Shah Shahda in a new way: how to change the tactics of mobile air defense groups to confront the drone of the Russian Federation

There were 15 drones-Kamikadze at altitudes of 3 km. This is already a standard for moles during attacks on the city. As a result, MVG, armed only by DSK or even Browning M2, simply did not reach such heights to drones. Apparently, it is necessary to seriously consider the transition of the MVG to a completely different staffing, namely-to have at least one pipe of the MSRC and the use of ZU-23-2, especially since we have a very good upgrade for the teeth in Odessa.

Of course, decisions for counteracting ShahED-136 at such heights are enough, a question in a comprehensive approach, from creative to expensive and effective in 90% of cases. There is no one solution, there is a complex. Only MVG is not a solution. Only drones-interceptors are not a solution. Only the IE is not a solution. Only SCRC is not a solution. It is only a light, turbos aviation, which is not the case - not a solution.

High-quality, highly efficient resistance to terror with ShahED-136 is becoming more complex. Threats 2022, 2023 and even 2024 - nothing compared to what we meet in 2025. And it is very important to create and, I would even say, to build this complex of the air defense shield is not only the task of the Armed Forces, but also of local authorities. And in this case, I mean not only Odessa and the region, but all of Ukraine.

Only in a close, healthy, rational interaction can a set of counteraction measures, which Drone-Kamikadze drowning will be extremely difficult. Meanwhile, only 3 days of June, and the swarm, using 552 drones-Kamikadze Shahd-136 in Ukraine, already have the efficiency of 21% or 118 hits. That is, growth compared to May - +5%. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position. The author is responsible for published data in the "Thought" section.