Nova Avdiivka is ripe. What do Russia's last movements in Bakhmut direction mean

That is, he tries to move to the segment of the rail between Bakhmut and Gorlovka, in the general western direction. As we remember, the enemy's offensive in the Bakhmut area began immediately after he was able to stop the promotion of our troops to the south of the city. When our advanced units were taken control of the tick and Andreevka, and also came close to Zelenopillya and Kurdyumovka, and there was a real opportunity to cut out the enemy of the enemy south of the city.

It was at this point that, having regrouping his forces and means in Bakhmut and north and focusing here with the main forces of his 2nd and 3rd Army Corps (AK), as well as at least 2 divisions of airborne troops ( 98th and 106th Airborne \ PDD) and the forces of the 8th All-Military Army (IFVA) were determined, in particular, its 150th Motorized Rifle Division-the enemy himself went on the offensive from the border of Dubovo-Vasylivka-Berkhivka, in the berry area and in the area Chrome, in the general southwestern direction (ie, accentuated in the direction of the Yar).

Moreover, the enemy gradually increased the forces, putting into battle. For example, at first, the 98th PDD operated in a single regiment (331th parachute-depository \ PDP), but then introduced into battle and two others-217 and 299th PDP, gradually moved here from the estuary.

The same happened with the forces of the 2nd and 3rd AK, which were involved in the enemy in the Bakhmut direction-with the 83rd and 88th separate motor-raimers (OMSBR) of the 2nd AK and 3rd AK (first acted Its 72nd OMSBR, and then began the introduction of regiments of the entire 6th MSD). That is, in fact, what was invested in the "scheme", which was obviously developed by the Ukrainian command during the planning and organization of the summer-autumn campaign in 2023.

Namely, taking advantage of the fact that the enemy will be forced to make every effort to keep Bakhmut (and, even from socio-political feasibility), to delay some of the enemy's forces into the Bakhmut direction and, in particular, to carry out a number of active, offensive actions In other areas, for example, in the southern operating area.

However, apparently, the command of the enemy calculated it and did what they expected from him-concentrated here a grouping of his airborne troops (VAT) and a considerable part of the 3rd AK, which, at other "decompositions" could find themselves- Either in the estuary, or somewhere in the south (for example in Berdyansk or Melitopol directions). But, they did the Russians with a well -conscious "till", that is, waiting for the right moment.

Whose? And quite understandable - the depletion of the offensive capabilities of our troops in the Bakhmut area . . . Moreover, now, in fact, the Russians use (more precisely, used) as "auxiliary" this offensive to delay some of our forces from the Donetsk direction.

At this point, the situation in this direction is as follows: but for a general understanding of the situation, it should be remembered that the use of the term "Bakhmut direction" is usually a little wider than the situation near and around this city. This is the situation to the north of the city (in fact, the southern Fas of the Seversky speech) and south of it.

That is, when we say "Bakhmut direction", it must be understood that the language goes for a "slightly larger" LBZ area than, in fact, the fighting around the city. For example, the active (offensive) actions of the 106th ODD, together with the units of the 123rd OMSBR in directions for Razdolivka and recess, north and northeast in Soledar, also refer to this direction and affect the situation around Bakhmut. We summarize . . .