defense policy of the state), both in peacetime and especially during the preparation and warfare. Israel's war with Iran in this sense is quite indicative.

Would Israel solve a strategic problem with, to put it mildly, "complications" of Iran's nuclear and missile programs, without turning in advance their own Air Force, air defense systems, and high -efficiency strategic defense contours of the whole country? Obviously, it is unlikely. And the reverse example.

The military-political leadership of Ukraine is "taken" to solve the operational-strategic task in the war (yes, I mean the same notorious "counter-offensive to the Azov coast" in 2023), not even that the benefits in the air space in the chosen strategic direction, but simply strikes of enemy attacks. Moreover, even before that it will "be" about this offensive, with any "convenient" occasion. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.